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By Email

June 16, 2021.

To:

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CC:

Stephen Kinnock
MP for Aberavon
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I have attached a Submission against the International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP) request for imposing sanctions on Sri Lanka Army Commander Mr. Shavendra Silva.

In our conclusion, the ITJP submission is a politically motivated, has no legal basis and should be rejected without further consideration.

Sincerely,

Jayaraj Palihawadana, LLB, Solicitor, UK
Convener
London Initiative

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
United Kingdom

Sanctions and Anti Money Laundering Act, 2018

The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020

**Submission against the International Truth and Justice Project
(ITJP) request for imposing sanctions on
Sri Lanka Army commander Mr. Shavendra Silva**

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Table of Contents

About the authours	2
Background	4
Our Submission	4
Analysis and Discussion	8
Section 1(2) of the <i>Act</i>	8
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is terrorist Organization	8
Statute limitation	9
Act in administrative or military capacity – Question of control	10
Purpose of the GHRSR regulations	12
Reasonable Doubt	13
Relevance and admissibility of evidence	14
	15
Conclusion	
Annexes	
Annex A – Letter - Hon. Stephen Kinnock, Member of Parliament for Aberavon	
Annex B – LTTE atrocities and factual analysis of final stage of the conflict	

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office
United Kingdom**

Sanctions and Anti Money Laundering Act, 2018

The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020

**Submission against the International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP) request
for imposing sanctions on Sri Lanka Army commander Mr. Shavendra Silva**

BACKGROUND

01. The International Truth and Justice Project (ITJP) has compiled a 50-page dossier on General Shavendra Silva, the current Commander of the Sri Lankan Army, and submitted it to the Sanctions Unit of the UK government's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office.
02. ITJP argues that Sri Lanka's current Army Commander should be designated under the United Kingdom's Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime.
03. Hon. Stephen Kinnock, Member of Parliament for Aberavon, has also submitted his request to the Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, Foreign and Commonwealth Office in supporting the ITJP request. Please refer to **Annex A**.
04. The purpose of our submission to evaluate the legality of the request submitted by ITJP according to British law.

OUR SUBMISSION

05. ITJP arguments fail in having no legal basis to bring sanctions against Sri Lanka's current Army commander General Shavendra Silva under the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime. Therefore, the ITJP submission should be rejected without any further consideration.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

06. *Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations, 2020* (GHRSR) came into effect under the authority of the *Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2018. (Act)*.
07. ITJP has misinterpreted GHRSR, a clear indication of ITJP's lack of understanding of interpreting the law. GHRSR sanctions primarily originated from the *Act* to prevent money laundering. However, the sanctions regime has expanded per GHRSR 1(5)(f) "impose sanctions within section 8 (other sanctions for purposes of UN obligations)."
08. ITJP has quoted many sections of the United Nations Human Rights Council's investigation on Sri Lanka (OISL) report ¹ as a supporting argument to impose sanctions against Shavendra Silva.
09. OISL report is not qualified for the purpose of GHRSR s 1(5)(f). Therefore, its recommendation can not be used against imposing sanctions.
10. GHRSR shall be read together with provisions of the *Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2018*. The ITJP has made a serious error in interpreting the law assuming that GHRSR stands alone.
11. The allegations against Mr. Shavendra Silva primarily focus on war crime during the last stage of the fight between Terrorist Organization LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka. War crimes are treated at a much higher threshold when compared to money laundering and related activities.
12. Section 1 of the *Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2018*, clarifies the *power to make sanctions regulations*. It states as follows.

Power to make sanctions regulations

- (1) An appropriate Minister may make sanctions regulations where that Minister considers that it is appropriate to make the regulations—
 - (a) for the purposes of compliance with a UN obligation,

¹ <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/55ffb1d04.pdf>

- (b) for the purposes of compliance with any other international obligation, or
- (c) for a purpose within subsection (2).

(2) A purpose is within this subsection if the appropriate Minister making the regulations considers that carrying out that purpose would—

- (a) further the prevention of terrorism, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere,
- (b) be in the interests of national security,
- (c) be in the interests of international peace and security,
- (d) further a foreign policy objective of the government of the United Kingdom,
- (e) promote the resolution of armed conflicts or the protection of civilians in conflict zones,
- (f) provide accountability for or be a deterrent to gross violations of human rights, or otherwise promote—
 - (i) compliance with international human rights law, or
 - (ii) respect for human rights,
- (g) promote compliance with international humanitarian law,
- (h) contribute to multilateral efforts to prevent the spread and use of weapons and materials of mass destruction, or
- (i) promote respect for democracy, the rule of law and good governance.

13. When we explore the purpose of s 1(2), (b) (c), (h) are not directly relevant to a current case. However, UK has an interest in foreign policy objectives on Sri Lanka, human rights. However, we would like to highlight competing interests in s 1(2) (i) of the GHRSR purpose of the promote respect for democracy, the rule of law and good governance and s 1 (2) (a) prevention of terrorism elsewhere, i.e., Sri Lanka.
14. The LTTE is a terrorist organization and occupied by force part of the territory in Sri Lanka. It is a well-known fact that LTTE had utilized civilians as human shields and military activities. Sri Lanka's government has constitutional obligations to protect its citizens. Therefore, the humanitarian operation has been launched with the support of armed forces to rescue civilians from LTTE clutches to establish and promote respect for democracy, the rule of law and good governance, and the prevention of terrorism in Sri Lanka.

15. Mr. Shavendra Silva was primarily involved with rescue civilians from LTTE clutches and liberated part of the territory by forcibly occupied by LTTE. Please refer to **Annex B**, humanitarian operation by Sri Lanka armed forces.
16. GHRSR sanctions s 1(2) (i) promote respect for democracy, the rule of law and good governance and s 1(2) (a) are aligned with Mr. Shavendra Silva's involvement.
17. Therefore, no legitimate reason to use GHRSR sanctions against Mr. Shavendra Silva.
18. Further, *Act* s 1 (8) defines "UN obligation," "UN Security Council Resolution," and "International obligation."

s 1 (8) In this *Act*

"UN obligation" means an obligation that the United Kingdom has by virtue of a UN Security Council Resolution;

"UN Security Council Resolution" means a resolution adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations;

"international obligation" means an obligation of the United Kingdom created or arising by or under any international agreement.

19. With reference to the Act, GHRSR shall comply with s 1. The s. 1 of the Act states sanctions can be imposed (a) for the purposes of compliance with a UN obligation, (b) for the purposes of compliance with any other international obligation. UN obligation is defined as an obligation that the United Kingdom has by virtue of a UN Security Council Resolution. "UN Security Council Resolution" means a resolution adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations. Also, international obligation" means an obligation of the United Kingdom created or arising by or under any international agreement.
20. In order to enforce GHRSR s 1 (8) against Mr. Shavendra Silva UN Security Council must have adopted a resolution. In other words, to enforce sanctions against Mr. Shavendra Silva, United Kingdom shall meet the definition of international obligation.
21. UN security council has not taken any resolution against Mr. Shavendra Silva. Also, the United Kingdom has no international agreement to impose sanctions against Mr.

Shavendra Silva. Therefore, no legal basis for enforcing any sanctions against Mr. Shavendra Silva under the authority of GHR SR s 1 (8) exists.

22. OISL report of UN Human Rights Council does not comply with s 1 (8) of the *Act*. Therefore, the OISL report cannot be used to impose sanctions against Mr. Shavendra Silva.
23. Thus, the ITJP arguments fail completely.
24. Further, the ITJP dossier does not contain any supporting arguments to activate sanctions against Mr. Shavendra Silva under the authority of the *Act regulating* GHR SR and hence should be rejected.

Section.1 (2) of the *Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2018*

25. Now we will turn in to s 1 (2) of the Act. It states

- (2) A purpose is within this subsection if the appropriate Minister making the regulations considers that carrying out that purpose would—
 - (a) further the prevention of terrorism, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere,

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) is a Terrorist Organization

26. Under the authority of the *Terrorism Act, 2000*, the Home Secretary has proscribed the LTTE as concerned with terrorism. This is because the LTTE committed and participated in acts of terrorism, prepared for terrorism, promoted or encouraged terrorism, including wherein the unlawful glorification of Terrorism was included.
27. The ITJP has failed to define and delineate the conflict between the democratically elected Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE.
28. The GOSL has fulfilled its constitutional obligation to protect its citizens from acts of terror and defended territorial integrity. A humanitarian operation was deployed with armed forces to defend and liberate all Sri Lankans, keeping with the constitutional guarantees imposed on the GOSL.

29. The armed conflict between the terrorist organization, viz., the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and Sri Lanka's Government is accurately classified as a non-international armed conflict. Therefore, any analysis of legal issues appurtenant to that conflict should be analyzed accordingly.
30. The LTTE's utilization of civilians as a human shield needs to be addressed when assessing civilian casualties. Sri Lanka's armed forces acted in broad terms proportionately, and collateral damage must be examined under International Humanitarian Law.
31. Sri Lanka's current Army commander Shavendra Silva had engaged in combatting LTTE terrorism. Contrary to ITJP claims, s 1 (2) (a) of the *Act* and its regulations, GHRSR does not impose sanctions against anyone involved with combatting terrorism.
32. Therefore, the ITJP arguments are invalid and cannot succeed.

Statute limitation

33. Now we will turn our focus on GHRSR and the Time Limit for proceedings for summary offences. It states,

36 (1) Proceedings for an offence under these Regulations, which is triable only summarily may be brought within the period of 12 months beginning with the date on which evidence sufficient in the opinion of the prosecutor to justify the proceedings comes to the prosecutor's knowledge.

(2) But such proceedings may not be brought by virtue of paragraph (1) more than three (3) years after the commission of the offence.

34. GHRSR offences are triable only summarily. They should be brought within a period of twelve (12) months, beginning with the date on which evidence sufficient in the opinion of the prosecutor to justify the proceedings comes to the prosecutor's knowledge.

35. However, GHRSR 36 (1) also has restrictions. s. 36 (2) states such proceedings may not be brought by virtue of paragraph (1) more than three (3) years after the commission of the offence.
36. ITJP dossier has provided, agreed and accepted that all alleged incidents occurred back in 2009 and attempts to initiate proceedings almost twelve (12) years after the claimed offences were alleged to have been committed. GHRSR s 36 (2) prohibits initiating proceedings more than three (3) years after the commission of the offence.
37. Therefore, statute limitation of the alleged incidents has expired, and the GHRSR can no longer be used to enforce any sanctions against current Sri Lanka commander Shavendra Silva.
38. Again, the ITJP submission fails as it has no legal basis.

Act in Administrative or Military Capacity – Question on Control

39. On page 3 of the ITJP dossier's summary, it is stated that Mr. Shavendra Silva was arguably the most important frontline ground Commander in the 2008-9 war in Sri Lanka. However, ITJP has failed to distinguish the military and administrative roles of Mr. Shavendra Silva.
40. It is essential to mention here that former Army Commander General Sarath Fonseka was in charge of the overall humanitarian operation. However, no single allegation against former Army Commander Fonseka, who was later aligned with Tamil National Alliance (political party), contested at the presidential election in 2010, subsequently lost against President Mahinda Rajapaksha.
41. ITJP is alleged only selected army officers involved with the humanitarian operation.
42. Therefore, it can be concluded that ITJP submission against Shavendra Silva is a politically motivated endeavour.

43. The ITJP dossier's summary (page 3) uses the term "most important." From the context, it was evident that the meaning implies the legal term "control." After carefully reviewing the information in the dossier, it can be concluded that Mr. Shavendra Silva's role refers to administrative rather than military control over the area final battle took place.
44. In order to explore this issue, we need to examine further the language of the appellation "purposes" used in the GHRSR.

It states

4 (1) The purposes of the regulations contained in this instrument are to deter, and provide accountability for, activities falling within paragraph (2).

(2) An activity falls within this paragraph if it is an activity which, if carried out by or on behalf of a State within the territory of that State, would amount to a serious violation by that State of an individual's—

- (a) right to life,
- (b) right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or
- (c) right to be free from slavery, not to be held in servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour, whether or not the activity is carried out by or on behalf of a State.

45. s. 4 (2) GHRSR states, (a) right to life, (b) right not to be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or (c) right to be free from slavery, not to be held in servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour, whether or not the activity is carried out by or on behalf of a State. These activities are directly under military control.
46. However, the lack of clarity of separating military and administrative "control" of the activities Mr. Shavendra Silva allegedly involved in creates reasonable doubt about information in the ITJP dossier.
47. With reference to *Reeves*, war crimes are connected with military control.

48. Mr. Shavendra Silva was a commander of the 58th division, and he had control, but that military control is very different from administrative control.² (also refer para 7)³
49. The so-called evidence presented in the dossier submitted by the ITJP fails to differentiate Mr. Shavendra Silva's role (control), whether administrative or military.
50. Therefore, the ITJP submission itself has created reasonable doubt about Mr. Shavendra Silva's involvement.
51. The crimes were that alleged criminal in nature. In order to qualify for imposing sanctions, alleged crimes must have beyond a reasonable doubt.
52. Therefore, based on the ITJP submission, which depends on GHRSR sanctions cannot be imposed against Mr. Shavendra Silva.

Purpose of the GHRSR regulation

GHRSR regulation states on

4. (1) The purposes of the regulations contained in this instrument are to deter, and provide accountability for, activities falling within paragraph (2).

(2) An activity falls within this paragraph if it is an activity which, if carried out by or on behalf of a State within the territory of that State, would amount to a serious violation by that State of an individual's—

53. The information on the ITJP dossier claim that Mr. Shavendra Silva carried out alleged conduct as military Commander on the 58 division in his official capacity.
54. We will take a similar approach in *Reeves*⁴. In order to prove before the court Mr. Silva carried out alleged conduct on behalf of the state, it has to be proved alleged conduct is part of his official duties. In other words, ITJP shall support their arguments that a person acting in an official capacity must be operating in the performance or purported performance of their official duties.

² *R v Reeves Taylor* [2019] UKSC 51, para 80.

³ *R v Reeves Taylor* [2019] UKSC 51, para 7.

⁴ *R v Reeves Taylor* [2019] UKSC 51, para 24

55. The ITJP dossier does not support any arguments to the effect that Mr. Silva acted in his official capacity to carry out the alleged conduct. Further, ITJP submission has failed to establish the alleged conduct in the official duties of Mr. Silva.
56. Therefore, the ITJP submission fails to establish the nature of the alleged conduct of Mr. Silva, and all its submissions must be rejected.

Reasonable doubt

57. The GHRSR has clarified its position in explanatory notes. The Regulations prescribe powers to provide and share information to enable the effective implementation and enforcement of the sanctions regime. The Regulations make it a criminal offence or circumvent any of the prohibitions in these Regulations and prescribe the mode of trial and penalties that apply to such offences.
58. The GHRSR regulation creates criminal offences, and criminality will be examined under the relevant statutory regime in the UK.
59. Criminality will examine under the statutory regime in the UK, *Criminal Justice Act, 1925, Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland), 1945, Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1995, Organized Crime and Police Act, 2005*.
60. At the criminal proceedings, any alleged conduct shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the ITJP dossier and its submissions create reasonable doubts about alleged incidents Mr. Shavendra Silva involved, e.g., Page 16 section 2.2 states, "eyewitnesses say their shells (Which included Multi Barrelled Rocket Launchers) landed on civilian areas." ⁵

⁵ In ITJP testimony, this man described his own homecoming under attack in September 2008: "In September I was outside my house at Paranthan Junction and security force heavy artillery was landing in our civilian housing area. I could hear the shells (artillery shells and multi barrelled shells) launch from the security force-held areas, travel, and then explode amongst the houses. The shells were hitting civilian housing areas and inflicting deaths and casualties amongst those civilians living there." Foot Note 49 of ITJP dossier.

61. The ITJP eyewitness confirmed shells were landed in civilian areas, but not that Mr. Shavendra Silva ordered shelling civilians or into Civilian areas. We are not going to analyses information submitted on an individual basis. However, all of the information fails to support Mr. Shavendra Silva's involvement in wrongdoing under GHRSR regulation. They are merely speculations rather than reasonable inferences.
62. Therefore, based on information provided in the ITJP dossier, there is no legal basis to consider sanctions against Mr. Shavendra Silva under GHRSR regulation.
63. Therefore, ITJP has miserably failed in establishing its claims against Mr. Shavendra Silva under GHRSR regulation.

Relevance and admissibility of evidence

64. We have identified that the information provided in the ITJP dossier characterized as evidence contains significant deficiencies. Therefore, the information on the ITJP dossier cannot be admitted under the evidentiary rule.
 65. Any party's submission will not be treated as evidence for the independent judicial process until it is tested before the court. The admissible rule applies to all information provided before the court. Therefore, information on the ITJP dossier submitted as evidence shall be rejected.
 66. Further, we will not analyze each item of individual information since each item can be subjected to a similar treatment.
 67. Considering the evidence needed to ensure sanctions, they should be concerned with: relevance, admissibility, and weight.
 68. Evidence of whatever type must be both relevant and admissible. Evidence is relevant if it logically goes to proving or disproving some fact at issue in the prosecution. It is
-

admissible if it relates to the facts in issue or circumstances that make those facts probable or improbable and properly obtained. The prosecution is only required to introduce evidence that proves each element of the offence. For example, it is unnecessary to introduce evidence as to the defendant's state of mind for an absolute offence. This would be irrelevant and inadmissible.⁶ The "weight" of the evidence is the reliance that can properly be placed on it by the court.

69. Based on principles discussed on Para 68, any information submitted assuming a state of mind is inadmissible. The ITJP submission provides information assuming that we are to believe that Mr. Silva had a particular state of mind.
70. Therefore, the ITJP submissions dossier must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

71. Finally, we like to draw attention to Lord Reed's submission in *Reeves* para 98, where Lord Reed has taken a similar approach to our position. Under UK domestic law and under international law (UN Security Council resolutions or UN obligations or any international instruments), the principle of legal certainty must be respected. As the United Kingdom law has long recognized, what it means here is that criminal legislation whose meaning is unclear should be given a restrictive rather than an expansive interpretation. The fact that a broad construction might better serve considerations of policy does not justify a departure from that principle.
72. For the foregoing reasons, we suggest that unverifiable, merely desk-reviewed information given in the ITJP dossier, having no merit, should not be considered for enforcing sanctions against Mr. Shandra Silva.
73. Further, "information" given in the ITJP dossier is merely created for the purpose of political propaganda, has no legal basis and should not be used for a judicial process.


⁶ See *R v Sandhu* [1996] TLR 2 January, CA, where it was held that such inadmissible evidence might have prejudiced the jury against the defendant and therefore the conviction could not stand.

Therefore, the ITJP dossier should be rejected without any further consideration against Mr. Shavendra Silva.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

Submitted at London, the United Kingdom, on June 16, 2021.

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Appendix A

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The Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
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SW1A 2AH

27 May 2021

Dear Lord Ahmad,

Re: General Shavendra Silva

I am writing to urge you to sanction Commander of the Sri Lankan Army General Shavendra Silva under the terms of the British Government's Global Human Rights Sanctions regime (otherwise known as the Magnitsky sanctions regime).

General Silva's direct involvement in gross human rights violations has been extensively documented by a number of organisations, including the International Truth and Justice Project - Sri Lanka (ITJP). You will presumably be aware of the fact that the ITJP submitted a 50 page dossier to the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office on 9 April 2021, in which evidence of the human rights abuses perpetrated by General Silva are meticulously set out.

The evidence which has been compiled by the ITJP and sent to the FCDO focuses on the campaign in the north of Sri Lanka, during the final phase of the war that lasted from early 2008 to the end of the war in May 2009. Based on the evidence collected and reviewed by the ITJP, experts believe that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Sri Lankan Army, including the 58 Division, conducted intentional and indiscriminate attacks against the civilian population in inter alia Kilinochchi, Puthukkudiyiruppu (PTK), Ampalavanpokkanai (Pokkanai), Putumattalan, Valayanmadam and Mullivaikkal that resulted in extensive civilian casualties and thus violations of the right to life.

The abuses that are detailed in the submission can be summarised as follows:

- violations of the right to life through bombardment (including the use of white phosphorus and cluster munitions);
- summary executions of surrendees in May 2009, as well as violations of the right not be subjected to torture, (including allegations of rape and other forms of sexual violence);
- deliberate attacks on civilians including women, children and the elderly, with many of the attacks also directed against specially protected persons under international humanitarian law, such as medical and religious personnel and persons hors de combat.

The ITJP submission presents facts which they state are corroborated by a variety of sources, including the UN Panel of Experts, OISL, reports of non-governmental organisations and most notably, eye-

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witness and insider witness testimony, all of which establish that General Shavendra Silva is an “involved person” in relation to violations of the right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture.

It provides evidence that General Shavendra Silva was the military commander of the 58 Division, and that a chain of command existed between him and his troops during the conduct of the final phase of the war in Sri Lanka. The report details how there are reasonable grounds to believe that General Shavendra Silva knew about or had reason to know about the torture committed by the troops under his effective control, and that he failed to prevent the violations and punish those responsible.

Section 4 of the ITJP submission illustrates that the two legal tests set out in the GHR Sanctions Regulations, namely that there are reasonable grounds to believe that General Shavendra Silva is an “involved person” and that designations against him “would be appropriate with regards to the GHR Sanctions Regime’s purposes”, are met.

The purposes of applying Magnitsky sanctions to perpetrators of serious human rights abuses are to ensure accountability for the perpetrator’s actions, and deterrence. In the case of General Silva, both these principles apply equally given that the UN report published on 27 January 2021 warned that the failure of Sri Lanka to address past violations has significantly heightened the risk of human rights violations being repeated.

The entire dossier on Shavendra Silva published on 29 January 2019 is available here: <https://itjpsl.com/assets/shavendra-silva-final-dossier.pdf>. Does this dossier include the level of evidence required to apply ‘Magnitsky’ sanctions? If not, please could you specify what is missing?

Finally, is the government planning to introduce provisions for Parliamentary scrutiny on decisions made under the UK’s Global Sanctions Regime?

Given the high degree of public interest in this matter I shall be placing this letter in the public domain.

I look forward to receiving your response.

Kind regards,

Stephen Kinnock MP
Shadow Minister for Asia and the Pacific

Annex B

Factual Analysis Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Tamil Terrorist Group's Atrocities and Final stage of the conflict

Report submitted to
United Nations Human Rights Council

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
A. Overview of this Report	1
B. Overview of the Humanitarian Operation	1
 <i>PART ONE</i>	
II. BACKGROUND	4
A. Overview of the LTTE	4
B. LTTE Atrocities against Civilians	6
C. Use of Child Soldiers by the LTTE	10
D. Ethnic Cleansing Carried out by the LTTE	10
E. Attacks on Democracy by the LTTE	11
F. The Global Threat posed by the LTTE	11
G. Proscription of the LTTE	12
III. SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE LTTE	13
A. Potency of the LTTE	13
B. Number of Cadres	14
C. Land Fighting Forces	14
D. The Sea Tiger Wing	17
E. The Air Tiger Wing	20
F. Black Tiger (Suicide) Wing	22
G. Intelligence Wing	22
H. Supply Network	23
I. International Support Mechanisms	25
J. International Criminal Network	27

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

	<i>Page</i>
IV. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT	28
A. Overview	28
B. The Thimpu Talks - July to August 1985	29
C. The Indo-Lanka Accord - July 1987	30
D. Peace Talks - May 1989 to June 1990	32
E. Peace Talks - October 1994 to April 1995	33
F. Norwegian-Facilitated Peace Process - February 2002 to January 2008	35
G. LTTE Behaviour during 2002-2006	37
 <i>PART TWO</i>	
V. RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES	43
VI. THE WANNI OPERATION	52
VII. THE CIVILIAN RESCUE OPERATION	60
VIII. RECEPTION OF CIVILIANS	69
IX. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE	70
X. GENERAL OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND PREPARATIONS TO SAFEGUARD CIVILIAN LIVES	71
A. General Procedures	71
B. Sri Lanka Army	71
C. Sri Lanka Navy	72
D. Sri Lanka Air Force	73
XI. PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN RIGHTS	76
A. Institutional Frameworks	76
B. Training on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law	76
C. Monitoring of Alleged Infringements	77
D. Investigations and Prosecutions	78

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Page

PART THREE

XII. CONSEQUENCES OF THE HUMANITARIAN OPERATION

81

XIII. CONCLUSION

85

ANNEXES

87

INDEX OF TERMS

161

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Overview of this Report

1. This report sets forth the factual background and operational context of the Humanitarian Operation undertaken by the Government of Sri Lanka between July 2006 and May 2009 to free the country from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). An examination of these facts demonstrates why the Government of Sri Lanka engaged in a military strategy against the LTTE, why Security Forces used the level of force they did, and how at each stage in the operation Sri Lanka took extraordinary steps to respect and protect the lives of civilians.
2. Part One of this report provides a detailed background of the LTTE, including its historical record of atrocities, its scale and sophistication, and its repeated rejection of options for a peaceful solution. At the end of Part One, it is clear why the Government of Sri Lanka had no resort but to pursue a military strategy against the LTTE.
3. Part Two explores the rationale for Security Forces using the degree of force and types of tactics they used, and demonstrates how all aspects of the Humanitarian Operation were planned and executed in light of deep concern for the lives of all Sri Lankan citizens. This section details the steps taken to minimise civilian casualties, including an examination of pre-operation training and policies and specific tactics used in the battles in the East and the Wannu.
4. Part Three concludes the report with an overview of the consequences of the war and shows why the Humanitarian Operation was just—both in the way it was conducted and in its result.

B. Overview of the Humanitarian Operation

5. For three decades, the LTTE unleashed a brutal campaign of terror and violence in Sri Lanka that resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of Sri Lankans of all ethnicities. Using a combination of terrorist tactics and conventional forces, the LTTE carried out massacres of innocent civilians, attacked economic targets and vital infrastructure and created a fear psychosis that crippled everyday life for several generations of Sri Lankans. The LTTE also assassinated over one hundred democratically elected

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

political leaders and government officials from all ethnicities in Sri Lanka as well as the head of state of Sri Lanka and a former Prime Minister of India.

6. In addition, the LTTE ceaselessly threatened and subjugated the civilians living in the North and East, particularly in the areas it dominated, recruiting young children as combatants, laying mines in civilian areas, engaging in ethnic cleansing campaigns and denying the people basic human rights and democratic freedoms. People in all parts of Sri Lanka were terrorised by the LTTE and forced to endure a state of unending fear and insecurity.
7. The LTTE has been recognised as one of the most ruthless and sophisticated terrorist organisations in the world. Its use of terrorist, guerrilla and conventional tactics through its semi conventional fighting force, coupled with access to hundreds of millions of dollars from criminal activities, voluntary contributions and the extortion of individuals throughout the world, made the LTTE a formidable foe that repeatedly eluded military defeat.
8. Throughout the protracted armed conflict with the LTTE, the Government of Sri Lanka repeatedly tried to engage the LTTE in peace talks with the goal of reaching a peaceful negotiated settlement. In two instances foreign governments also assisted in this effort: in 1987, the Governments of India and Sri Lanka signed the Indo-Lanka Accord, which led to the presence of an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka for two years, and in 2002, a peace process was facilitated by Norway. During each attempt for a negotiated settlement, the LTTE rebuffed the opportunity for peace and used the cessation of hostilities during talks to regroup, rearm and strengthen its military capabilities.
9. During the ceasefire that accompanied the last peace process, the LTTE closed a vital sluice gate at Mavil Aru in July 2006, posing a dire threat to civilians of all ethnicities in the Trincomalee District. This was immediately followed by a well-planned attack by the LTTE on several fronts to take possession of the strategic Trincomalee Harbour and the surrounding areas. Given the immediate threat to civilian lives, the history of atrocities inflicted on its people, and the LTTE's repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement, Sri Lanka had no resort but to launch a Humanitarian Operation to liberate the people of the East and North from LTTE control and free all Sri Lankans from the LTTE's terror.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

10. As this Humanitarian Operation progressed in Sri Lanka's favour, an increasingly isolated LTTE leadership surrounded itself with a human shield of thousands of civilians in a brutal attempt at self-preservation. The LTTE forcibly detained these civilians and kept them hostage through violent means, and deliberately endangered their lives by blurring the distinction between combatants and civilians, and by using protected civilian sites for military activity.
11. Acutely aware of the atrocities committed by the LTTE, its scale and sophistication, and the clear and present danger to thousands of civilians trapped by the LTTE, the Government of Sri Lanka had a responsibility and a duty to defeat the LTTE and liberate the civilians trapped in its clutches. Security Forces acted with the force necessary to accomplish this task and proportionate to the threat they faced.
12. The Government of Sri Lanka made every effort to protect civilians in the conflict zone through the creation of Safe Corridors and No Fire Zones, and by adhering to a "Zero Civilian casualty" policy that had been conveyed to all troops through repeated training and operational orders. Sri Lanka also took a proactive and extensive role in delivering humanitarian assistance to these civilians before, during and after the fighting. Despite the clear intent of the Government of Sri Lanka and the numerous precautions taken, it was impossible in a battle of this magnitude, against a ruthless opponent actively endangering civilians, for civilian casualties to be avoided.
13. On 18 May 2009, Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE, bringing to an end three decades of conflict and suffering. The Government of Sri Lanka provided immediate humanitarian assistance to the civilians who had been trapped by the LTTE and acted expeditiously to resettle internally displaced persons in their original villages.
14. Today, Sri Lankans of all ethnicities, living in all parts of Sri Lanka, are free from LTTE terror and no longer live in a state of fear. Democracy is restored in the North and the East, the electoral process has been resuscitated after decades, internally displaced persons have been resettled in their homes, infrastructure is being restored, the economy has been revived, former armed groups have been disarmed and have joined the political process, child soldiers conscripted by the LTTE are back with their families, and other cadres who surrendered are being reintegrated into civilian life after rehabilitation. Sri Lankans have begun the process of rebuilding their lives and their country.

PART ONE

II. BACKGROUND

A. Overview of the LTTE

15. The LTTE was one of a number of organised militant groups that increasingly sought to take the Tamil community out of the democratic process in the 1970s. To achieve their ends, these groups engaged in armed violence. During the 1980s, all of them with the exception of the LTTE engaged in dialogue with the Government of Sri Lanka and renounced violence.

16. Sri Lanka has a long history of persuading militant groups to enter the political mainstream. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a radicalised Sinhalese movement which attempted to overthrow the Government through armed violence in the early 1970s and the late 1980s entered the political mainstream in 1994 following negotiations with the Government of Sri Lanka, and has adhered to democratic means ever since. Similarly, most of the armed groups emerging from the Tamil community agreed to give up armed struggle and worked with the Government of Sri Lanka to resolve their issues.

17. In contrast, the LTTE rebuffed peaceful methods, growing increasingly intransigent. It systematically suppressed and eliminated competing Tamil armed groups and political parties in the North and East, arbitrarily claiming to be the exclusive representative of the Tamils, and assassinated dissenting Tamil individuals such as political figures, government officials, academics and intellectuals elsewhere in Sri Lanka. Some of these figures include:

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Date	Target	Position
27-Jul-75	Mr. Alfred Duraiappa	MP & Mayor of Jaffna
2-Oct-80	Mr. Subramaniam	UNP Organiser for Kilinochichi
16-Mar-81	Mr. C. Thanabalasingham	Leader, TNT (armed group)
1-Jan-82	Mr. K. Sundaram	Military Leader, PLOTE (armed group)
19-Jan-83	Mr. K. T. Pullendran	Ex-MP & UNP Organiser for Vavuniya
12-Aug-83	Mr. A. G. Rajasooriyar	UNP Chief Organiser for Jaffna
14-Aug-83	Mr. Kulasekaran	Leader, TELA (armed group)
1-Sep-85	Mr. K. Thuraiathnam	MP, TULF
6-May-86	Mr. S. S. Sabaratnam	Leader, TELO (armed group)
13-Jul-87	Mr. A. Amrthalingam	Past Opposition Leader, MP & SG TULF
13-Jul-87	Mr. V. Yogeshwaran	MP, TULF
7-May-90	Mr. S. Thambimuttu	MP, EPRLF
19-Jun-90	Mr. K. Pathmanabha	Leader, EPRLF
29-Jul-99	Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam	MP, TULF
14-Aug-05	Mr. Lakshman Kadirgamar	Foreign Minister

(Refer to Annex A for details)

18. From its inception, the strategic vision and end objective of the LTTE was to set up a separate state — “Tamil Eelam” — exclusively for Tamils in the North and East of Sri Lanka. This separate state was to comprise 28.7% of Sri Lanka’s landmass and 60% of its coastline.
19. Towards the achievement of its objectives, the LTTE engaged in an armed struggle of remarkable violence through a sustained campaign of guerrilla tactics, semi conventional military action and terrorism. The armed conflict was concentrated mostly in the North and East of Sri Lanka, while the terrorist campaign was carried out throughout the entire country with far reaching consequences for political, economic and social stability.
20. The LTTE’s operational concept on land was twofold. First, it aimed to infiltrate civilian areas and conduct atrocities including mass killings in vulnerable villages to weaken the security and administrative functions of the Government of Sri Lanka and create panic and instability. Second, it aimed to cause maximum damage to Security Forces and military establishments, mustering its full fighting power, using multiple thrusts combined with semi conventional, guerrilla and terrorist tactics.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

21. Apart from its advanced land fighting capability, the LTTE also developed a very sophisticated naval wing known as the Sea Tiger Wing. This allowed the LTTE to counter Security Forces through amphibious operations including direct confrontations and suicide missions, and enabled it to maintain sea lines of communications for the logistics supplies channelled through its international network.
22. Unique amongst terrorist organisations the world over, the LTTE was able to develop an Air Wing. In addition to attacking military and civilian aircraft from the ground, the Air Wing enabled the LTTE to carry out offensive operations throughout Sri Lanka using its aircraft even in the latter stages of the conflict.
23. A crucial component of the LTTE's offensive capability was the formidable Black Tiger Wing. This was a special unit dedicated to conduct suicide attacks against the Security Forces, as well as deep penetration terrorist attacks on civilians throughout Sri Lanka. On at least one occasion, the Black Tigers also carried out a suicide attack in south India.

B. LTTE Atrocities against Civilians

24. The LTTE's terror campaign was a defining feature of the entire conflict. This campaign was aimed at destabilising the Government of Sri Lanka, paralysing the economy, suppressing the LTTE's opponents, disrupting the military and engendering a fear psychosis throughout Sri Lanka. Innocent civilians of all ethnicities were targeted in these terrorist attacks, and many thousands were killed, maimed and wounded.
25. The LTTE carried out attacks on civilian targets throughout Sri Lanka using human bombs, vehicle bombs, time bombs, claymore mines, different Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and armed attacks. The attacks on innocent civilians using these methods killed over 9,800 and grievously injured more than 10,000 in Government controlled areas. The number of civilians killed and injured by the LTTE in areas under its dominance is unknown. Some of the deadliest bomb attacks include the central bus station attack in Colombo in 1987 that killed over 100 people, and the truck bomb attack at the Central Bank in 1996 that killed 86 whilst wounding over 1,300. Several armed attacks were also carried out, including the massacre of 120 devotees at the sacred Buddhist site of the Sri Maha Bodhiya in Anuradhapura in 1985, the massacre of 37 civilians including 33 novice Buddhist monks aboard a bus

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

at Aranthalawa in 1987, and the massacre of 147 Muslim devotees at prayer at the Kathankudy Mosque in Batticaloa in 1995. Other large scale attacks included:

Date	Location	Killed	Injured	Description
17-Apr-87	Habarana	96	44	Attack on passenger bus
6-Oct-87	Valachchenai	40	-	Setting fire to a mail train
13-Apr-89	Trincomalee	51	43	Car bomb
24-Jul-96	Dehiwala	57	356	Bomb on a train
5-Mar-98	Maradana	36	270	Attack on a passenger bus
29-Sep-98	Jaffna	54	-	Attack on a civilian aircraft
20-Nov-99	Madhu Church	38	66	Small arms & mortar fire
15-Jun-06	Kebetigollawa	48	86	Claymore mine targeting a bus

(Refer to Annex B for details)

26. The LTTE also attacked civilians in vulnerable villages, using automatic weapons, small arms, swords, machetes, clubs and other handheld weapons. These attacks were mostly carried out under cover of night and indiscriminately targeted innocent men, women and children. In sum, LTTE attacks on vulnerable villages are estimated to have killed over 1,950 civilians and injured over 400. The worst of these attacks took place at a Muslim village in Eravur, Batticaloa in August 1990, killing 173 civilians. Other attacks included:

Date	Village	Location	Killed	Injured
29-Nov-84	Dollar Farm	Welioya	33	0
10-Oct-88	Mahakongaskada	Medawachichiya	44	4
11-Feb-89	Dutuwewa & Sinhapura	Welioya	37	5
29-Apr-92	Karapola, Muthugala, A'thana	Polonnaruwa	130	71
15-Oct-92	Palliyagodella & Ahamedpura	Polonnaruwa	146	83
25-May-95	Kallarawa	Polonnaruwa	42	15
2-Jul-97	Erakkandy	Trincomalee	34	0
18-Sep-99	Galapitagala, Badirekka, Borapola	Ampara	50	5

(Refer to Annex C for details)

27. LTTE attacks on economic targets and key civilian infrastructure facilities were aimed at crippling economic activity within Sri Lanka. Its attack on the country's

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Central Bank in Colombo in 1996 imperilled the entire financial system. Its attack on the country's International Airport in July 2001, in which several passenger jets including an Airbus A-340 and an Airbus A-330 were completely destroyed and many others seriously damaged, had a devastating impact on the tourism industry for many years. The LTTE also targeted the critical Kolonnawa Oil Refinery on several occasions, the last of which was an air raid it carried out in 2007. The LTTE targeted essential transport infrastructure facilities such as the Central Bus and Train Stations in Colombo, and carried out attacks on numerous buses, trains and civilian aircraft. Some of the LTTE's attacks included:

Date	Location	Killed	Injured	Description
3-May-86	The International Airport	16	0	Bomb on civilian aircraft
7-May-86	Central Telecommunication Complex	15	4	Bomb explosion
21-Apr-87	Central Bus Station, Colombo	106	295	Car bomb at bus station
6-Oct-87	Valachchenai, Batticaloa	40	0	LTTE attack
20-Oct-95	Kolonnawa Oil Refinery	17	35	Armed raid
31-Jan-96	Central Bank, Colombo	86	1,338	Truck bomb
24-Jul-96	Dehiwala, Colombo	57	356	Bomb on board a train
15-Oct-97	World Trade Centre	12	113	Vehicle bomb
24-Jul-01	The International Airport	6	16	Attack on the airport
26-May-08	Office Train, Dehiwala	9	80	Time bomb

(Refer to Annex D for details)

28. The LTTE also engaged in a brutal campaign of assassinations. The victims of this campaign include two national leaders. A female suicide bomber killed former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. Serving Sri Lankan President Ranasingha Premadasa was also killed in a suicide bombing in 1993. In 1999, Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga narrowly escaped a similar fate. The LTTE also assassinated Sri Lanka's Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratna in 1991 and, during the last ceasefire period, killed Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar. Apart from the foregoing, other notable victims of the LTTE's assassination campaign included:

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Date	Target	Position
27-Jul-75	Mr. Alfred Duraiappa	MP & Mayor of Jaffna
13-Jul-87	Mr. A. Amirthalingam	Past Opposition Leader, MP & Sec/Gen TULF
13-Jul-87	Mr. V. Yogeshwaran	MP, TULF
23-Apr-93	Mr Lalith Athulathmudli	Former Minister of National Security
24-Oct-94	Mr. Gamini Dissanayake	Opposition Presidential Candidate
	Mr. G. M. Premachandra	MP, Leader of the DUNF
	Mr. W. Mallimarachchi	MP, Former Minister of Food & Cooperatives
	Mr. O. Abeygunasekera	MP, Leader of the SLMP
29-Jul-99	Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam	MP, TULF
7-Jun-00	Mr. C. V. Gooneratne	Minister of Industrial Development
8-Jan-08	Mr. D. M. Dasanayake	Minister of Nation Building
6-Apr-08	Mr. Jayaraj Fernandopulle	Minister of Highways & Road Development

(Refer to Annex E for details)

29. In addition to its assassination of political figures throughout Sri Lanka, the LTTE killed government officials, public servants, members of the judiciary and other individuals in its efforts to undermine law and order in Sri Lanka. This included 364 policemen in the East of Sri Lanka, who were killed after surrendering on orders and being guaranteed safety by the LTTE during peace talks with the Government of Sri Lanka in June 1990.
30. The terrorist campaign carried out by the LTTE throughout Sri Lanka had far reaching consequences. The atmosphere of fear and instability fostered by its numerous attacks had a devastating impact on the country's economy. The LTTE's indiscriminate attacks on civilians, including the butchering of children, and its targeting of places of religious worship, made it clear that no one and nothing was safe from its violence. This placed tremendous strain on ordinary life in Sri Lanka, causing incalculable psychosocial harm to several generations of Sri Lankans of all ethnicities and disrupting civilian life.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

C. Use of Child Soldiers by the LTTE

31. The LTTE made ruthless use of children. It forcibly recruited even children as young as 10 years in the areas it dominated. Families were coerced to provide at least one child for its cause during the initial stages of the conflict. The LTTE ideology was promoted at ceremonies forcibly held in schools, and children were abducted even whilst in school. Conscripted children were subject to indoctrination as well as brutal training. Some were even brainwashed into becoming suicide cadres.
32. Even after the signing of the ceasefire agreement of 2002, recruitment of children by the LTTE continued unabated. Although the LTTE agreed to release child soldiers in its custody and to refrain from such recruitment in the future, it failed to honour either of these undertakings. In 2006, UNICEF estimated that over 5,700 of the LTTE's cadres were children.

D. Ethnic Cleansing carried out by the LTTE

33. To further its ambition of creating a mono-ethnic separate state for the Tamils, the LTTE systematically attacked Sinhalese and Muslim civilians and attempted to drive them out of the areas it dominated.
34. Starting in the early 1980s, the LTTE drove out the Sinhala residents from the Jaffna peninsula. Attacks carried out on Sinhala civilians in the North and East during the 1980s accounted for close to 500 deaths, while over 150 more Sinhala civilians were killed in vulnerable villages near LTTE dominated areas during the same period. The brutal impact of the LTTE's ethnic cleansing programme can be gauged from the fact that, of the 19,334 Sinhala civilians recorded in the census of 1981 as residents of the Northern Province, virtually none remained a few years later.
35. The LTTE was also determined to drive out the Muslims from the North. The most blatant example of this was in October 1990, when it expelled 75,000 Muslim residents of the Jaffna peninsula, ordering them to leave their homes within 48 hours. The LTTE carried out several brutal attacks on Muslim villages in the North and East, massacring almost 600 civilians.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

E. Attacks on Democracy by the LTTE

36. The LTTE's campaign of terrorism struck at the very roots of democracy. In addition to assassinating its opponents in the areas it claimed to dominate, including three sitting Mayors of Jaffna, the LTTE's victims throughout Sri Lanka included President Ranasinghe Premadasa, former Opposition Leader A. Amirthalingam, and Opposition Presidential Candidate Gamini Dissanayake. An attempt was also made on the life of President Chandrika Kumaratunga in 1999. The political figures killed in Sri Lanka included the following:

Political Figures	Assassinated
President of Sri Lanka	1
Opposition Presidential Candidate	1
Leaders of Political Parties	10
Cabinet Ministers	7
Members of Parliament	37
Members of Provincial Councils	6
Members of Pradeshiya Sabha	22
Political Party Organisers	17
Mayors	4

37. The LTTE denied democratic rights to the people in areas it dominated. Free elections could not be held in any area with a strong LTTE presence as it used violence to prevent people from exercising their franchise. In 2005, it was reported that the one person in the Kilinochchi District who disobeyed the LTTE and cast his vote in the Presidential election was dismembered and killed by the LTTE as a lesson to others. The LTTE did not allow dissent or plurality in any form, and regularly used violence to silence those who expressed contrary views.

F. The Global threat posed by the LTTE

38. From the 1980s onward, the LTTE developed a global network with cells in over 50 countries. In addition to furthering the LTTE's objectives through the ruthless conduct of a propaganda war, this network engaged in a number of illegal activities. These activities include human trafficking, narcotics smuggling, arms smuggling, money laundering and extortion. The primary purpose of these activities was to

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

raise funds to enable the LTTE to procure arms. Even after the demise of the LTTE's military organisation in Sri Lanka, the LTTE's global network remains strong and continues to pose a significant threat to law and order around the world.


G. Proscription of the LTTE

39. The unambiguously terrorist nature of the LTTE led to its being designated and proscribed as a terrorist organisation in 32 countries, including India (since 1994), the United States (since 1997) the United Kingdom (since 2001) and the European Union (since 2006).
40. The LTTE's primary front organisation, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), was designated as a terrorist organisation and banned in the United States in 2007, and has been delisted as a charity in the United Kingdom since 2005. The TRO was the primary entity through which the LTTE collected funds used for arms procurement, in the guise of collecting money for charitable projects in Sri Lanka.
41. The Government of Sri Lanka initially proscribed the LTTE in 1978, but lifted the proscription in 1987 as part of the Indo-Lanka Accord. The proscription was again imposed on the LTTE in 1998 after the bombing of the Sri Dalada Maligawa, one of the foremost Buddhist shrines in the world. The ban was suspended in 2002 following the ceasefire agreement that accompanied the peace process. Sri Lanka re-imposed the proscription on the LTTE in January 2009, when it was clear that the LTTE leadership had no interest in a peaceful solution.

III. SIZE AND SCOPE OF THE LTTE

A. Potency of the LTTE

42. The LTTE’s military capabilities defined the challenges the Government of Sri Lanka faced in its efforts to prevent the LTTE’s attacks against its citizens and the state. An examination of the LTTE’s scale and its military capabilities demonstrates the necessity for the types of force that had to be used by Security Forces to defeat them.



Outline of the LTTE Organisation

43. The determination of the LTTE for a prolonged war against Security Forces can be gauged from the capabilities it developed over the years, particularly during the period of the last ceasefire. The LTTE constructed technologically sophisticated underground bunkers for its leaders, established factories to manufacture ammunition and mines, built a food canning factory, set up boatyards to develop suicide boats and submersible vessels, and maintained hangars as well as service centres for its aircraft. Foreign expertise was obtained on several occasions for this capacity development, and LTTE cadres were also sent abroad for extensive training in certain fields.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

B. Number of Cadres

44. At the beginning of the Humanitarian Operation in July 2006, the LTTE maintained approximately 25,000 cadres including regular cadres and auxiliary forces that had been given combat training and were employed for both offensive and defensive operations. As the Humanitarian Operation progressed, the LTTE escalated its recruitment process, forcibly conscripting and training many more civilians, including child soldiers, to fight in the battlefield. At the start of 2008, it was estimated that the LTTE maintained approximately 30,000 cadres in its ranks.
45. The regular cadres of the LTTE were supported by an auxiliary force that had been given basic military training. This auxiliary force comprised two distinct organisations:
 - a. *Eelapadai* - This was an auxiliary force comprising approximately 5,000 volunteers initially employed as home guards and subsequently used for both offensive and defensive operations. They were on the payroll of the LTTE.
 - b. *Gramapadai* - This was an auxiliary force also comprising approximately 5,000 individuals, who helped resist Security Forces ingress into LTTE dominated areas in the North. They were also used to assist the LTTE in meeting its logistics requirements as well as for carrying out defensive operations, and were employed for offensive purposes during the later stages of the Humanitarian Operation.

C. Land Fighting Forces

46. Starting from a small group of armed militants, the LTTE grew into a large experienced, battle-hardened land fighting force over the years. The vast majority of LTTE cadres comprised its land fighting forces.
47. The LTTE's land fighting units had intimate knowledge of the ground terrain, and often fought in civilian clothing. This made it possible for its cadres to blend in with civilians and penetrate areas close to the detachments of the Security Forces. The knowledge of the ground and intelligence gathered about Security Forces deployments proved a formidable threat when coupled with the scale of the land fighting forces and the tactics it employed.
48. By attacking isolated military establishments, mustering its full fighting power and denying Security Forces reinforcement capability through multiple thrusts using

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

guerrilla and semi conventional tactics, the LTTE proved a significant threat to Security Forces. The LTTE attempted to create a fear psychosis amongst Security Forces personnel with its fearsome unceasing waves of combatants prepared to die, and through its ability to inflict maximum casualties with its artillery and mortar.

49. The LTTE's land fighting capabilities were augmented by advanced training programs, sophisticated military hardware and equipment, and the formation of special regiments, including:
 - a. Special Reconnaissance Group - This regiment consisted of many of the most accomplished cadres from all other regiments, who assisted the Intelligence Wing collect information prior to offensive operations.
 - b. Snipers - LTTE deployed snipers to limit the freedom of movement of Security Forces. Snipers were used during large scale offensives carried out by the LTTE, and were also used for assassinations.
 - c. Assault Pioneers and Mine Laying Teams - These teams performed all critical engineering tasks including the laying of mines.
 - d. Tank Regiment and Anti Tank Regiment - The main task of this regiment was to act against the armoured vehicles of the Government of Sri Lanka and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). The LTTE captured armoured vehicles from Security Forces during their many attacks, and improvised ones of their own.

50. The arms, ammunition and equipment used by the land fighting units of the LTTE included artillery guns, heavy and medium mortars, rocket propelled grenades, RCLs, anti-aircraft guns, Surface to Surface Missiles, Surface to Air Missiles, small arms, anti-tank mines and anti-personnel mines. A list of weapons recovered by Security Forces during the Humanitarian Operation is attached as Annex F. Most of the LTTE's heavy and sophisticated weapons were destroyed by the LTTE to avoid capture by Security Forces just prior to the end of the Humanitarian Operation. The table illustrates overleaf the estimated number of certain LTTE weapons:

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Item Description	Estimated Nos.
T - 55 Main Battle Tank	1
130mm Cannon Type 59-1	12
152mm Gun-Howitzer Type 66	9
122mm Gun	2
107mm Rocket Artillery	2
140mm Mortar	4
120mm Mortar	150+
82/81 mm Mortar	500+
RPG 7	350+
IGLA - 1 Missile (SA - 16)	16+
IGLA - 1 Missile Launcher	5+

51. The training given by the LTTE for its land fighting groups could be broadly divided into three categories:
- Basic Training - Civilians and newly recruited youth underwent basic training at LTTE bases, which were established in almost every village under its control.
 - Refresher Training - Serving members in the various fields of operation and specialisation of the LTTE's different regiments were expected to follow refresher courses.
 - Special Operations Training - This training was given to selected groups of cadres and dealt with attacks on specific targets, which also included Black Tiger operations both on land and sea, as well as deep penetration attacks throughout the country.
52. The capabilities of the LTTE's land fighting units can be gauged from the several successes the organisation had against Security Forces in various battles over the years. In all, 19,282 Security Forces personnel were killed and 82,104 were maimed or wounded in battles against the LTTE and 2,609 were missing in action prior to the launch of the Humanitarian Operation in 2006. The losses sustained by the Security Forces during major battles illustrates the formidable nature of the LTTE's land fighting forces. Some of these included:

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Date	Location	Killed	Injured	Missing
5-Jul-87	Nelliady	19	31	
7-Dec-90	Kokavil	48	18	
10-Jul-91	Elephant Pass	156	748	
11-Nov-93	Pooneryn	229	561	92
18-Jul-96	Mullaitivu	1,173		
9-Jan-97	Paranthan	158	392	65
6-Mar-97	Batticaloa	73	98	2
2-Jan-98	Kilinochchi	89	405	26
27-Sep-98	Kilinochchi	857	936	171
2-Nov-99	Oddusudan	117	1,459	94
11-Dec-99	Vettilaikkerni & Thanankilappu	197	1,921	28
23-Apr-00	Elephant Pass	708	2,576	
10-May-00	Ariyalai / Thanankilappu	628	5,129	301

(Refer to Annex G for details)

D. The Sea Tiger Wing

53. The LTTE possessed a highly trained and well-equipped maritime fighting force, known as the Sea Tiger Wing, which was capable of countering the operations of the Security Forces through semi-conventional naval tactics as well as suicide missions. The Sea Tiger Wing was a critical component of the LTTE, as the seas were its main supply route for bringing in weapons and other military equipment. The Sea Tiger Wing posed a grave threat to civilian harbours and vessels, as well as to the naval units of the Security Forces. It also allowed the LTTE to induct its cadres into sensitive areas from the sea, enhancing the LTTE's deep penetration capability.
54. Immediately after its inception in the early 1980s, the Sea Tiger Wing used fishing boats to carry out smuggling and gun running. In the 1990s, the LTTE employed fast boats fitted with Outboard Motors (OBMs) in groups of five to six, which enabled them to engage the Security Forces naval units in "Wolf Pack" attacks. Each vessel was equipped with formidable weaponry and each of its occupants was armed with personal weapons such as machine guns and grenade launchers.
55. When counter action by Security Forces naval units including Fast Attack Craft began to hinder LTTE sea movements, the LTTE developed suicide boats. These were mostly

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

fibreglass dinghies fitted with several OBMs, carrying minimum crew but packing high-powered explosives. The abundance of civilian fishing craft in the seas off the North and East coasts of Sri Lanka was used as a cover by the LTTE to carry out suicide attacks, endangering not only Security Forces personnel but also civilians who used the sea for peaceful purposes.

56. In addition to its attack craft, the LTTE extensively used sub-surface attacks through its suicide divers and semi-submersible craft, which it began developing in the mid 1990s. In the 2000s, the LTTE also began developing mini submarines. The Sea Tigers also made substantial use of sea mines and Improvised Explosive Devices, with which it targeted Security Forces as well as infrastructure.

57. The main equipment used by the Sea Tiger Wing was as follows:

Type of Equipment	Total No.
Cargo Boats	25+
Fast Attack Crafts	20/30
Transport Boats	20+
Suicide Boats	23
Submarines (Locally Manufactured)	6
Water Jets	Unknown Quantity
Underwater Scooters/Diving Scooters	20+
Remote Control Boats	01
Fibre Glass Boats	76
Fibre Glass Dinghies	115
OBMs (300-40HP)	Large Quantity
Different type of Radars (KODEN / FURUNO / JRC / JMA / TOKIMEC / RAY MARINE)	50+
GPS Navigations / Navigation Watches / Compasses	Large Quantity
GPS Tracking Systems	Unknown Quantity
KE - 04 Electronic Remote Control Systems	Unknown Quantity

58. From 1986 to 2009, the Sea Tigers gradually increased in strength and carried out many cluster attacks using attack boats. Suicide boats were their primary and deadliest weapon, and were mainly used against the Sri Lanka Navy. The Sri Lanka

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Navy lost 8 major vessels, 20 fast attack craft and 28 inshore patrol craft due to such cluster attacks and suicide attacks by the Sea Tigers. 52 Officers and 348 sailors were killed during these sea battles. The attacks carried out by the Sea Tigers included:

Date	Vessel: Modus Operandi - Location	Killed	Injured	Missing
4-May-91	Abheetha (Surveillance Command Ship): Suicide attack (SA) - Point Pedro	9	4	-
19-Sep-94	Sagarawardana (OPV): LTTE attack - Mannar	1	7	20
19-Apr-95	Ranasuru (FGB): Suicide diver - Trincomalee	6	10	-
2-Oct-95	Ranaraja (LCM): LTTE attack - Mullaitivu	4	6	-
17-Oct-95	A 512 (Auxillary Ship): Suicide diver - Trincomalee	7	5	-
31-Jul-96	Ranaviru (FGB): Suicide attack - Mullaitivu	8	-	22
23-Feb-98	Valampuri I (Ferry): Suicide attack - Point Pedro	20	-	-
25-Mar-06	P 431 (FAC): Suicide attack - Kudiramalai	-	11	8
9-Nov-06	P 416 (FAC): Suicide attack - Thondiainanaru	10	7	-
22-Mar-08	P 438 (FAC): Suicide attack - Nayuru	3	5	9

(Refer to Annex H for details)

59. The Sea Tigers also engaged in sea piracy on several occasions, attacking merchant vessels off the coasts of Sri Lanka. The vessels attacked are:

Year	Location	Name of the Vessel
9-Oct-94	Off Vettalaikerni	MV Ocean Trader
9-Aug-95	Off Pulmoddai	MV Princess Wave
29-Aug-95	Off Mullaitivu	Irish Moana
29-Aug-96	Off Trincomalee	MV Athena
1-Jul-97	Off Pesalai (Mannar)	MV Misen
7-Jul-97	Off Point Pedro	MV Morong Bong
9-Sep-97	Off Pulmoddai	MV Cordiality
25-Jul-99	Off Trincomalee	MV Newko
26-Jun-2000	Off Point Pedro	MCS Uhana
20-Mar-03	Off Trincomalee	Fuyuan Ya 225 (Chinese Trawler)
23-Dec-06	Off Muallaitivu	MV Farha III
21-Jan-07	Off Point Pedro	MV City Of Liverpool

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

E. The Air Tiger Wing

60. Unparalleled among terrorist organisations the world over, the LTTE had a fledgling air force that was obtaining aircraft and developing infrastructure at a rapid pace. The LTTE aircraft were civilian craft that were obtained through front organisations abroad, smuggled into Sri Lanka through LTTE ships and modified for offensive capabilities. The LTTE maintained several runways in the Iranamadu, Mullaitivu and Kilinochchi areas. The main runways were set up in a conventional configuration and included associated facilities such as hangars, clearways, navigation aids and parking areas.
61. A considerable number of LTTE cadres serving in the Air Tiger Wing underwent training in private flying schools in South East Asian countries and in Europe. A number of training programmes including aircraft maintenance, flying instructions and parachute jumping were also conducted prior to 2005.
62. During the last two decades, the ground operations of the LTTE Air Wing shot down or destroyed 52 airplanes and helicopters including civilian aircraft using Surface to Air Missiles as well as ground attacks.
63. The LTTE carried out air attacks against military bases and Government of Sri Lanka installations outside North and East areas using light aircraft. Most of the targeted installations, which included the International Airport at Katunayake and the Oil Refinery at Kolonnawa, survived these attacks with minimal damage.
64. However, the fact that the LTTE's offensive capabilities had an air dimension was particularly worrying. Its occasional night raids caused panic amongst civilians throughout the country, and led to Colombo being blacked out on several occasions as a precautionary measure. In addition, the main International Airport at Katunayake had to be shut down on occasions when LTTE air raids were carried out, and some international airlines cancelled flights to Colombo as a result of these raids.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

65. The Air Tiger Wing possessed the following aircraft:

Type of Air Craft	Total No.
Micro Light Air Craft	2
Light Air Craft - ZLIN 143	5
Helicopters	2
UAVs / Remote controlled planes	2

66. The attacks carried out by the LTTE's Air Tiger Wing against military and civilian aircraft and targets of the Government of Sri Lanka include the following:

Date	Aircraft	Modus Operandi - Location	Killed
28-Apr-95	Avro	Missile - off Palaly	48
29-Apr-95	Avro	Missile - off Palaly	52
22-Nov-95	AN 32	Missile - off Palaly	63
22-Jan-96	MI 17	Missile - off Palaly	39
29-Sep-98	AN 24	Missile - off Mannar	54
24-Jul-01	3 x MI 17	Attack on Katunayake Base	6
	MI 17		
	MIG 27		
	2 x KFIR		
	3 x K 8		
	A 340	Attack on International Airport	
A 330			
26-Mar-07		Air attack on Katunayake Air Base	3
24-Apr-07	B 212	Air attack on Kolonnawa Oil Refinery	-
		Air attack on Muthurajawela Gas Storage	
22-Oct-07	3 X PT 6	Attack on Anuradhapura Base	20
	K 8		
	MI 24		
	MI 17		
	B 206		
	Beech Craft		
28-Oct-08		Air attack on Kelanitissa Power Station	1

(Refer to Annex I for details)

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

F. Black Tiger (Suicide) Wing

67. The Black Tiger Wing consisted of an elite group of cadres specialised in suicide operations. These cadres underwent specialised training for suicide operations in groups or as individuals. These trainings included reconnaissance training, language instruction, training on handling weapons and explosives, training on driving vehicles, training on piloting boats, training on maintaining supplies, as well as mission oriented training on a replica of the target. In addition, extensive indoctrination ensured that the cadres remained motivated and focused on the task.
68. The Black Tigers were utilised in offensive operations against Security Forces. Cadres from the Black Tiger Wing were also attached to infiltration teams to conduct sabotage operations. The Black Tigers regularly targeted civilians throughout Sri Lanka. According to a public declaration by the LTTE, a total of 274 male suicide bombers and 104 female suicide bombers died in action between July 5, 1987 and November 20, 2008. In addition to cadres who perished while attacking Security Forces, these figures include the cadres who assassinated numerous VIPs and civilians. Each attack was unique and most were meticulously planned; for example, the suicide cadre who assassinated President Ranasinghe Premadasa was effectively embedded in his circle of associates for more than two years. Other victims of the Black Tigers included Opposition Presidential Candidate Gamini Dissanayake and former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

G. Intelligence Wing

69. In carrying out assassinations as well as in facilitating its terrorist campaign throughout Sri Lanka, the LTTE relied heavily on its extensive intelligence network. Cadres from the LTTE's Intelligence Wing infiltrated Colombo and the rest of the country, establishing a substantial network of cells. The intelligence network carried out reconnaissance on targets, facilitated the entry of suicide cadres from the LTTE's Black Tiger Wing to safe houses, and acted as their handlers in guiding them to their targets and in ensuring that these attacks were carried out. The Intelligence Wing also successfully inveigled certain Security Forces personnel and police personnel, as well as several civilians in the rest of the country, to aid and abet its actions.
70. In the North and East, cadres from the LTTE's Intelligence Wing were stationed in proximity to Security Forces establishments and vital infrastructure. They gathered

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

information that was used in attacks carried out by the LTTE's offensive units. Apart from such information gathering exercises, cadres from the Intelligence Wing were actively involved in detaining suspected informants as well as civilians who expressed dissent against the LTTE in areas dominated by them. The Intelligence Wing ran the camps in which such civilians as well as captured Security Forces personnel were incarcerated. These Security Forces personnel and many of the incarcerated civilians were eventually killed.

H. Supply Network

71. In order to build its formidable arsenal, the LTTE developed a sophisticated arms procurement and delivery network that operated around the world through LTTE front organisations, shipping networks and a fleet of floating warehouses stationed in international waters off Sri Lanka.
72. Funds were raised from a range of sources including voluntary and coerced contributions from individuals; income from businesses such as fuel stations, supermarkets and communication centres; income from fraudulent humanitarian relief charities; and criminal activities such as drug running, trafficking in persons and credit card fraud. These funds were laundered through the LTTE's sophisticated international network, and used for the procurement of arms, ammunition and equipment from a variety of sources.
73. Once procured, these items were sent to Sri Lanka through the LTTE's shipping network. Starting with small-scale gun running and human smuggling efforts between Sri Lanka and South India in the 1980s, this network had grown by 2005 to include over 20 large vessels and a considerable number of trawlers registered under different flags. Boatyards were also established in South East Asian countries to facilitate this shipping operation. The crewmembers of these ships were LTTE cadres travelling under various assumed identities using the passports of several nations, and they transported the items procured under the guise of normal cargo.
74. Several large vessels were anchored in international waters off the coast of Sri Lanka to serve as floating warehouses for the LTTE. Smaller boats were dispatched through the Sea Tiger Wing to smuggle the items to Sri Lanka. Large items were disassembled for transport and reassembled at LTTE bases in Sri Lanka. Among the items smuggled

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

in were missiles, artillery guns, anti-aircraft guns, armoured vehicles, light aircraft, machine guns, small arms, ammunition and large quantities of explosives. The LTTE vessels captured or destroyed include:


Date	Name of Ship	Area Detected	Description
12-Dec-90	MV Sunbird	Penang Malaysia	Detained by the Malaysian Authorities
01-Nov-91	MV Ongova	North East Coast of India	Seized by the Indian Navy. The ship was carrying arms and ammunition
28-Nov-92	MV Checesri	Penang Malaysia	Detained by the Malaysian Authorities
16-Jan-93	MV Yahath	Bay of Bengal	The ship carrying arms and ammunition was detected by the Indian Navy and scuttled by the LTTE to avoid capture
14-Feb-96	MV Horizon	Off Mullaittivu / Nayaru	The ship was detected by the SLN whilst unloading arms and ammunition to smaller LTTE vessels. SLN and SLAF destroyed the vessel
02-Nov-97	MV Fratzescom	Off Mullaittivu	SLN and SLAF destroyed the vessel after it was detected unloading arms & ammunition
11-Mar-98	MV Mariamman	Off Andaman Islands	This ship carrying arms and ammunition was destroyed by the Indian Navy
01-May-98	MV Showamaru	Off Mullaittivu	SLN craft on patrol detected a vessel unloading cargo off Mullaittivu. The vessel escaped approaching SLN craft
10-Mar-03	MV Koimar	Off Mullaittivu	This vessel carrying arms was destroyed by the SLN
14-Jun-03	MV Shoshan	Off Mullaittivu	This ship carrying logistics was destroyed by the SLN
17-Jun-06	Name of the ship unknown	Off Kalmunai	This ship carrying logistics was destroyed by the SLN

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

28-Feb-07	MV Koyei	Southern Coast	This ship carrying arms was destroyed by the SLN
18-Mar-07	MV Seyo	Off Arugambay	This ship carrying arms was destroyed by the SLN
10-Sep-07	MV Manyoshi	South of Sri Lanka	This ship carrying arms was destroyed by the SLN
10-Sep-07	MV Seishin	South of Sri Lanka	This ship carrying arms was destroyed by the SLN
11-Sep-07	MV Koshia	South of Sri Lanka	This ship carrying arms was destroyed by the SLN
07-Oct-07	MV Matsushima	South of Sri Lanka	This ship carrying arms was destroyed by the SLN

I. International Support Mechanisms


75. Facilitating the procurement and supplies network of the LTTE was its international network, which has been functioning since the mid-1980s. This network was established to carry out the LTTE’s propaganda campaign, organise its international arms procurement, and assist its various fundraising and criminal activities. The network comprised a number of front organisations as well as propaganda offices that operated in various parts of the world prior to the proscription of the LTTE.



Proscription of the LTTE

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

76. Since the ban imposed on the LTTE by various governments, including those of the United States, the United Kingdom and the European Union, many of the LTTE’s international activities have been conducted through its front organisations. LTTE front organisations have been set up in 54 locations in 32 countries around the world. These front organisations, which work through radicalised elements in the Tamil Diaspora, enabled the LTTE to lobby foreign governments, some international non governmental organisations, media outlets and opinion makers for propaganda purposes, and network with various international actors, including arms dealers.
77. The LTTE maintained a number of television and radio stations, websites, and printing presses in several European capitals which have a significant Tamil Diaspora presence. These were used to propagate the LTTE’s ideology amongst the Tamil Diaspora and assist in raising funds for its military operations. The LTTE also established links with several popular independent media networks and influenced them to publish or broadcast material sympathetic to their cause.
78. In addition, several hundred Tamil schools were set up all over the world under patronage of the LTTE or its front organisations. These were used to indoctrinate second and third generation Tamils whilst also providing a cover for organised fundraising. Children attending such schools were often made to participate in protest and propaganda campaigns of the LTTE.



HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

J. International Criminal Network

79. In order to finance its terrorist activities in Sri Lanka, the LTTE utilised a global criminal network. Since the mid-1980s LTTE cadres have been involved in narcotics smuggling in Europe. The LTTE's one time drug couriers formed trafficking groups located in Europe and Southeast Asian countries. Numerous arrests of LTTE cadres have been made abroad. For example, in 1986, a former head of the LTTE International Secretariat was arrested and convicted in France for smuggling illicit drugs into Paris.
80. The LTTE's involvement in human trafficking also dates back to the 1980s. The earliest known case involving the LTTE was when 155 Tamils were smuggled into Canadian waters from West Germany and set adrift in lifeboats. In subsequent years, the human trafficking operation became centred on some Southeast Asian nations including Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, which became transit points and gateways to western states. The LTTE's involvement in human trafficking has been reported in the Thai port of Songkla, where a small vessel with a Sri Lankan crew was seized, and in the city of Pattaya, where 49 Sri Lankans were arrested in an apartment in 2005. The latest case reported in connection with the LTTE's involvement in human smuggling concerned the two vessels "Sun Sea" and "Ocean Lady", which travelled from South East Asia to Canada in 2010.
81. The LTTE also extorted contributions for its operations from members of the Tamil Diaspora. While some contributions were voluntary, intimidation, threats and violence were used to collect a significant amount of these funds. Those who resisted contributing were told that no guarantee could be given about the safety of their relatives still living in Sri Lanka, nor could their safety be guaranteed if they returned to Sri Lanka.
82. Taking into account voluntary and coerced contributions as well as the income generated from its many illegal activities, it is estimated that the LTTE raised funds on the scale of US\$ 50 - 75 million each year between 1993 and 2002, and over US\$ 200 million on an annual basis from 2002 to 2008. These funds were laundered through the LTTE's sophisticated international financial network using hard to trace, document-less transactions. Some of the funds raised were transferred to Sri Lanka through LTTE front organisations such as the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation and utilised for the LTTE's local expenditure, while the bulk of the funds was used for its international procurement activities.

IV. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS FOR A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT

A. Overview

83. Successive governments of Sri Lanka tried to engage the LTTE in negotiations to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict. In addition to three peace processes consisting of direct talks between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, there were also two peace processes facilitated by third parties – India and Norway. In each case, the LTTE put forward obstinate demands and pre-conditions and demonstrated an unwillingness to discuss political issues that could have brought the two sides closer to a sustainable solution.
84. In none of the peace talks did the LTTE seriously address the issues confronting Tamil people that, in its rhetoric to the outside world, it claimed to care deeply about. Instead, it was the Government of Sri Lanka that put forward proposals and took action to address many of these concerns. In contrast, the LTTE took positions and actions during the peace talks that advanced only its own agenda – its quest for absolute power over all Tamils, status of sole representative for the Tamil people, and domination of the North and East. The history of efforts to talk peace with the LTTE, and the reasons for successive failures, clearly show that for the LTTE, a negotiated solution was not a viable option, and that it was always determined to confront the Government of Sri Lanka through violent means. In the course of every negotiation, the LTTE took the opportunity to destroy other Tamil political and militant organisations.

Phase	Period	Location	Head of Delegation	
			GOSL	LTTE
Peace Talks 1				
	13-Jul-85 12-Aug-85	Bhutan: Thimpu City	Dr. H W Jayawardena	Mr. L Thilakar
Indo Lanka Talks				
	July-87	Sri Lanka: Colombo	<i>The talks were between the Indian and Sri Lankan Governments</i>	
Peace Talks 2				
	3-May-89 6-Mar-90	Sri Lanka: Colombo - Jaffna	Minister A C S Hameed	Mr. A Balasingham

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Peace Talks 3				
1st Round	13-Oct-94	Sri Lanka: Jaffna	Mr. K Balapatabandhi	Mr. Karikalan
2nd Round	2-Jan-95			Rt. Rev. Bishop K Fernando
3rd Round	14-Jan-95			
4th Round	10-Apr-95			
Peace Talks 4				
1st Session	16-Sep-02	Thailand: Sattahip Naval Base, Chonburi	Minister G L Pieris	Mr. A Balasingham
	18-Sep-02			
2nd Session	31-Oct-02	Thailand: Rose Garden Hotel, Nakhorn Pathom		
	3-Nov-02			
3rd Session	2-Dec-02	Norway: Radisson SAS Plaza Hotel, Oslo		
	5-Dec-02			
4th Session	6-Jan-03	Thailand: Rose Garden Hotel, Nakhorn Pathom		
	9-Jan-03			
5th Session	7-Feb-03	Germany: Norwegian Embassy, Berlin		
	8-Feb-03			
6th Session	18-Mar-03	Japan: Hakorn Prince Hotel, <i>Kanagawa</i>		
	21-Mar-03			
Resumption of Peace Talks				
Geneva	22-Feb-06	Switzerland: Geneva	Minister N S de Silva	Mr. A Balasingham
	23-Feb-06			
Oslo	8-Jun-06	Norway: Oslo	Dr. P Kohona	<i>LTTE came to Oslo but did not participate</i>
	9-Jun-06			
Geneva II	28-Oct-06	Switzerland: Geneva	Minister N S de Silva	Mr. S P Tamilselvam
	29-Oct-06			

B. The Thimpu Talks – 8 July 1985 to 17 August 1985

85. The first attempt by the Government of Sri Lanka to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the conflict was initiated by President J.R. Jayawardene and the talks took place in Thimpu, Bhutan. During these talks, the LTTE was one amongst several Tamil groups: the Tamil United Liberation Front [TULF], the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation [TELO], the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam [PLOTE], the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front [EPRLF] and the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students [EROS].
86. The Government of Sri Lanka came prepared for these talks with comprehensive proposals for the devolution of power. In contrast, the LTTE and the other Tamil groups did not agree to enter into discussions about political proposals and instead put forward four demands which they insisted had to be agreed to by the Government

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

of Sri Lanka, in totality, as a pre-condition for the continuance of the talks. The four demands were:

- a. The recognition of the Tamils as a Distinct Nationality;
- b. The recognition of the right of the Tamils to an identified Tamil Homeland;
- c. The recognition of the right of self-determination of the Tamil Nation; and
- d. The recognition of the right to full citizenship of all Tamils living in Sri Lanka

87. The fourth demand was specific to the conditions of Tamils from India living in Sri Lanka, which was in the process of being granted. Since the Tamil groups refused to proceed with the talks without the Government of Sri Lanka's acceptance of the other three demands, the talks collapsed.

88. The LTTE, however, used the ceasefire granted by the Government of Sri Lanka accompanying these talks as a means to strengthen itself militarily. Thus, shortly after the breakdown of the talks, the LTTE was able to take control over the Jaffna Peninsula. During the ceasefire period, the LTTE had purchased a number of M-16s, AK-47s and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) and large quantities of explosives and they used these weapons and explosives extensively against Security Forces and civilian targets.

89. It was during this period that the LTTE established itself through violence as the dominant Tamil militant group. The LTTE decimated the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) and eliminated Sri Sabaratnam, the leader of the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO). Subsequent to the talks, the LTTE used the military advantages it had established to systematically assassinate the leaders of other Tamil groups, and wipe out several of the groups in entirety.

90. Using international contacts established during the Thimpu Talks, the LTTE purchased its first ship named "Cholan" in 1986. This marked the beginning of its international shipping network.

C. The Indo-Lanka Accord - July 1987

91. In 1987, Sri Lanka was in a position of military strength and dominance over the LTTE. However, a successful offensive by Security Forces in the North, Operation

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Liberation, was abated and the Government of Sri Lanka agreed to a cessation of hostilities. Subsequently the Indo-Lanka Accord was signed in Colombo on 29 July 1987, between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President J.R. Jayewardene. This led to the arrival of an Indian peacekeeping force in Sri Lanka. The Government of Sri Lanka took the concrete step of amending the national constitution, adding a thirteenth amendment that provided for a provincial system of governance, the Provincial Council system. Subsequently, by Gazette Notification, the Northern and Eastern provinces were merged.

92. An important feature of this agreement was that the LTTE was required to surrender its arms, together with all other militant groups. Unlike all the others, the LTTE only made a token insignificant handing over of some weapons, and instead used the ceasefire to further consolidate its power in the North and East. On 01 October 1987, just four days after falsely claiming it had surrendered all its arms, the LTTE launched a pogrom against Sinhalese civilians in the East, killing 211 civilians within two weeks and wounding 39. These attacks were as follows:

Date	Location	Killed	Inured	Modus Operandi
6-Oct-87	Batticaloa Town	18	6	Armed attack on civilians
6-Oct-87	Valachchenai	40	0	Setting fire to mail train
6-Oct-87	Talawai, Batticaloa	25	0	Armed attack on village
6-Oct-87	Sagarapura, Trincomalee	27	6	Armed attack on village
7-Oct-87	Lahugala, Pottuvil	30	0	Attack on a bus
10-Oct-87	Gantalawa, Kantalai	9	3	Armed attack on village
15-Oct-87	Ellakantalai, Trincomalee	14	0	Armed attack on village
16-Oct-87	Pulmoddai - Anuradapura	8	0	Attack on a bus
19-Oct-87	Kalkudah	40	24	Landmine explosion

93. Shortly thereafter, 17 LTTE cadres were arrested when they were caught on board two trawlers, on their way to rendezvous with a supply ship. Prior to being brought to Colombo for law enforcement action, 11 of the LTTE cadres committed suicide on 5 October 1987 by ingesting cyanide smuggled in by the LTTE.

94. Within a few days the LTTE reacted by attacking two army camps and murdering eight soldiers in their captivity and killing 23 civilians. A few days later, the LTTE

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

killed five or six Indian soldiers. This open hostility of the LTTE, following its refusal to surrender arms, led to the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) becoming an active participant in the conflict. The IPKF directly fought the LTTE for the following two years, during which the LTTE killed 1,138 Indian soldiers and wounded 2,762 according to IPKF records. The fact that the LTTE embroiled third-party peacekeepers in a full-scale conflict and persisted in committing terrorist acts despite the Government of Sri Lanka's reconciliatory actions demonstrates the LTTE's inherent violent nature and its insincerity in exploring peaceful alternatives.

D. Peace Talks – 3 May 1989 to 10 June 1990

95. After 18 months of war with the IPKF, the LTTE sought the respite of a ceasefire. To buy time and strengthen its forces, the LTTE agreed to a series of peace talks with newly elected President Ranasinghe Premadasa, commencing on 25 April 1989. To show goodwill to the LTTE during these talks, the Government of Sri Lanka compelled the IPKF to enter into a ceasefire with the LTTE and, on 8 June 1989, ordered the IPKF to depart from Sri Lanka. In its attempt to engage with the LTTE and as a gesture of goodwill, the Government of Sri Lanka also agreed to a number of other LTTE demands, including closing down several strategic army camps. The LTTE continued to make further demands for concessions.
96. During the second round of talks that took place on 11 June 1990, while the LTTE delegation was in Colombo under the protection of Sri Lanka's Security Forces and Police, the LTTE surrounded and attacked over a dozen police stations in the East, taking hundreds of police officers as prisoners. Over the course of one day, the LTTE killed 364 of these police officers after they surrendered to the LTTE as instructed by the Government, most of them Sinhalese and Muslims. During the following week, the LTTE continued to attack and capture police stations throughout the East and North. The Government of Sri Lanka was committed to not giving up on the negotiations, and so dispatched a senior Minister to Jaffna for further negotiations with the LTTE. As a result of these negotiations, on 17 June 1990, a ceasefire between the Government of Sri Lanka and LTTE was declared.
97. The LTTE proceeded to break this ceasefire too, attacking numerous Air Force and Army camps as well additional police stations, killing an additional 342 and wounding 412. In this way, the LTTE once again exploited a period of peace talks and ceasefire

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

to advance its interests, recovering from near military defeat to a position of tactical and psychological advantage over Security Forces.

98. During these peace talks, the LTTE also further consolidated its power over other Tamil groups through a campaign of assassination and targeted violence. The chief victims this time were the leaders of the TULF. The former Leader of the Opposition, A. Amirthalingam, was killed along with Mr. V. Yogeshwaran, MP for Jaffna, in July 1989. In addition, one of the leading Tamil politicians in the East, Mr. Sam Thambimuttu, MP of the EPRLF, was also killed by the LTTE in May 1990.
99. With the commencement of war in June 1990, the LTTE recommenced its suicide attacks and expanded its suicide operations from the areas where the conflict prevailed to the areas outside the North and East of the country including to India. The main targets were political and military leaders who had been identified by the LTTE leader as potential threats to the attainment of his ultimate objective.
100. The LTTE also targeted Muslims in its killing spree. In August 1990, the LTTE killed 147 Muslim devotees praying at a mosque in Kathankudy and 173 Muslim villagers in Eravur, Batticaloa. Later that same year, the LTTE expelled all Muslims from Jaffna.
101. This period also marked the beginning of suicide attacks against naval craft operating off the Eastern coast of Sri Lanka. The first sea borne suicide attack was reported on 10 July 1990 at Velvettithurai, Jaffna, where the Black Sea Tigers made an attempt to ram an explosive laden boat on the Sri Lankan Naval vessel "*Edithara*".

E. Peace Talks – 13 October 1994 to 18 April 1995

102. President Chandrika Kumaratunga initiated "unconditional talks" with the LTTE within days of assuming office as Prime Minister on 17 August 1994. Subsequently, a "Declaration of Cessation of Hostilities" was agreed upon, that provided for both the LTTE and Security Forces to maintain their then present positions on the ground. The LTTE, however, steadfastly refused to engage in any discussion on substantive political issues until a series of additional demands, none of which

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

were provided for in the ceasefire agreement, were agreed to by the Government. These demands included that the Government of Sri Lanka remove a strategic Army Camp at Pooneryn, open up a strategic land route to the mainland for LTTE use, allow LTTE cadres to carry arms in the East, exempt LTTE cadres from checkpoints and screening on roadways, and relax restrictions on fishing activities in the East. Although the LTTE alleged these were for humanitarian reasons, it was clear that the granting of each of these demands would grant the LTTE a military advantage that would help advance its separatist agenda.

103. Nevertheless, for the sake of pursuing a peaceful settlement with the LTTE, President Kumaratunga accommodated the LTTE on most of these demands except the closure of the Pooneryn camp, although the LTTE still was not satisfied and insisted that every demand must be met before political discussions could proceed. While the talks were continuing, the LTTE suddenly blasted two naval gunboats in Trincomalee Harbour, killing 12 sailors and wounding 21 others. The LTTE not only failed to provide the 72 hours notice of termination of the ceasefire agreement as required in that agreement, but showed blatant disregard for the peace process by responding to the Government of Sri Lanka's concessions with such violence.
104. The LTTE significantly enhanced its strength during this period of ceasefire. The LTTE formed four new Infantry and Support Arms Regiments namely Anbarasi (anti aircraft), Malathi (female infantry regiment), Kittu (artillery regiment) and Victor (anti tank regiment). The LTTE also purchased large quantities of artillery guns, anti aircraft and anti tank weapons and explosives from Eastern European and Eastern Asian countries.
105. For the first time in the conflict, the LTTE used Surface to Air Missiles against the Sri Lanka Air Force, which it had procured during the ceasefire period. The LTTE shot down two Avro aircraft of the Sri Lanka Air Force on 28 and 29 April 1995, killing 100 unarmed military personnel returning on leave as well as some civilians. Missile attacks in this period also accounted for an AN-32 aircraft in November 1995 and a MI-17 passenger transport helicopter in January 1996, killing a further 102.
106. In 1996, the LTTE launched a massive attack targeting a Security Forces establishment in Mullaitivu killing more than 1,100 soldiers.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

107. With the commencement of Eelam War III, the LTTE expanded its suicide operations targeting religious places and economic establishments. The attack launched on the Sri Dalada Maligawa or Temple of the Tooth — the Buddhist Shrine housing the sacred tooth relic of Lord Buddha — using an explosive laden vehicle was the first suicide attack launched by the LTTE on a religious place. The suicide attack launched on the Oil Refinery Complex at Kolonnawa and Oil Tanks at Orugodawatta in Colombo on 20 October 1995 can be identified as the first suicide attack conducted by the LTTE on economic targets, which adversely affected the economy of the country. This was followed in January 1996 by an attack on the Central Bank.
108. These examples make clear that the LTTE exploited the peace talks and ceasefire period to markedly increase its military strength and acquire sophisticated equipment that was then used against Security Forces and civilians with detrimental consequences.

F. Norwegian-facilitated Peace Process – 21 February 2002 to 16 January 2008

109. The United National Front (UNF) government led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe came into power in December 2001 promising to end military operations against the LTTE and restore peace through negotiations. Shortly after the UNF victory, the LTTE unilaterally offered a ceasefire and unconditional talks on 24 December 2001, which was accepted by the UNF Government. The Government and the LTTE signed a formal Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) on 22 February 2002.
110. The Government of Norway functioned as facilitator of the peace process, coordinating communication between the parties and arranging logistics before and during the peace talks. In addition, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), comprising members from Nordic countries, was appointed to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. The SLMM monitored events on the ground and was required to make determinations regarding allegations of ceasefire violations in keeping with their mandate. In addition, the governments of the United States, Japan and Norway and the European Union were appointed as Co-chairs of the Tokyo Conference on Re-Construction and Development of Sri Lanka on 10 June 2003, and in this role served to encourage the peace process through the provision of funding for economic development projects in the North and East.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

111. As in previous peace talks, the LTTE insisted on numerous concessions by the Government of Sri Lanka and pre-conditions before it would sit down to negotiate. These included demands to ease restrictions on transport of dual purpose (civilian and military) goods to LTTE-controlled areas, provision of transportation for LTTE cadres, access to foreign funding, supplying of communication equipment and access to international training programs for its cadres. The LTTE stated that these were necessary for “confidence building” and “humanitarian reasons,” but did not allow any concessions to the Government of Sri Lanka. Despite the Government of Sri Lanka’s granting of almost all of the LTTE’s demands during this time, the LTTE still balked, stalled and ultimately walked out of the peace talks when it was time to commit to taking action on substantive political issues. Although there was a standstill with regard to the resumption of the peace talks, the ceasefire continued, mainly because the LTTE continued to benefit from the ceasefire and waited for an opportune moment to break it.

112. Shortly after winning the presidential election in November 2005, President Mahinda Rajapaksa successfully restarted the stalled talks with the LTTE. Aware of the LTTE’s tactics of insisting on short-term demands whilst avoiding discussing substantive political issues, the Government of Sri Lanka delegation this time refused the LTTE’s demand to limit the discussion to the ceasefire agreement and instead insisted on an open agenda. While progress was made in beginning the dialogue on an array of issues in the first round of peace talks under President Mahinda Rajapaksa, the LTTE subsequently reverted to its usual tactics and made logistical excuses and additional demands that had the effect of halting the talks.

113. In June 2006, the LTTE delegation took the opportunity to fly to Oslo, Norway for a round of scheduled talks with the Government of Sri Lanka, but refused to show up for the negotiation session, stating that they were not satisfied with the composition of the Government of Sri Lanka delegation. In the last round of talks in October 2006, the LTTE refused to proceed with further peace talks until the Government of Sri Lanka agreed to open up the A-9 highway, a demand that the Government of Sri Lanka could not meet for security reasons. When talks broke down this time, however, the LTTE had achieved what it needed under the ceasefire agreement and was ready to resume hostilities.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

G. LTTE Behaviour During 2002–2006

114. From the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement in February 2002 by the Government led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe, until the breakdown of peace talks in October 2006, the LTTE significantly and measurably increased its military strength. There is documented evidence that the LTTE exploited the ceasefire period to rearm and build stockpiles of weapons and ammunition, engage in a large-scale recruitment drive to markedly increase its strength, and assassinate its political opponents to consolidate its power in the North and East. During this period, the LTTE also engaged in a campaign to provoke, threaten and demoralise the Security Forces, who were precluded from retaliating due to their adherence to the terms of the ceasefire agreement. LTTE also repeatedly and systematically violated the ceasefire agreement, increasing the frequency and seriousness of such violations beginning in late 2005. The massive number of violations confirmed by the SLMM make clear the LTTE's contempt for the Ceasefire Agreement.

Acquisition of Arms and Ammunition

115. The LTTE engaged in upgrading weapons systems and stockpiling large quantities of weapons during the ceasefire. It managed to procure a number of arms consignments from abroad and was successful in unloading them to its strongholds in Mullaitivu utilising sea routes. These armaments included large quantities of personal weapons, mines, artillery guns, aircraft, missiles and large quantities of explosives. The LTTE maintained a fleet of merchant vessels that transported weapons for the group. These vessels would voyage to international waters off the coast of Sri Lanka and transfer consignments of weapons to multi-day fishing trawlers that would smuggle them to the coastline. Details of the reported arms procurements are available in Annex J.
116. The detection of such weapons laden trawlers by the Sri Lanka Navy with SLMM ceasefire monitors is recorded in the SLMM reports of 14 July 2002 and 10 February 2003. In these instances the SLMM ceasefire monitors on-board the Sri Lanka Navy vessels documented evidence of weapons transfer by the LTTE during the ceasefire. The detection and destruction of 10 LTTE vessels carrying thousands of tons of weapons and equipment by the Sri Lanka Navy between the period of September 2006 to October 2007, establishes empirical evidence on the *modus operandi* used by the LTTE to transport weapons during the ceasefire.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Acquisition of Aircraft

117. The LTTE, which had earlier been limited to land and sea, added a new dimension to its warfare by introducing aerial attacks with the use of aircraft that were procured during the ceasefire. The LTTE also exploited the ceasefire by managing to send its cadres abroad for flight training and built a number of airfields during this period.

Recruitment of Cadres

118. The LTTE also capitalised on the ceasefire period by significantly increasing its recruitment activities, including in Government controlled areas. This included the abduction of adults and children. The SLMM determined that the LTTE was responsible for 1,743 instances of child recruitments, 253 abductions of children and a further 579 abductions of adults during the ceasefire. These SLMM records only refer to complaints made by relatives to the SLMM regarding LTTE recruitments and abductions. As the SLMM did not have a process to monitor CFA obligations and receive public complaints in areas controlled by the LTTE, it is likely that a substantial number of such incidents in these areas have not been reported.

119. The LTTE also significantly increased the strength of its auxiliary forces, and provided mandatory training to civilians within its areas of control. LTTE's recruitment drive during the ceasefire period led to a significant increase in its strength: from a strength of less than 14,000 cadres in 2002 it grew to 25,000 cadres by June 2006.

Exploitation of LTTE Political Offices

120. Under the ceasefire agreement, the LTTE was permitted to engage in political activity in government controlled areas. It was the expectation that the LTTE would make best use of this opportunity to transform from a militant organisation to a political one. Unfortunately, the indulgence of the Government of Sri Lanka to facilitate such a transition was misused by the intransigent LTTE. For example, the ceasefire agreement provided for LTTE combatants to enter government controlled areas, which resulted in the LTTE establishing several "LTTE Political Offices" in areas controlled by the Government of Sri Lanka. The LTTE used these "Political Offices" to organise recruitment drives, spearhead intelligence efforts, collect arms and threaten and intimidate residents.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Strengthening of International Funding and Arms Procurement Operations

121. During the ceasefire, the LTTE actively engaged in restructuring its international network to improve its fundraising and weapons procurement operations. In July 2003, the international coordination centre of the LTTE convened a meeting of key leaders of the overseas branches and provided them direction on re-organising the international network. This re-organisation took effect immediately and the Tamil Diaspora was persuaded, or in many cases coerced, to contribute money towards the resumption of war. The LTTE message to the Tamil Diaspora was that large sums of funding is required as the LTTE was preparing for a decisive battle to achieve its goal. This was referred to as the final war.

122. The LTTE exploited every source of revenue to sustain its fast growing expenditure and develop military infrastructure facilities in the North and East during the ceasefire, including using funds it received following the December 2004 tsunami. The LTTE collected funds from overseas in the guise of utilising the funds for development and rehabilitation work in the North and East. The funds were channelled through its primary front organisation, the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), which was later banned by several countries for supporting terrorism. The LTTE also established an illegal bank during the ceasefire, the “North and East Development Bank,” based in Killinochchi, and channelled money from the TRO to this bank.

Assassination of Opponents

123. During the ceasefire period, the LTTE commissioned a fresh campaign of assassinations targeting its opponents. The LTTE used its newly-formed “political offices” in government controlled areas to plan and support these covert operations. An LTTE sniper killed Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar in August 2005, and Kethesh Loganathan, the Deputy Secretary General of the Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process, was shot and killed outside his home in August of the following year. During the ceasefire, the LTTE also killed a number of Tamil political party leaders and members who had opposed it and entered the democratic mainstream.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Provocative Acts

124. After the signing of the ceasefire agreement in February 2002, LTTE gradually increased its provocative acts against Security Forces, attempting to provoke the Security Forces to react and violate the ceasefire agreement. These included several acts of intimidation, inclusive of abductions, attacks and assassinations targeting the Security Forces, as well as smaller acts that attempted to elicit an immediate response. At checkpoints throughout the North and East, the LTTE engaged in taunting, throwing stones, spitting and other acts intended to humiliate individual soldiers. There are several incidents where LTTE cadres in civilian attire brutally attacked and killed Security Forces personnel while they were on patrol on the streets in government controlled areas. LTTE cadres dressed in civilian clothing also engaged in acts such as burning tires on the street, blocking traffic and otherwise disrupting civilian life. Despite these provocations by the LTTE, Security Forces acted with restraint in keeping with the spirit of the ceasefire agreement.

Violations of the Ceasefire Agreement

125. Between February 2002 and May 2007, the SLMM ruled that the LTTE violated the ceasefire 3,830 times, compared with just 351 violations attributed to the Government of Sri Lanka. It should be noted that the SLMM monitoring and ability to investigate complaints was limited by its permitted role and resources, particularly in LTTE controlled areas. Therefore, it is likely that the LTTE violated the ceasefire far more times than even this number indicates.

126. After the LTTE was banned by the European Union, the LTTE retaliated by saying that it could no longer guarantee the safety of SLMM personnel. As a result of these threats by the LTTE, the SLMM significantly reduced its presence and role in Sri Lanka from September 2006. From May 2007, the SLMM ceased making determinations on ceasefire violations.

127. Given the SLMM's inability to consistently investigate complaints made against the LTTE in LTTE controlled areas, and the reductions in its personnel and presence necessitated by LTTE provocations, it is prudent to also examine the record of complaints made against the LTTE during the ceasefire period. The table opposite summarises the nature and number of these complaints.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

CATEGORY	Jaffna	Wanni	Batticalao, Ampara and Polonnaruwa	Trincomalee	Colombo	Other Areas	TOTAL
Abduction of Civilians	102	147	753	186		1	1,189
Provocative Activities	221	101	218	118		1	659
Protest Campaign	45	16	42	21			124
Demanding Ransom		1	36	9			46
Conscription	85	96	213	40			434
Forcible removal of Private Vehicles	4	1	79	9			93
Hoisting of LTTE Flag in public institutions	111	97	20	19			247
Harassment to Civilians	37	30	251	55			373
Carrying Weapons in Cleared Areas	11	28	35	39	1		114
Construction of new Camps/Bunkers	4	2		5			11
Killing of Civilians	243	99	311	112	30	5	800
Killing of Security Personnel	593	265	225	152	29	105	1,369
Naval Exercise with live fire		1		1			2
TOTAL	1,456	884	2,183	766	60	112	5,461

128. It should be noted that while the ceasefire agreement formally ended on 16 January 2008, the ceasefire was effectively over by July 2006 due to the LTTE's marked increase in violence and effective abrogation of the agreement subsequent to this time.

LTTE's Preparation for War


129. An examination of complaints made against the LTTE in the period leading up to July 2006 shows an increased quantity and severity of ceasefire violations, evidence of military build-up, and a record of increasingly brazen provocations of Security Forces. Evidence of the LTTE trajectory toward war is documented in SLMM correspondence. The chart overleaf shows a clear increase in the number of allegations in 2005 and 2006 compared to the previous years.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Violations of the Ceasefire Agreement by the LTTE

Year	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	Total
Number of Violations	815	871	702	975	2,098	5,461

Number of Ceasefire Violations




130. The statistics above demonstrate the clear intention of the LTTE to provoke the Government of Sri Lanka to a military response. At the same time, the nature of the targets selected by the LTTE clearly indicates its intention at the time to limit the ability of the Government of Sri Lanka to wage a military response successfully. During the ceasefire, the LTTE succeeded in assassinating 24 Sri Lankan intelligence agents. In April 2006 the LTTE attempted to assassinate the Commander of the Sri Lanka Army through an attack carried out by an LTTE suicide bomber who infiltrated Army Headquarters. A suicide bomber assassinated the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Sri Lanka Army in June 2006. An attempt was also made on the life of the Secretary to the Ministry of Defence in December of the same year.
131. Despite the many attempts of the LTTE to provoke the Government of Sri Lanka to a military response, such a response was not forthcoming until military intervention became the last resort to prevent the burgeoning humanitarian crisis caused by the LTTE's closure of the Mavil Aru sluice gates in July 2006.

PART TWO

V. RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES

132. On or about 21 July 2006 villagers of Muslim, Sinhalese and Tamil origin reported to the Irrigation Engineer of the Mavil Aru sluice gates that they observed an unusual reduction of the water flow in the Kallar inlet channel. The Irrigation engineer on going out to inspect the sluice gates was prevented by the LTTE at gunpoint. It became apparent that the head sluice gates were closed by the LTTE on their suddenly taking control of the area, which resulted in the stoppage of the flow of water.




Mavil Aru Sluice Gate

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

133. Mavil Aru comprises three sluice gates - Head Sluice, Source Sluice and Radial Gate. The Source Sluice and Radial Gate have been constructed across two streams of Verugal Aru, which flows eastwards. The Head Sluice controls the water flow to the Kallar Inlet Channel, which flows northwards and provides water for the villages.
134. The population of the Mavil Aru area to which water was provided included 9,510 Muslims, 8,013 Sinhalese and 4,439 Tamils living in 20 villages. The closure of the sluice gate gravely affected their livelihood and domestic requirements. The primary occupation of the villagers was farming and their lifeline to water was from this source. The families engaged in animal husbandry and fishing trade in tank water were also affected. A catastrophe was in the making as livelihood and survival were under threat.
135. The matter was reported to the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) and other relevant authorities but the situation remained unchanged. All peaceful efforts to have the flow of water restored failed. With the passing of days the problem remained unresolved. If the water supply was not restored, the entire crop would have been ruined. The community was becoming desperate.
136. The villagers wanted to march towards the point of stoppage with the intention of opening the Sluice Gates. This would have led to confrontation with the LTTE, which had to be prevented. The denial of water, a basic right to life of a community, seemed designed by the LTTE to provoke the Government of Sri Lanka to react after previous attempts had failed. The community was being used as a pawn by the LTTE.
137. This situation demanded action by the Government if the villagers were not to be forced to abandon their livelihood and lands. The Government was compelled to launch a limited military operation to open the sluice gates. Security Forces commenced operations at 0500 hours on 28 July 2006.
138. The momentum of the Security Forces was slowed because of the high concentration of mines placed by the LTTE, and heavy resistance from recently constructed and heavily fortified trenches and bunkers. Troops also faced artillery and mortar barrages from the LTTE.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

139. Whilst the Mavil Aru operation was in progress, the LTTE launched simultaneous attacks at approximately 0200 hours on 2 August 2006 on Army Camps in Kaddaiparichchan, Selvanagar and Mahindapura and the Muttur Naval Detachment and Muttur town. Security Forces also now had to counter the LTTE attacks on these new fronts around the Trincomalee Harbour. The main troop carrier, the Jetliner, was also attacked whilst entering the Trincomalee Harbour.




Commencement of Mavil Aru Operation & LTTE Response

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

140. The town of Mutur which faces the Trincomalee Harbour fell into the hands of the LTTE while fierce fighting took place at Kattiparichahan at the entrance to Mutur. Attacks on Selvanagar and Galkanda also made the civilian population in the entire area to the south of Trincomalee Harbour flee their homes. The Internally Displaced Persons that fled to camps in Kantale amounted to 76,745, comprising 5,848 Sinhalese, 29,620 Tamils and 41,277 Muslims.
141. The intention of the LTTE was to capture Trincomalee Harbour, which was the main logistics base for the transport of supplies to Jaffna for the civilian population as well as for the Security Forces. The alternate mode of transport was by air as the land route A-9 (Main Supply Route) was partly controlled by the LTTE. If Trincomalee fell into the hands of the LTTE, the Jaffna peninsula would have been in great jeopardy as ready access would not have been available for men and material.
142. On the morning of 6 August 2006, the Security Forces commenced clearing Mutur Town, and troops consolidated the area by evening. Kattaparichchan was also cleared around this time. Total control of Trincomalee South was regained by 7 August 2006.
143. Having successfully controlled Trincomalee South, troops were re-launched to continue the effort to liberate Mavil Aru. On 10 August, Security Forces consolidated on the western bank of Radial Gate, ending the battle for water. The sluice gates were reopened, and water flowed freely into the cultivation areas.
144. To halt Security Forces operations in the East and divert troops to Jaffna, the LTTE expanded its theatre of operation on 11 August 2006. Just 15 minutes before the close of function for the day, the LTTE attacked the Muhamalai Entry/Exit point on the Kandy-Jaffna A-9 road, seriously violating the ceasefire agreement. Approaching the Entry/Exit Point on board a bus, taking cover behind another bus carrying pilgrims, the LTTE mounted a well coordinated ground assault, closely supported by concentrated artillery and mortar fire, killing the unprepared military personnel who were busy winding up the day's activities at the check point. The attack also killed civilians near the scene. Simultaneously, attempts were launched by the LTTE to capture the Naval Detachment at Kilaly and the Forward Defence Line in Muhamallai. The LTTE had partially succeeded in these attempts by 2300 hours.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

145. Subsequently, LTTE Sea Tiger cadres conducted a sea landing and captured a portion of defences held by the Naval troops at Kayts Island while engaging Ariyalai with concentrated artillery fire. Naval troops had to vacate the positions in the Forward Defence Line and occupied their alternative positions located in the interior. The initial success achieved was exploited by the LTTE, which established a stronghold at Allaippiddi.



Attacks on Jaffna peninsula

146. Troops encountering the initial thrust had to redeploy to occupy the counter penetration positions to prevent further penetration. Reinforcements were sent to take control of the situation in the Kilaly front, whilst containing the LTTE at Muhamallai including the area north of the Entry/Exit Point. Troops manning counter penetration positions launched a series of local counterattacks without achieving much success. From 11 to 14 August 2006, Security Forces made several attempts to recapture the Forward Defence Line but were halted effectively by the LTTE.


147. A counterattack was launched to recapture the Naval Detachment at Kilaly. Security Forces successfully recaptured the Naval Detachment under heavy resistance with

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

the help of Armour and Artillery fire. By 0400 hours on 12 August 2006, the defences in the Kilaly Lagoon front were re-established.

148. At Kayts, Sri Lanka Navy troops held the bases having redeployed themselves, vacating some of the strong points along the coastal belt. Security Forces launched a successful counterattack on 12 August 2006 and recaptured the positions occupied by the LTTE. Sri Lanka Navy troops consolidated the liberated defences at Mandaitivu on the following day.
149. Security Forces managed to contain the LTTE penetration until 17 August 2006 by successfully occupying counter penetration positions and then launched counter attacks of different magnitudes. The degradation exerted by Security Forces reduced the LTTE combat efficiency which prevented it launching deliberate attacks on the counter penetration positions and shoulders occupied by the troops. Security Forces and the LTTE both suffered heavy casualties during the confrontation.
150. Security Forces completed the recapture by 27 August 2006 and established the Forward Defence Line in Muhamallai intact.
151. Having failed in their earlier major offensive to capture the port of Trincomalee, the LTTE continued to fire artillery and mortar from Sampoor and Ralkuli (situated on either side of Mutur inside the harbour basin) towards the Naval Dockyard, SLAF Base at China Bay and threatened the Mitsui Cement Factory, the Prima Flour Mill and the Oil Tanks. This was a serious threat to the Trincomalee area, and civilians started to move out due to fears for their safety.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS



LTTE major offensive to capture Trincomalee

152. Security Forces initiated providing shelter and necessary amenities to the people, which was later undertaken by the civil administrative machinery. The LTTE was continuously attempting to attack Naval Craft sailing in and out of the Trincomalee Harbour and Mutur Jetty. This disruption of the sea lines of communication to Jaffna would have given a tremendous military advantage to the LTTE.
153. In addition to these factors, displaced civilians of Mutur and the Trincomalee South area, who had experienced the recent LTTE assaults and artillery and mortar fire, demanded that the Security Forces guarantee their safety by evicting the LTTE and the constant threat it presented. In this situation, given the series of attacks previously experienced, it was deemed essential to secure Sampoor and adjacent areas and ensure the safety of the civil population.
154. The LTTE increased its strength and fortified the area to deny Security Forces ingress and prevented any sea landing from the general area Foul Point. LTTE activities in the areas of Sampoor and Ralkuli continued to pose a direct threat on naval

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

activities in the Trincomalee Harbour. There was an increase of Sea Tiger activities with the arrival of senior Sea Tiger leaders along with fast craft and suicide boats that made a significant change in their strike capabilities.

155. The Government of Sri Lanka, having been forced to react to the brazen provocations of the LTTE at Mavil Aru and Trincomalee South in the East, and Muhamallai and Kayts in the Jaffna peninsula, was impelled to counter this unceasing threat by launching a proactive operation against the LTTE.
156. The Security Forces launched the Humanitarian Operation to secure the Sampoor area at 0300 hours on 24 August 2006. The accuracy of artillery and precision of air interdictions combined with small group actions caused heavy casualties to the LTTE, whilst the tactical manoeuvring of the main column created confusion among the LTTE leadership. By 3 September it was observed by Security Forces as well as through technical sources that the remaining LTTE cadres were attempting to withdraw southwards. The Navy prevented sea withdrawals by the LTTE. By 1400 hours on 4 September 2006, Security Forces were able to gain full control of the Sampoor area.
157. The successful completion of the operation had a tremendous impact on the confidence of the civilians and boosted the overall image of the Government. Further, the regained area provided much needed depth for the safety of Trincomalee Town, Harbour and the Naval Dockyard. Manirasakulam which the LTTE had seized during the ceasefire period was recaptured, which prevented terrorist movements between the Wannai, Trincomalee and Batticoloa.
158. After the area was secured, all those who had left the area were able to return in full confidence for their safety. Normal activity resumed and fields that had been abandoned for years were cultivated again. The rice bowl around Trincomalee began to flourish in the absence of the LTTE.
159. A salient feature of this operation was that civilian life and property were by and large safeguarded. However, civilian deaths were caused by the LTTE, including through shooting at a passing ambulance at Galkanda. Muslim civilians fleeing from artillery attacks were targeted by withdrawing LTTE cadres.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

160. The Humanitarian Operation continued to liberate the rest of the East including Vakarai, the Batticaloa bowl, Thoppigala and Trincomalee North. By 10 July 2007, Security Forces completed the liberation of the Eastern Province.

161. The sustained violations of the Ceasefire Agreement by the LTTE had made it abundantly clear that the LTTE used the ceasefire only as a cover for achieving its military objectives. The need for a measured response had been amply proven, and the success of that response ensured relief for civilians. As a sovereign state with legitimate authority, Sri Lanka had an obligation to protect all its citizens, and in particular those under the LTTE yoke, so that they too could enjoy the same rights and benefits as other citizens.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

VI. THE WANNI OPERATION

162. While the Humanitarian Operation in the East was reaching its climax, it was decided to open a frontage in the Wanni theatre. During this period, an area of 6,792 sq km was under the control of the LTTE. Security Forces manned an 11 km long Forward Defence Line (FDL) from Kilalaly to Nagarkovil via Muhamallai in the North and a 140 km long FDL from Mannar to Kokkuthuduwai via Omanthai in the South. The operation in the Wanni was launched on 5 March 2007.



Wanni Theatre

163. Initial confrontations took place in the primary jungle, thus restricting effective use of Armour and Artillery. Built up areas were carefully avoided in keeping with the “Zero Civilian Casualty” policy that had been adopted. Before the campaign began, substantial work was done to identify locations where the civilian population

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS


resided, with the assistance of public servants in those areas, to avoid making them conflict zones. Such areas were comprehensively avoided even after the civilians had left.

164. Security Forces operations were carried out by small groups that maintained some distance between them and operated ahead of the strongly held defence line, known as the base line. The deployment of small groups reduced the requirement for artillery assets. Further, task oriented training imparted on small groups on Forward Observer duties also proved very effective in their ability to call for accurate indirect fire when such was required, greatly increasing the effectiveness of fire and reducing casualties to civilians and own troops. The demand for Armour fire support was also reduced as a result of the small group operations, which in turn greatly reduced the risk of causing civilian casualties.
165. The LTTE, after its defeat in the East, realised the damage caused by these small groups and modified its tactics. LTTE lines were highly fortified unlike in the East, and the LTTE strongly resisted the forward movement of Security Forces using a heavy concentration of mines, booby traps and artillery fire. Troops sustained heavy casualties as a result, and progress was slow.
166. During the Humanitarian Operation in the East, the strategy adopted with careful use of terrain imperatives by the Security Forces successfully managed to separate terrorists from civilians to a large extent. This denied the LTTE the opportunity of exploiting civilians as a human shield, except at Vakarai. However, having learned a lesson in the East, the LTTE prevented civilians escaping from the initial stages of the operation in the Wanni. Therefore they deployed armed cadres at the Entry/Exit points at Omanthai and Ulliyankulam. Against all odds, a small number of civilians were able to evade these cadres in March 2008, when 46 families comprising 138 members were able to cross into government controlled areas. Such attempts to flee the LTTE continued until the conclusion of the Humanitarian Operation. Several safe corridors were kept open between the A-9 and A-32 roads for such civilian movement as well as for the uninterrupted supply of essential items, especially food convoys along the A-9 road by UN agencies, coordinated by Security Force Headquarters Wanni.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

167. Having planned from the inception of the Wannu operation to use civilians as a human shield, the LTTE compelled civilians to move to points behind their rear lines to use them when the occasion arose. The LTTE carried the civilian population with them also to recruit them to their ranks, to use as labour particularly in constructing bunds and ditches, and to obtain free food and medicine from the Government of Sri Lanka. LTTE moved all the civilians out of their homes long before the arrival of the Security Forces in built up areas.
168. Security Forces gave public notice through leaflets and amplifiers to encourage civilians to leave the combat zone, in case there were people left behind that the LTTE had not taken with them. More sophisticated systems were installed in the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs') after the Eastern operation to enable pictures to be dispatched to the level of Formation Commanders for identification of military targets. Instructions were strictly adhered to by having Commanders up front in charge of operations monitor and safeguard civilian locations. All available high tech resources including highly experienced and skilled personnel ensured precision targeting of military objectives, which minimised collateral damage.
169. The recapture of Madhu on 24 April 2008 was considered the first major objective liberated during the Wannu operation due to its significance for Sri Lankan Roman Catholics. The LTTE had built bunkers around the church and launched artillery attacks from the premises. It also used the church premises to treat its wounded cadres. In keeping with the instructions given to avoid any harm to places of religious and cultural significance, Security Forces avoided offensive operations in proximity of the church. Instead, troops cut off LTTE supply routes around the church, causing the LTTE to withdraw. The liberation of Madhu whilst avoiding direct engagement was greatly appreciated by the Church authorities, and the annual feast was held on schedule with support of the Security Forces.
170. The Humanitarian Operation continued, liberating Adampan, the Rice Bowl of Mannar and Periyamadhu. Security Forces captured Veddithalathive, a major Sea Tiger base, by July 2008. The ditch cum bund prepared and manned by the LTTE, which ran from Nachchikudah to Therumurukandi via Akkarayankulam stalled progress. Heavy artillery fire by the LTTE caused heavy casualties amongst Security Forces, which used UAVs and Radars to accurately locate and destroy the LTTE's artillery assets. Nachchikuda was liberated in October 2008.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS




Security Forces captured Veddithalathive

171. The capture of the Akkarayankulam earth bund was a key event in the Humanitarian Operation as the LTTE had planned to fight its main battle there by launching a full-scale counterattack. Security Forces negotiated a series of ditch cum bunds that had been heavily mined and booby trapped, and repulsed the LTTE counterattacks. This engagement was critical: having been beaten comprehensively in a terrain which favoured guerrilla warfare, the LTTE shifted its *modus operandi* to a semi conventional defensive posture. Due to a shortage of resources, the LTTE forcibly employed civilians for the construction of ditch cum bunds and mobilised earthmoving machinery forcibly taken from civilians and INGOs. This was evident from reconnaissance conducted through the Beech Craft of the Sri Lanka Air Force. During this time, the LTTE also used civilians who had been given training in weapons handling along with LTTE cadres in defensive operations, preserving its experienced cadres for counterattacks and future offensives. Akkarayankulam was captured in November 2008.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

172. Security Forces operations continued steadily on all axes in the other fronts of the Wanni theatre.
173. When Security Forces entered the town of Kilinochchi, LTTE's administrative hub, all civilians had been driven to Vishvamadhu. The LTTE's aim was to create a human shield to block the Security Forces' advance to Puthukudirippu, where the LTTE leadership was in its military stronghold. On 2 January 2009, President Mahinda Rajapaksa called upon the LTTE to lay down its arms and surrender. The LTTE did not heed this call. It continued to occupy successive lateral lines and deployed its cadres near the people, to fire on the troops.




Security Forces captured Kilinochchi town

174. The Government declared the first No Fire Zone (NFZ) in January 2009 in the area of the greatest concentration of civilians being forcibly held by the LTTE at that time. It was not the case that the Security Forces declared areas as NFZ and then pushed

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

people to such areas. The creation of the NFZ was a precautionary measure taken by the Government to safeguard people still under LTTE control.


175. Security Forces, in moving nearer to the NFZ, aimed to facilitate the escape of people from the zone. By the first week of February, over 20,000 civilians had crossed to Government controlled areas, at which point the LTTE reacted by sending a suicide bomber who intermingled with the civilians and detonated herself at a reception centre in Vishvamadu on 9 February 2009, causing many civilian and military casualties. This had the effect of discouraging civilians crossing, though many still continued to try.
176. As a result, the LTTE moved people from this relatively large and accessible NFZ, into increasingly smaller and less accessible areas of land. These are the areas that became the subsequent NFZ. The carriage of people was the act of the LTTE. It became obvious that the people wanted to escape from the clutches of the LTTE; at every available opportunity civilians crossed to the sanctuary offered by Security Forces and many made desperate attempts to come over. Many such civilians were killed by the LTTE.



Declared No Fire Zones

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

177. In its relentless movement of civilians to smaller and smaller areas, the LTTE destroyed the Kalmandukulam Tank entrapping the civilians and preventing them from moving to Government controlled areas. The LTTE also attempted to destroy the Iranamadu Tank bund, the largest water reservoir in the North. This would have resulted in a major humanitarian catastrophe had it succeeded, but the cadres who were to carry out the mission refused to do so and surrendered to Security Forces.



Kalmandukulam and Iranamadu Tanks


178. LTTE constantly used civilians of all ages inside the NFZs to shift its war material and used the food rations which they stole and held for their consumption leaving the people in hunger. Whilst on the run, LTTE had often used these siphoned heaps of food bundles especially the rice, flour and sugar to construct makeshift bunkers and covered them with canopies distributed among civilians by the UN agencies, to attack or launch suicide attacks on advancing troops.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

179. At the later stages of the Wannai operation the LTTE intermingled with the civilians to launch attacks, including artillery and mortar attacks, on Security Forces. LTTE cadres dressed as civilians, and fired from amongst civilians. This hampered Security Forces operations since return fire to neutralise targets had to be greatly reduced. The LTTE also launched attacks from areas supposed to be free of combat, such as hospitals, with similar results.
180. From the beginning in January 2009, the LTTE moved its cadres and weapons into areas that had been declared NFZ. It attacked Security Forces from these positions, using artillery, tanks, mortar and other heavy calibre weapons. The LTTE was also constructing obstacles to prevent civilians crossing over to Government controlled areas. It was a daunting task to separate the civilians from the LTTE as the cadres were dressed in civilian attire as camouflage.
181. The LTTE haphazardly and irrationally directed violence at civilians to create humanitarian issues—a role the LTTE traditionally employed in desperation in most losing battles. Balancing the required imperatives complicated the operations but Security Forces maintained a strict vigilant enforcement regime of avoiding civilian casualties in a difficult and complicated environment. The prime intention was saving civilians from LTTE clutches that required neutralising the grip that the LTTE asserted over them.
182. The LTTE, upon realising that their ability to control the civilians in larger expanses of territory was limited, kept forcefully moving the civilians to smaller and smaller extents of land until they reached Putumattalan. This was a narrow stretch of land bounded by the sea and a lagoon, which formed natural obstacles to civilians escaping in addition to the LTTE's hostile actions to keep them trapped. In a well documented incident, the LTTE started shooting at many thousands of civilians amassed on the border of the lagoon, attempting to cross over to the safety of government controlled areas. This compelled Security Forces to expeditiously launch a hostage rescue mission.
183. With the commencement of the hostage rescue mission Security Forces on instructions ended the use of heavy calibre guns and combat aircraft and aerial weapons that might cause civilian casualties. The operations were confined to the mission of rescuing civilians.

VII. THE CIVILIAN RESCUE OPERATION

184. The Humanitarian Operation that commenced in Mavil Aru, converted itself to a civilian rescue mission in the last phases of the war as the civilians were forcibly held against their will by the LTTE, in the areas of Putumattalan, Karayamullivaikkal and Vellamullivaikkal, where geographical location (between the lagoon and the sea) made it difficult to create safe passages for the civilians to cross over to the liberated areas.



Areas where civilians were forcibly held by the LTTE

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

185. Crossing the canal was a water based operation where sometimes a home base was related to an island in the water via which small groups carried out initial reconnaissance drives, adopted stealth moves and made surprise entries. Initial surprise entry was of prime importance. Ropes, barrels, tubes, logs, sticks and inflated tubes were placed in the water along with divers and skilled swimmers as water scouts for evacuation of civilians. Dinghies were not used to avert possible detection by LTTE listening posts. Safe lanes were secured to facilitate rescue of civilians.
186. The stealth operation was initiated by small groups in locally created rafts without the aid of rope as it may have led to detection. Instead divers and skilled swimmers assisted in direction and guidance.
187. The LTTE countered by constructing earth-bunds and multiple layers of obstacles creating twin complications to delay entry and hinder entrapped civilians' access to freedom. During this period, there was a considerable increase in the atrocities committed by the LTTE against the incarcerated civilian population, *i.e.*, shooting those attempting to leave the control of the LTTE, permanent deployment of civilians as human shields, forced labour, forced recruitment of children, and forced construction of large earth bunds by civilians coerced by armed guards. The civilians who crossed over to the liberated areas confirmed that the civilian population was subject to severe violence by the LTTE.
188. Small groups on surprise landings under cover of night crawled inland and were met by earth bunds. Maximum surprise was utilised in negotiating the earth bunds while reserves stood in the background. The task was to open mobility corridors for civilians to find a way to safety. Behind the bunds were the LTTE bunkers. Once the bunds were occupied, snipers were employed to pin down the LTTE guns and take shots at the bunkers. Small groups moved forward with scouts and navigators in the front. LTTE fire caused many casualties that required evacuation. Gradual move forward meant slow entry after capturing congested territory with temporary huts and tents. Civilians ran desperately towards the oncoming Security Forces and were directed in language and signals to move to safe positions. Sick and elderly with their baggage had to be carried and some required medical attention. Many servicemen lost their lives while assisting civilians to safety, struck by LTTE snipers from the NFZ. Considering the safety of the civilians, Security Forces throughout the

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

rescue mission used minimum force to retaliate to LTTE fire and targeted clearly identified armed cadres with aimed fire of limited arms. These precautions led to unavoidable casualties among Security Forces personnel.

189. There was clear evidence of the civilians' desperation to get away from the clutches of the LTTE. Security Forces provided maximum support to the civilians.
- a. From the time the LTTE began keeping the civilians captive, many attempts were made by the civilians to cross the lagoon and come over to Government controlled territory. The Security Forces announced frozen periods during which they would be on a standstill position to tempt the LTTE to release the persons held in captivity, to no avail as the LTTE failed to respond favourably.
 - b. When the civilians gathered in numbers to make the crossing or to board an ICRC boat, the LTTE rounded the civilians attempting to leave and shot at the gathering and dispersed the people. It was obvious the captives were hostile to the LTTE. The LTTE at the later stages attempted to recruit the civilians forcibly to their fighting ranks. The LTTE killed and injured several civilians who attempted to cross the lagoon. Security Forces placed ropes, tubes and boats along with divers to assist the civilians attempting to make the crossing in the night on water.
 - c. When the ICRC was ferrying the sick and the aged to safety, the LTTE placed their own injured fighting cadres on those boats, depriving the sick and aged civilians from securing the medical care they required.
 - d. Security Forces had to re-locate the centres that received civilians and provided assistance away from the LTTE artillery as the LTTE was using artillery on these locations to deter civilians from crossing the lagoon.
 - e. The civilians who escaped incarceration were transported to the camps in protected vehicles as LTTE engaged suicide cadres to blow themselves up and the civilians, after disguising themselves as civilians.
190. The other methods adopted locally by Security Forces to free the civilians, included asking civilians who had escaped the LTTE to make announcements over loud speakers encouraging those civilians forcibly held to stage similar escapes. Some of the male civilians volunteered to return to the LTTE held territory and were allowed to go back in an effort to rescue more of their own kith and kin. Leaflets

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

were dropped in areas where the civilians were being held hostage by the LTTE and loudspeaker and radio announcements were made, encouraging the civilians to escape.

191. Despite these measures, the UAVs deployed over the uncleared territories revealed an increase in the force used against the civilians by the LTTE who were shooting at any civilians attempting to escape their control. Therefore the Government of Sri Lanka decided to use force to rescue the civilian population from the imminent danger they were facing under the LTTE. But the force used was limited nature weapons as per instructions.
192. Security Forces were well trained in armed combat and rescue mission operations and had the professional expertise to control extreme situations in a way consistent with the human rights obligations of the State.
193. Furthermore, prior to embarking on rescue operations, model training and rehearsals and situation training mainly focusing on rescue operations were conducted; these included recreation of the NFZ and rehearsals.
194. The Sri Lanka Army has elite units specialised in Hostage Rescue Operations who were deployed for the task, who in turn gave leadership and training to the other units of the Security Forces engaged in the rescue operations.
195. Information relating to hostages was gathered with the means of UAV footage that was received by Security Forces, as well as through military intelligence and civilian sources and through international networks. Civilians who crossed over were debriefed by Security Forces. This exercise was carried out to ascertain the factual situation even though it was exceptionally challenging to access all the necessary information in order to assess the full factual picture, including the imminence of the deadly threat. The prime consideration was to minimise the risk to civilian lives in planning strategy.
196. With the utilisation of this information meticulous pre-planning was carried out prior to commencing each phase of the rescue operation. The chief objective being the minimising of casualties, the following strategies were adopted:

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

- a. Model training and rehearsals and situation training mainly focusing on rescue operations and protecting civilian lives; UAV images were used on an actual size model and series of rehearsals were conducted.
 - b. Specially trained anti-hijacking and hostage rescue troops were deployed during the hostage rescue operations along with the ground troops;
 - c. Change of weaponry — *i.e.*, no artillery power was used in the NFZs. However, small arms fire including sniper attacks were used for the rescue operations;
 - d. Snipers were constantly used since the LTTE were intermingling with civilians. This had a tremendous impact on the civilians as they observed that the targets taken were the LTTE combatants engaged in the act of firing, and Security Forces carefully avoided the civilians in the vicinity. This action on the part of Security Forces gave a strong message that helping hands would come to their assistance in making the crossing and encouraged more civilians to cross the lagoon.
 - e. Deliberate change in the use of weaponry from rapid fire to deliberate fire.
 - f. Maximum utilisation of the skills of the SOF and their night fighting capabilities. Night operations were carried out with great caution as it had disadvantages on visibility issues, though special equipment was used.
 - g. The concept of small groups (4/8 man teams) — the accent was on strategic attacks with the use of personal arms on an aim and fire at the target rule.
 - h. Construction of trenches and approaching through these trenches.
197. By establishing secure launching pads for subsequent operations it was possible to open more secure passages for evacuation, and over 42,000 civilians were rescued on 20 April 2009. They were initially conducted to receiving stations via the safe passages and their immediate medical needs and basic comforts were attended to. Then they were transferred to civilian centres for occupation. The rescued civilians became a mine of information for activities in the LTTE positions that assisted greatly in operational plans of rescue missions. LTTE control of the civilians reduced when the NFZ was partitioned into two sectors by the troops, creating a passage to the sea. As the troops went forward the LTTE compelled the civilians to move south.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS


198. On 21 and 22 April 2009 over 60,000 civilians were saved from the hands of the LTTE, demonstrating the magnitude of the operation and the logistic support necessary. The civilians were determined to escape and they were able to do so with the assistance offered by Security Forces. The civilians came to Government controlled area in small groups or in large numbers wherever and whenever possible. Night moves were often resorted to in order to make the opening for the civilians.
199. Open areas made Security Forces vulnerable and the LTTE had constructed bunkers with forced labour to prevent the onward drive. Several forays were launched using the lagoon to make surprise entries. The LTTE, desperate and taxed, resorted to sending suicide motorcyclists and infiltrations by boat movement. Security Forces held the advantage with strong reserves and multiple lines in the rear to repulse possible counterattacks. Rotating fresh troops at each phase also kept morale high.
200. Security Forces that ferried civilians to safety had to encounter water filled ditches heavily mined with anti personnel mines and booby traps. There were also earthworks that extended from sea to lagoon that had to be overcome.
201. In the last stages, the LTTE adopted a new tactic of using isolated small groups to fight until death to hinder the advance of Security Forces. This seemed a last desperate attempt to save the leadership by gaining time to facilitate intended departure or rescue for the leadership by external forces. Sources reported the remaining civilians were at the edge of the lagoon in the south expecting assistance to escape. Estimates indicated around 70,000 civilians trapped. Troops had to make their way through sand banks (270m long and 40m wide) for which exercise previous trainings were undertaken. A long trench was cut to secure the remaining causeway for the extraction of the trapped civilians.
202. Due to oncoming attacks, Security Forces had to dig positions in the ground. The trenches had to be dug at night to avoid visibility, a hazardous operation since the LTTE kept on firing during construction. In one week alone, Security Forces lost 47 personnel digging such trenches. These trenches had a protective wall constructed in some places for cover. Security Forces were entrenched in pre-fabricated bunkers (routed in zigzag curvature to reduce the impact of oncoming indirect fire) long

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

before action was to commence and thereafter inched their way forward in slow leap frogging movements. Strict instructions were given and followed of observing the fire and taking targets in the face of the fire from close range.

203. The LTTE also used snipers and anti tank guns. The approaches were heavily mined and attacks against the escaping civilians by the LTTE became more frequent and LTTE Sea Tigers became operative to damage the coastal belt by carrying suicide cadres in explosives filled sea craft. Security Forces used protective walls, prefabricated bunkers and tin sheets to overcome the difficulties encountered in the sand and to improve mobility. Security Forces also had to be in readiness, using radar too, to prevent LTTE cadres escaping by boat. Some of the leaders and cadres also attempted to reach the jungles by night to escape. Confrontations to prevent this sometimes went on till dawn.
204. Security Forces engaged the LTTE in the Nanthi Kadal lagoon area on three fronts (North/West/South) to gain the tactical advantage. The LTTE terrorists were entrenched in a limited space, with the sea and the lagoon on east and west. Security Forces advanced from north and south in order to directly target the LTTE gunmen. This exercise resulted in exceedingly slow movement but, due to close proximity, the LTTE could not use their artillery fire. Small arms fired from diverse positions by Security Forces at close range often succeeded in disorienting and thereafter eliminating LTTE firepower.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS



Security Forces engaging the LTTE in three fronts

205. The constant use of UAV pictures flashed to the forward commanders in up front positions were the most useful source to identify combatants with weapons, even though some of these were in civilian attire.
206. The hostage rescue operations were conducted with careful supervision and monitoring. Monitoring was carried out through the chain of command and radio monitoring. The supervision and monitoring process ensured:
 - a. Commanders were “well forward” to monitor all action on the ground. This ensured proper implementation of the commands by the troops;

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

- b. UAV monitoring was available at all command centres;
 - c. Brainstorming sessions and debriefing with assessments of the situation were made very frequently; since it was a NFZ and the use of arms was narrowed to weapons of a limited nature as per instructions, the task was onerous and therefore high priority was given to briefing/debriefing sessions for the troops as manoeuvres had to be performed with care and caution;
 - d. Situation reports were regularly given to the higher command.
207. The LTTE built their bunkers and fortifications close to areas where the civilians were and also moved some of their heavy weapons to civilian locations. The LTTE began to destroy most of its military hardware and communication equipment during the last stage of the humanitarian operations in order to prevent them falling to Security Forces. The LTTE also destroyed a number of its ammunition dumps, heavy guns and other logistics using explosives devices, causing casualties among the civilians. The fire destroyed hundreds of IDP shelters. Video footage taken by UAV on 17 May 2009 confirms the magnitude of these explosions and the destruction caused in the area. As per civilian sources, a number of LTTE cadres too committed suicide by self detonation after destroying their equipment.
208. When Security Forces came reasonably close to the remaining civilians and secured safe passage, they felt confident to move towards them. It was only after the military established a foothold across the Vadduvakkal Lagoon that the civilians started moving past the lagoon towards Security Forces in large numbers. This group of approximately 80,000 were the last to escape from the LTTE leadership. However, some of the LTTE cadres who had been with the leaders also escaped with the civilians having discarded their combat wear. With this, the Security Forces completed the civilian rescue mission.
209. The hostage rescue operation against the LTTE was launched as a last resort by the Government of Sri Lanka, after exploring all other avenues and imploring the LTTE to release the civilians. The numerous requests from the international community and the Government of Sri Lanka to the LTTE, to refrain from using civilians as human shields and for their release, had been unheeded by the LTTE.

VIII. RECEPTION OF CIVILIANS

210. All those who crossed over to Government controlled areas received immediate care and attention. Reception centres had been established and detailed preparations had been made beforehand. Screening locations had to be established at such centres following the earlier incident of the LTTE suicide bombing at Vishvamadu in February 2009.
211. Medical teams from the Sri Lanka Army Medical Corps evaluated all those received for injuries and illness, and evacuated them to medical stations for treatment. Dehydration and hypoglycaemia were treated at the initial point of contact, and anyone with bleeding was given emergency treatment to arrest the flow of blood. No distinction was made between civilians and combatants in the services provided.
212. A large number of medical officers and trained medics were deployed. Eight Advanced Dressing Stations were established within 500 meters to 1 kilometre of the front lines for minor surgical procedures. More complex procedures were carried out at the five Main Dressing Stations established in the divisional headquarters area. Those with severe injuries were evacuated to hospitals at Vavuniya and Anuradhapura using helicopters.
213. After initial screening, all civilians not requiring medical treatment were sent to the relief villages established by the Government of Sri Lanka in the Vavuniya.
214. LTTE cadres who surrendered were taken to centres for further investigation, and for rehabilitation. Former child combatants were looked after separately.

IX. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

215. A comprehensive account of the humanitarian assistance provided by the Government of Sri Lanka prior to, during and after the Humanitarian Operation is documented in the companion report to this one: “Sri Lanka’s Humanitarian Effort” issued by the Presidential Task Force for Resettlement, Development and Security in the Northern Province. Readers are advised to refer to this Report for detailed coverage of this topic.

X. GENERAL OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES AND PREPARATIONS TO SAFEGUARD CIVILIAN LIVES

A. General Procedures

216. In advance of the Humanitarian Operation, Security Forces underwent extensive training and preparation tailored to achieve a high standard of protection for civilians and to minimise civilian casualties.
217. Training was conducted towards efficient Command, Control, and Communication.
218. Efficient weapons handling and precision in targeting were primary objectives in training courses.
219. Tamil language was taught to all personnel, to ensure the ability to communicate with Tamil speaking civilians.
220. Materials, including leaflets, instruction booklets, placards and Power Point presentations, dealing with offences in armed conflict and rules of conduct, were widely distributed to ensure that personnel understood and abided by the legal framework of Laws of Armed Conflict.
221. Regular delivery of lectures and workshops on the Laws of Armed Conflict and related rules of conduct, as an integral part of the Security Forces training programmes for senior and junior commanders, contributed immensely towards recognising command responsibilities and to abiding by these throughout the Humanitarian Operation.
222. While human errors were mitigated through training, regular inspections, periodical checks and sight tests were carried out on all weapon systems to minimise technical errors.

B. Sri Lanka Army

223. Training focused on improving of individual and small unit skills as well as efficiency and effectiveness of supporting elements, which paid dividends in minimising

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

collateral damage. Focused training programmes such as Advance Infantry Platoon Training (AIPT) and Special Infantry Operation Training (SIOT) to develop small group skills contributed significantly to identify precise targets during the Humanitarian Operation.

224. Realistic model training and battle drills designed and put into practice by operational divisions, particularly to capture fortified localities including earth bunds, ensured precision and effectiveness. This was augmented by effective employment of radar and UAVs.
225. Cultural properties such as Holy Madhu Shrine and Hindu Temples were protected from attacks and restrictions were imposed on the use of force against them, unless used for military activities by the LTTE or in the case of imperative military necessity.
226. Induction of artillery and mortar detecting radars, extensive use of UAVs and fire controllers with forward troops, helped verify targets and ensure precision.
227. Accurate Battle Damage Assessment was carried out to minimise collateral damage and to maintain effective engagement against identified LTTE targets.
228. Multiple warnings for civilians were provided as needed prior to attacks, and used sophisticated technology to confirm the departure of civilians and minimise collateral damage.

C. Sri Lanka Navy

229. The Sri Lanka Navy established secure sea corridors for civilians escaping from the LTTE held areas and these areas were continuously kept under close surveillance.
230. During daytime, boats carrying civilians were identified with the naked eye and escorted to the nearest Security Forces positions on land. Small boats with 2 crew members were used to close in and identify the civilian character of the occupants, taking risks inasmuch as the LTTE deployed suicide boats amongst the escaping boats.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

231. During the dark hours, craft fitted with Electro Optical Devices (EOD) were used to identify the escaping boats. Even the smaller Inshore Patrol Craft (IPCs) were equipped with EODs. Aerial illuminating parachutes were used to guide the boats closer to naval craft.
232. Chemmalai and Chilawatta, in the East Coast south of Mullativu, had Electro Optical Surveillance System (EOSS) fitted on the radar mast to have continuous surveillance on the sea front and beach area, which helped to monitor escaping boats from the beach.
233. During the entire Humanitarian Operation, there were no incidents of misidentification or firing at escaping boats as strict restrictive conditions were issued to all naval units not to fire unless they were fired upon.
234. Boats with excess civilians and civilians with urgent medical needs were assisted by naval craft taking people on board to avoid any possible accident.
235. Sick and wounded civilians were provided urgent first aid by Navy Personnel and then evacuated to Pullmodai and Point Pedro for more comprehensive medical treatment by naval medical personnel at makeshift hospitals.
236. Telephone facilities were provided to the escaped civilians to allow them to contact people remaining in LTTE custody in the No Fire Zone and encourage them to escape by taking sea route for their survival.

D. Sri Lanka Air Force

237. Having a battle ready inventory in its possession and with the battle infrastructure set up, a stringent and meticulous mission execution procedure was laid down by the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) in undertaking any type of offensive action.
238. Presence of civilian population was thoroughly investigated from informants, captured LTTE cadres, and whenever possible from Security Forces who penetrated into enemy territory, once areas for engagement were received. In cases where the slightest doubts were present, such places were avoided.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

239. Targets were re-evaluated using the sources held/maintained by other intelligence organisations prior to engagement. *i.e.*, whenever a target was given by Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI), it was crosschecked with State Intelligence Service (SIS), Directorate of Naval Intelligence (DNI) and other intelligence agencies. This multiple verification ensured that no doubt was present when targeting was done. Single source targeting was never done.
240. All the targets were re-evaluated using imagery by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) or other aerial reconnaissance platforms and other sources like aerial photography/satellite images. This positively confirmed the absence of civilians in those areas targeted by air.
241. SLAF exercised maximum precautions on weapon to target matching and selecting munitions. Various types of conventional, general purpose bombs were in the warehouse to select and various types of aircraft to suit any type of target. When weapon to target matching is done, higher Command was vested with the decision making process. The selection of weapons to be deployed was decided having regard to the target that was to be taken.
242. In destroying those targets, SLAF ensured accuracy by observing high discipline and detailed procedures:
- a. Pilots' accuracy was developed by constant training. Pilots were specifically and carefully selected for various missions as per their levels of experience and skill. The highest level of the SLAF was involved in this decision making process.
 - b. Once areas of engagement were decided, the strike pilots were extensively briefed prior to engagement. In some cases, separate UAV missions were conducted to familiarise the pilots with targets. Pilots were not sent if there was the slightest doubt about the identification of targets. Furthermore, the pilots were given the sole discretion of aborting an attack should the slightest doubt prevail at the time of engagement. In order to enable the proper execution of battle damage assessment, all air strikes were made under surveillance.
243. SLAF deployed only Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) for those targets that demanded a high degree of accuracy.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

244. Battle damage assessment was carried out using real time imagery soon after the strike. Even the attack process was filmed for review. It must also be mentioned that the information collection process recorded all information, even though the sources were not reliable, and was given due consideration until its validity was confirmed.
245. In carrying out Battlefield Air Interdictions (BAI), the SLAF had certain advantages as well as certain limitations:
- a. All BAI missions occurred within a belt of 3 - 5 km from the enemy Forward Defence Lines (FDL). This ensured the absence of civilians for a considerable distance during the battle. However, this liberty was lost in the final stages as the LTTE took up strategic positions mingled with the civilian population effectively ending SLAF's BAI missions.
 - b. In order to address the shortcoming of reduced state of ground intelligence, aerial reconnaissance equipment was extensively used to obtain final confirmation.
246. In carrying out Close Air Support (CAS) certain other measures had to be curtailed in order to address the urgency and efficiency of the battlefield. As such, the constraints are examined below.
- a. CAS missions were carried out as per the requirement of the field commander. This took place directly within the battle theatre, which reduced the likelihood of civilian presence.
 - b. However, the requirement projected by the field commanders was channelled to Air Force Headquarters and followed the usual process, whilst the strike was carried out under surveillance and strict rules of engagement.
 - c. Target identification was at a professional standard as the pilots were provided with updated satellite imagery. Due to this reason, when the pilots were over the target, they were quite familiar and comfortable with the geographical terrain enabling positive identification of the target.

XI. PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN RIGHTS

A. Institutional Frameworks

247. As shown in the foregoing, the Humanitarian Operation was carried out with utmost care to safeguard civilian lives. Several measures were also in place to ensure that civilian rights were also well protected.
248. Security Forces have several institutional mechanisms in place to safeguard human rights.
- a. The Directorate of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law of the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) was established in January 1997. Its role is to further improve the appreciation and knowledge of SLA personnel of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and Human Rights (HR) through training, monitoring the compliance of its personnel to these norms, and inquiring into and reporting alleged transgressions.
 - b. The Sub Directorate on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law in the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) was established in June 2002 as a means of providing advice, conducting training programmes for naval personnel, disseminating information and coordinating work with various agencies on all matters related to HR & IHL.
 - c. The International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights cell of the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) was established in 2002 along similar lines.

B. Training on Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law

249. Security Forces personnel receive in-depth training on HR and IHL through the directorates described above. In particular, officers and soldiers actively engaging in operations are trained to be aware of their responsibilities with regard to the safety of civilians and the protection of human rights, and to make appropriate and informed decisions in the heat of battle.
250. Training comprises three distinct programmes:
- a. Training of instructors to conduct seminars and awareness programmes on HR and IHL for other personnel on a continuous, full time basis

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

- b. Regular field level training for other personnel conducted by these trained instructors in the operational areas
- c. Formal training for officers and other ranks at established training centres

These training programmes are supported by the dissemination of written materials, including leaflets, instruction booklets, placards *etc.*, dealing with human rights, codes of conduct, offenses in armed conflict and other relevant material.

- 251. Assistance for these training programmes has been obtained from Governmental, non-governmental and international organisations such as the Ministry of Disaster Management, the ICRC, the UNDP, the British Council, the National Commission on Human Rights, the National Institute of Education, the Centre for the Study of Human Rights at the University of Colombo and the Sri Lanka Foundation Institute.
- 252. Overall, more than 175,000 personnel of the SLA have undergone training in this subject area since the year 2001. Education on IHL and HR has been a compulsory subject for all SLN personnel in induction training courses, on the job training and all mandatory courses pertaining to promotion. More than 24,000 personnel of the SLAF have also received training in this subject area.

C. Monitoring of Alleged Infringements

- 253. Monitoring of Security Forces conduct and the process of investigating alleged infringements by its personnel is an integral part of the effort to safeguard human rights. The sophisticated institutional support mechanism within the SLA, which is the security force that has the greatest interactions with civilians due to its ground role, illustrates the monitoring mechanism.
- 254. A national level network of Human Rights cells was set up within the SLA under its Directorate of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law. These cells comprise groups of officers holding senior appointments within each division, brigade and battalions of the SLA. These officers have a wide mandate to monitor the human rights situation and send fortnightly reports to the Directorate. In addition to their reporting function, the cells are charged with assisting in the investigations carried out by the Directorate of Legal Services and the Military Police of the SLA on alleged violations, as well as the civil Police and other relevant agencies.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS


255. In the case of complaints being lodged, the following actions were taken:
- a. Conducting of inquiries by the Military Police
 - b. Handing over of suspects to the civil Police
 - c. Assisting the civil Police conduct their investigations
 - d. Making the suspects and witnesses available to the civil Police and Courts
 - e. Conducting internal inquiries in parallel and prosecuting per military law
256. Another mechanism that is available to a person seeking to complain of an alleged violation of his fundamental rights is the mechanism whereby a complaint can be referred to the Human Rights Commission, which is a constitutionally appointed forum. The Human Rights Commission is further empowered to refer matters which they deem fit for further inquiry to the Supreme Court.
257. It may be noted that the Constitution of Sri Lanka affords entrenched guarantees with regard to any alleged infringement of Human Rights which can be referred to the Supreme Court, which has been vested with exclusive jurisdiction. There have been several petitions referred to the Supreme Court, wherein Security Forces personnel have been cited as respondents.

D. Investigations and Prosecutions

258. Security Forces have in place a military justice procedure, whereby allegations of offences are investigated by the military police, and processed by a military Court of Inquiry and, in the case of major offences, also by the civilian police and civilian courts of law. There have been several instances where military personnel have been subject to indictments preferred by the Attorney General to the High Court.
259. Irrespective of the outcome of a case referred to the civil courts, if there is a *prima facie* case made against the accused after the military inquiry, the accused is discharged from the Security Forces.
260. The military justice procedure is set forth below. This is a procedure that Sri Lanka inherited from the British, post-independence. This procedure has now been laid down statutorily in the Sri Lanka Army, Navy and Air Force Acts, and subsidiary legislation has been enacted under those laws.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

MILITARY JUSTICE PROCEDURE



261. A summary of major offenses committed by Sri Lanka Army personnel between 2005 and 2010 in the North and East and the resultant actions taken by the Army and the civil courts is set forth below:

CATEGORY	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	TOTAL	COURT ACTION				ACTION TAKEN BY THE ARMY					
								CONVICTED	ACQUITTED	NO COURT ACTION	ACTION PENDING IN COURTS	TOTAL	ACQUITTED	DISCHARGED FROM THE ARMY	OTHER PUNISHMENTS	COURT OF INQUIRY- EVIDENCE BEING RECORDED	TOTAL
MURDER	1	4	1	1		1	8		3		5	8	1		1	6	8
RAPE	1		1	1		1	4	1			3	4		1		3	4
SEXUAL ABUSE						1	1			1		1		1			1
TOTAL							13					13					13

262. For each offense, the Army has taken prompt disciplinarian action, and the cases are also pending in the civil courts.

PART THREE

XII. CONSEQUENCES OF THE HUMANITARIAN OPERATION

263. The successful conclusion of the Humanitarian Operation resulted in incalculable positive consequences not only for the civilians freed from LTTE captivity, but also for Sri Lankans of all ethnicities in all parts of Sri Lanka. The positive benefits of the end of the conflict were both immediate and long-term.

Eradication of Terrorism

264. For the first time in three decades, Sri Lankans can go about their everyday lives without the constant fear of a terrorist attack or the palpable sense of insecurity that plagues a nation under constant threat of terrorism. Leaders of the Government of Sri Lanka, political representatives and innocent civilians are no longer under the constant risk of death by terrorist action. This is a benefit that is hard to quantify, but of enormous significance in that it has positively changed the day-to-day lives of all Sri Lankans.

Restoration of Elections

265. The right of franchise has been restored for thousands of residents of the North and the East, and democratic elections are now taking place regularly. The following elections took place in Sri Lanka subsequent to the end of the Humanitarian Operation in May 2009:

Election	District	Date
Local Authorities Elections	Jaffna & Vavuniya (Northern Province)	08 August 2009
Provincial Council Elections	Eastern Province	10 May 2008
	Sabaragamuwa & North Central Province	23 August 2008
	Central & North Western Province	14 February 2009
	Uva Province	08 August 2009
	Western Province	25 April 2009
Presidential Election	Countrywide	26 January 2010
General Election	Countrywide	8 & 20 April 2010

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

The Government of Sri Lanka acted expeditiously to enable Provincial Council elections to take place in the Eastern province shortly after the East was liberated from the LTTE. During that election, an ex-LTTE combatant who rejected terrorism and joined the democratic process was elected as Chief Minister of the Eastern Province. The Presidential Election, which took place in January 2010, was the first election in decades in which the residents of the North and East were able to vote freely without being subjected violence and threats of violence by the LTTE. The General Election in April 2010 soon followed, in which the Tamil National Alliance emerged as the party with the third highest number of seats in Parliament, winning the Northern Province as well as the Batticaloa District in the Eastern Province. Provincial Council Elections have already been held in the East, and local government elections are scheduled to be held in the North on 23 July 2011.

Restoration of Democracy in the North and East

266. For the first time in decades, the people in the areas previously dominated by the LTTE have the opportunity to participate in the democratic process without duress. The flourishing of political plurality in these areas can be seen by the triumph of an Opposition party in the North, whereas the main Government party emerged triumphant in the East and came second in the North during the General Election held in 2010. The emergence of a large number of independent political parties during that election also demonstrates that electoral politics in these areas is regaining vitality after the dismantling of the dictatorial LTTE.

Disarming of Armed Groups

267. The armed groups that opposed the LTTE in the East have been disarmed and transformed into political parties within the democratic mainstream seeking to represent the people through the electoral process. The Government of Sri Lanka took concrete steps to disarm these groups after the success of the Humanitarian Operation. With the demise of the LTTE, it was no longer imperative for members of such groups to carry weapons to protect themselves. The Government of Sri Lanka also issued firm directions to the police to arrest any person carrying arms illegally to ensure that disarmament was comprehensively carried out.

Right to Dissent and Freedom of Expression

268. In the North, where the LTTE successfully wiped out any resistance to its dominance, the Right to Dissent has finally been re-established. Throughout the areas formerly dominated by the LTTE, Freedom of Expression has been restored to the people, and people have regained the freedom to participate in civic life without fear of being subjugated.

Demining of the North and East

269. A major impediment to the swift resettlement of internally displaced people was the extensive presence of land mines placed by the LTTE in civilian areas. To meet this challenge, Security Forces conducted a comprehensive demining operation to clear the North and East of this hazard. Several foreign governments and international agencies provided support for this endeavour. As a result, tens of thousands of families have been able to return to their homes in an expeditious manner. As importantly, not a single incident of a landmine explosion causing injuries to civilians has been reported since the internally displaced were resettled.

Rehabilitation of Former LTTE Cadres

270. Rehabilitation efforts of former LTTE cadres have been largely successful. Of the more than eleven thousand LTTE cadres who surrendered or were detained by Security Forces, the 595 former LTTE child soldiers were rehabilitated under a programme assisted by UNICEF and were then reunited with their families by May 2010. A policy decision was made by the Government of Sri Lanka to not prosecute any child soldiers. A further 6,130 adults were successfully rehabilitated and re-integrated into civilian society by June 2011. Most of the remaining ex-combatants are undergoing further rehabilitation, while some have been identified for prosecution through the legal system for their greater culpability in terrorist activities.

Freedom of Movement

271. All Sri Lankans can now go to any part of the country, without being impeded by LTTE threats, violence, or checkpoints necessitated because of LTTE activities. Many in the Tamil Diaspora who did not co-operate with the LTTE's international network have also felt free to return to Sri Lanka for the first time in decades.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

Normalcy in the North and East

272. The people living in the North and East of Sri Lanka enjoy a state of normalcy - children freely go to school and no longer need to fear being forcibly recruited by the LTTE; the judicial system is functioning without impediment; farming is possible in areas that were previously full of mines; in all other facets of life for the people in these areas, life is returning to normal after a prolonged period of living in a state of fear. Any person irrespective of ethnicity can own land in any part of the country.

Removal of Restrictions on Fishing

273. The extensive restrictions that had to be in place in the North and East due to the adverse security situation caused by the LTTE's Sea Tiger Wing have been lifted. The restrictions on the capacities of Out Board Motors were relaxed, while the extent of the "No Fishing Zones" near critical harbours were also greatly reduced. More critically, the restrictions on the timings during which fishing could take place were gradually phased out between June 2009 and February 2010.

Economic Development in the North and East

274. The Government of Sri Lanka launched a rapid infrastructure development programme soon after the liberation of the East in 2007. In the North, a diverse programme of projects was launched in fields such as Transport & Highways, Railways, Irrigation & Agriculture, Fisheries, Power Supply, Education and Financial Services *etc.*, encompassing the gamut of services and needs essential to life in the community. As a result of peace and the rapid development of infrastructure, the Northern and Eastern provinces are benefitting from new commercial activity undertaken by small and medium businesses. Large investments are also starting to be made in these areas, which were previously mostly ignored by the commercial sector - or, in the case of the formerly LTTE controlled areas, completely inaccessible.

Economic Revival in Sri Lanka

275. The potential of Sri Lanka's economy has been stifled for decades because the threat of terrorism had driven away investment and tourists. Further, the adverse environment caused by the conflict had taken a toll on the economy and precluded

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

successive governments from investing in beneficial infrastructure projects over the years. The end of the Humanitarian Operation marked a period of growth and economic opportunities despite the unfavourable economic conditions prevalent globally.

Communal Harmony

276. Without the provocations and threats of the LTTE, communities of different ethnicities and religions have returned to co-exist peacefully throughout Sri Lanka.

Safety and Security

277. With the eradication of the LTTE in Sri Lanka, all residents of Sri Lanka who lived under a fear psychosis caused by terrorism can now enjoy living in one of the most stable and secure environments in the world. Countries that used to issue cautionary travel advisories to their citizens warning them against traveling to Sri Lanka have now withdrawn those advisories.

Reconciliation and Accountability

278. Due to the success of the Humanitarian Operation, the country now has an opportunity for reconciliation both on a national and local level. On 15 May 2010, President Mahinda Rajapaksa established the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) with the objective to heal the wounds created as a result of the protracted conflict and to bring about reconciliation and unity among the people of Sri Lanka. The Commission has the authority to investigate and report on, inter alia, the facts and circumstances which led to the failure of the ceasefire agreement and the sequence of events that followed thereafter up to 18 May 2009, inclusive of identifying persons or groups responsible for those events. The LLRC has conducted public hearings and sought testimony from a wide spectrum of individuals, from government officials to military officers to ordinary civilians, including through field visits to the conflict-affected areas. On 13 September 2010, the LLRC submitted its interim recommendations, and the Government of Sri Lanka has appointed a high level committee to implement these recommendations through practical measures and to strengthen the related processes that are already underway.

XIII. CONCLUSION

279. Sri Lanka engaged in a military strategy against the LTTE as a last resort, after enduring decades of violence and terrorism committed against its citizens and the State. The LTTE attacks documented in this report are not exhaustive but illustrative of the sheer scale and intensity of LTTE attacks on civilians, political leaders, political opponents and vital infrastructure.
280. Despite the enormity of the losses suffered and tribulations endured by Sri Lanka and its people because of LTTE attacks and threats of attack, successive Governments of Sri Lanka were willing and eager to negotiate with the LTTE for the sake of achieving peace. The details of the previous peace processes attempted by the Government of Sri Lanka described in this report, including the corresponding atrocities committed by the LTTE during each period of ceasefire, make it clear that the LTTE never intended to settle for anything less than a military victory to achieve its aim of a separate state.
281. Having exhausted all alternatives, Sri Lanka used military force at the point when it was necessary to defend its citizens and state from the LTTE. The amount of force used was determined based on a consideration of the strength, resources and sophistication of the LTTE.
282. The details provided in this report about LTTE's human resources, weapons, funding sources and other resources show why defeating the LTTE could not be achieved with a minimal operation or single tactic. Military victory required a large-scale, coordinated effort, combining the strength of all three armed forces, a high level of discipline and the use of multiple tactics, adapted for different terrains and contexts.
283. Recognising the amount of force necessary for a Humanitarian Operation of this magnitude, Security Forces were equally aware of the possible adverse consequences of such force - namely, civilian casualties. As a result, Security Forces took utmost care prior to, during and after the operation to keep collateral damage at a minimum, having regard to the Zero Civilian Casualty policy of the Government. This is demonstrated by the precautions taken before the operation, the specific guidelines issued and the tactics employed in the Humanitarian Operation.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

284. The narratives of the battles in the East, in Wanni and in the final hostage rescue operation presented in this report show how in different environments, and at different stages of the war, Security Forces adapted their tactics and the level of force used in achieving the overall goal of defeating terrorism. This report has shown how in the last stage of the conflict, at the point when the LTTE was weakened and reduced in size, Security Forces adapted their tactics to the new environment.
285. What the narrative has made clear is that while Security Forces were able to change their tactics as needed, they could not cease their offensive. The threat of the LTTE remained until the last hour, and certain success required continued, focused and disciplined force to meet the new challenge created by the LTTE: the thousands of civilians trapped by, and exposed to imminent harm and violence at the hands of a desperate LTTE, had to be skilfully extricated from a precarious situation. Security Forces successfully met this challenge by using the right amount of force, and minimising the resulting losses.
286. The result for the civilians, and for Sri Lanka, has been overwhelmingly positive. Thousands of lives that would have been lost had terrorism continued and war remained in Sri Lanka, have been saved. The quality of life of all Sri Lankans as well as Sri Lanka's prospects in the world economy have markedly improved. The positive consequences of the Humanitarian Operation described in this report are representative and not exhaustive; the benefits of defeating terrorism are immeasurable.
287. From the initial rationale for undertaking an operation utilising military force, to the amount of force used during the operation, to the eventual result, this report has shown how, in all respects, the Humanitarian Operation was just.

ANNEXES

ASSASSINATION OF
TAMIL POLITICIANS /ACADAMICS /INTELLECTUALS /GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	NAME	MODUS OPERANDI
TAMIL POLITICIANS				
1	27/07/1975	Jaffna	Mr. Alfred Duraiappa - MP and Mayor of Jaffna	By gunning down
2	02/10/1980	Kilinochchi	Mr. Subramaniam - UNP Organiser for Kilinochchi	By gunning down
3	24/05/1981	Batticaloa	Dr. Thiyagarajah - UNP Candidate for District Development Council (DDC) elections - 1981	By gunning down
4	15/11/1982	Jaffna	Mr. Vallipuram Thambipillai - UNP Organiser for Punnalaikadduvan	By gunning down
5	19/01/1983	Vavuniya	Mr. K T Pullendran - Ex-MP/UNP Organiser for Vavuniya	By gunning down
6	29/04/1983	Jaffna	Mr. K V Rathnasingham - UNP Candidate for UC elections - Point Pedro	By gunning down
7	30/04/1983	Jaffna	Mr. S S Muttiah - 1st Candidate for UC elections, Chavakachcheri (retd PWD)	By gunning down
8	04/06/1983	Jaffna	Mr. Sinnathambi Thilagar - UNP, Candidate for Local Govt. elections - 1983	By gunning down
9	12/08/1983	Jaffna	Mr. A G Rajasooriyar - UNP Chief Organiser for Jaffna	By gunning down
10	01/09/1983	Batticaloa	Mr. Mala Ramachandran - UNP Member of Municipal Council	By gunning down
11	01/09/1985	Jaffna	Mr. K Thurairathinam - TULF MP for Point Pedro	By gunning down
12	03/09/1985	Jaffna	Mr. K Rajalingam - TULF, MP for Uduppiddi	By gunning down
13	03/09/1985	Jaffna	Mr. V Dharmalingam - TULF MP for Manipai. Father of Mr. D Siddharthan (PLOTE Leader)	By gunning down
14	03/09/1985	Jaffna	Mr. K Alalasundaram - TULF, MP for Kopay	By gunning down
15	08/03/1988	Jaffna	Mr. S Vijayanatham - Secretary of the Ceylon Communist Party in Jaffna	By gunning down
16	20/03/1988	Batticaloa	Mr. Velumurugu - TULF organizer	By gunning down
17	25/01/1989	Jaffna	Mr. N K Sivagnanam - All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC) Candidate	By gunning down
18	08/03/1989	Jaffna	Mr. Sinnathambi Sabanandan - Chief Organiser of TULF	By gunning down
19	13/07/1989	Batticaloa	Mr. Sinnathambi Sambandanmoorthi - Chairman of District Development Council / Chief Organizer of the TULF in Eravur	By gunning down

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	NAME	MODUS OPERANDI
20	13/07/1989	Colombo	Mr. A Amirthalingam, MP, Secretary General of the TULF/ a Former Opposition Leader	By gunning down
21	13/07/1989	Colombo	Mr. V Yogeshwaran - TULF, MP for Jaffna	By gunning down
22	28/01/1990	Trincomalee	Mr. P Ganeshalingam - EPRLF, Ex-Provincial Council Member	By gunning down
23	07/05/1990	Trincomalee	Mr. Sam Thambimuttu - EPRLF MP for Battialoa	By gunning down
24	19/06/1990	India	Mr. V K Yogasangari - EPRLF, MP for Jaffna District	By gunning down
25	19/06/1990	India	Mr. Periyathamby Kirubakaran - Finance Minister of North East Provincial Council	By gunning down
26	19/06/1990	India	Mr. Kandasamy Pathmanabha - EPRLF Leader	
27	15/07/1990	Ampara	Mr. K Kanagaratnam - MP for Pottuvil	By gunning down
28	15/07/1994	Batticaloa	Mr. Velepodi Alagiah - TELO, Pradesiya Sabha Member	By gunning down
29	03/09/1994	Batticaloa	Mr. T Jayarajan - Deputy Leader of TELO / Chairman of the Provincial Council in Batticaloa	By gunning down
30	31/12/1994	Colombo	Mr. Arumugam Chelliah @ Karavai Kandasami - Vice President of DPLF / Leader of PLOTE	By gunning down
31	28/04/1995	Colombo	Mr. K Vinodan - Former SLFP Organiser, Jaffna	By gunning down
32	11/06/1995	Ampara	Mr. Pathmanandan - Chairman of Thirukkivil Pradesiya Sabha	By gunning down
33	26/10/1995	Batticaloa	Mr. Anthony Thomas - Deputy Mayor (TELO member)	By gunning down
34	05/07/1997	Trincomalee	Mr. Arunachalam Thangathurai - TULF MP for Trincomalee	By gunning down
35	03/10/1997	Jaffna	Mr. S P Tharmalingam - President of SLFP Jaffna office	By gunning down
36	16/05/1998	Jaffna	Mrs. Sarojini Yogeshwaran - Mayor of MC, Jaffna / Wife of Mr. V Yogeshwaran TULF MP for Jaffna who was killed by the LTTE on 13/07/1989	By gunning down
37	15/07/1998	Vavuniya	Mr. Saravanabawanandan Shanmuganathan @ Vasanthan - PLOTE, MP for Vavuniya District	By claymore mine attack
38	11/09/1998	Jaffna	Mr. Ponnadurai Sivapalan - TULF / Mayor of MC, Jaffna	Time Bomb Explosion
39	26/12/1998	Jaffna	Mr. Ponnadurai Mathimugarajah - District Secretary of the TULF, Nallur/ The Chairman of the International M G Ramachandran Organisation	By gunning down

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	NAME	MODUS OPERANDI
40	04/02/1999	Jaffna	Mr. Nadarajah Sivarajh - The Vice Chairmen of Valikamam East Provincial Council and an EPDP member	By gunning down
41	04/02/1999	Jaffna	Mr. Bandari Kandasami - EPDP member of Valikamam East Provincial Council	By gunning down
42	05/05/1999	Vavuniya	Mr. Veerathahay Gunarathnam - PLOTE Provincial Council member for Pachchilaipalli	By gunning down
43	13/05/1999	Jaffna	Mr. Kailasapathi - PLOTE, Pradesiya Sabha member of Valikamam East	By gunning down
44	29/05/1999	Batticaloa	Mr. Moorthilingam Ganeshamoorthi - RAZIK Group Leader	Suicide Attack
45	31/05/1999	Jaffna	Mr. Thiyagarajah Rajkumar - EPDP/Member and Vice Chairman of Provincial Council, Nallur	By gunning down
46	16/07/1999	Vavuniya	Mr. Baskaralingam - PLOTE Leader in Vavuniya	By gunning down
47	16/07/1999	Jaffna	Mr. Piyasena Karunarathne - Chief Organizer of EPDP	By gunning down
48	29/07/1999	Colombo	Dr. Neelan Thiruchelvam - TULF MP (National list)/Constitutional Lawyer	Suicide Attack
49	02/09/1999	Vavuniya	Mr. K Manickadasan - Deputy Leader of PLOTE	
50	12/10/1999	Ampara	Mr. Thambirasa Vinayagamoorthi @ Vasikaran - EPDP Co-ordinating Officer	By gunning down
51	02/11/1999	Colombo	Mr. Nadarajah Atputharajah - EPDP, MP/Secretary of the Politbureau of the EPDP/Editor of "Thinamurusu" (a Tamil tabloid)	By gunning down
52	05/01/2000	Colombo	Mr. Kumar Ponnambalam - General Secretary of the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC)/ leading lawyer	By gunning down
53	13/01/2000	Jaffna	Mr. Vadivelu Wijayarathnam - UC Chairman, Point Pedro	By gunning down
54	02/03/2000	Jaffna	Mr. Anton Sivalingam - EPDP/Member of Municipal Council, Jaffna	By gunning down
55	07/06/2000	Batticaloa	Mr. Kanapathipillai Navarathna Rajah @ Robert - TELO, member of Pradesiya Sabha, Arapathi, Batticaloa	By gunning down
56	10/09/2000	Ampara	Mr. R J Perimanayagam - PA Candidate for Batticaloa - General Election 2000	By gunning down
57	07/11/2000	Batticaloa	Mr. Ashley Nimalanayagam Saundranayagam - TULF MP for Batticaloa	By gunning down
58	17/11/2001	Batticaloa	Mr. Sinnathamby Rajkumar - UNP Candidate for Batticaloa district - General election 2001	By gunning down

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	NAME	MODUS OPERANDI
59	18/04/2003	Ampara	Mr. Mariyamuttu Rajalingam @ Jegadeesan the Chairman of the Alayadivembu Pradeshiya Sabha (Member of EPDP).	By gunning down
60	03/05/2003	Jaffna	Mr. Dharmarajah Jeyarasa - EPDP, Former Chairman of the Nelliady Pradeshiya Sabha	By gunning down
61	01/06/2003	Batticaloa	Mr. Kalirajah Ramanan - Former member of the Batticaloa Minicipal Council and Former TELO member	By gunning down
62	14/06/2003	Jaffna	Mr. Subaddiran @ Robert - Deputy Leader of PLOTE	By gunning down
63	16/06/2003	Batticaloa	Ponniah Ramachanran @ Prathab - Candidate Contesting the Local Govt. Election for the Batticaloa Urban Council	By gunning down
64	01/03/2004	Batticaloa	Mr. Sinnathambi Sundarampillai - UNP candidate for the Batticaloa District at the General Election 2004	By gunning down
65	30/03/2004	Batticaloa	Mr. Rajan Sathyamoorthy - TNA Candidate for Batticaloa District	By gunning down
66	21/07/2004	Batticaloa	Mr. Ravindran Velaudan @ Kamalan - the Chairman of the Alayadivembo Pradeshiya Sabha (Member of EPDP)	By gunning down
67	16/08/2004	Colombo	Mr. Balraj Nadarajah Aiyar @ Ileyavan - EPDP Tamil media spokesman / an EPDP candidate for the Jaffna District at the General Election 2004 and a senior journalist	By gunning down
68	10/09/2004	Trincomalee	Mr. Athmalingam Ramani @ Pandiyan - the Deputy Orgniser of the EPDP for Trincomalee	By gunning down
69	11/09/2004	Jaffna	Mr. Mayan Chandra Mohan @ Aruldas - An EPDP member, (Ex-member of Kayts Atchuveili Pradeshiya Sabha).	By gunning down
70	18/09/2004	Puttalam	Mr. Thambithurai Sivakumar @ Bawan - the EPDP leader of Thilladi, Jaffna. (An EPDP candidate for the Jaffna District Parliamentary Election 2004)	By gunning down
71	27/09/2004	Jaffna	Mr. Vallisundaram - a former member of the Valikamam North Pradeshiya Sabha (from 1998-2002) and a member of the EPRLF (Vardaraja Perumal group)	By gunning down
72	19/10/2004	Batticaloa	Mr. Kingsly Rajanayagam - a former TNA MP for Batticaloa	By gunning down
73	28/04/2005	Batticaloa	Mr. Murugesu Wardaraja, EPRLF - A member of Porathivu Pradeshiya Sabha (former EPRLF deputy leader in Batticaloa)	By gunning down
74	25/05/2005	Trincomalee	Mr. Periyapudi Sooriyamoorthi - Former Mayor of Trincomalee (A TELO member)	By gunning down on 18/05/2005

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	NAME	MODUS OPERANDI
75	12/08/2005	Colombo	Hon. Lakshman Kadiragamar - Minister of Foreign Affairs	By gunning down
76	28/11/2007	Colombo	Mr. Stephen Peiris - MP Dougals Devananda's Secretary Coordinator	Suicide Attack
77	01/01/2008	Colombo	Mr. T Maheswaran - A former Minister of UNF government	By gunning down
78	06/04/2008	Gampaha	Mr. Jeyaraj Fernandopulle - Minister of Highways & Road Development and Chief Government Whip	Suicide Attack
79	13/05/2008	Jaffna	Miss Maheshvari Velautham - MP Dougals Devananda's Adviser	By gunning down
80	02/06/2008	Batticaloa	Mr. Pushpanadan Aiyathure - Vice Chairman of Kaluthavali Pradeshiya Sabha	By gunning down
81	06/10/2008	Anuradhapura	Dr. Raja Johnpulle - Organizer of Anuradhapura District	Suicide Attack
82	11/10/2008	Vavuniya	Mr. T M Tavachelvam - UNP Organizer, Vavuniya	By gunning down
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS				
83	25/05/1984	Jaffna	Mr. Vaththiyampillai Francis - Gramasevaka of Madagal	By gunning down
84	18/09/1984	Batticaloa	Mr. Samythambi Gopalapillai - Special Service Officer of Thambiluvil	By gunning down
85	08/12/1984	Jaffna	Mr. U Ramaiah - Supervisor of Cement Corporation - Kankesanthurai	By gunning down
86	24/02/1985	Kilinochchi	Mr. S Gnanachandiram, GA, Mullaitivu	By gunning down
87	03/10/1985	Batticaloa	Mr. Vadivel Perimbam - Gramasevaka	By gunning down
88	23/08/1986	Trincomalee	Mr. S Vishvalingam - Gramasevaka	By gunning down
89	09/04/1987	Batticaloa	Mr. Kanapathipillai Sundaralingam - Gramasevaka	By gunning down
90	15/09/1987	Ampara	Mr. P Vignarajah - AGA, Samanthurai	By gunning down
91	28/09/1987	Trincomalee	Mr. Arumugampillai - Secretary UC, Trincomalee	By gunning down
92	08/10/1987	Batticaloa	Mr. S S Jeganathan - AGA, Batticaloa	By gunning down
93	06/11/1987	Trincomalee	Mr. V S Paramaguru - Dept. Engineer	By gunning down
94	26/11/1987	Trincomalee	Mr. P Sinnadurai - AGA, Mr. Haniffa - Gramasevaka	By gunning down
95	17/12/1987	Trincomalee	Mr. P Sundaranayagam - Gramasevaka, Kokkadichoalal	By gunning down
96	17/12/1987	Batticaloa	Mr. P Undaranayagam - Gramasevaka of Kokkadicholal	By gunning down
97	11/05/1988	Batticaloa	Mr. Nadarajah Kugadasan - Co-operative Manager	By gunning down
98	07/04/1989	Jaffna	Mr. Ramanathan - AGA, Jaffna	By gunning down
99	01/05/1989	Jaffna	Mr. V M Panchalingam - GA for Jaffna	By gunning down

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	NAME	MODUS OPERANDI
100	02/05/1989	Kilinochchi	Mr. Panchalingam - Assistant Manager of Marketing Depot - Kilinochchi	By gunning down
101	10/05/1989	Jaffna	Mr. Mahalingam - Asst. Manager of Marketing Depot - Kilinochchi	By gunning down
102	03/08/1989	Batticaloa	Mr. Arasaratnam Ganeshapillai - Supervisor of the Irrigation Department	By gunning down
103	28/06/1989	Jaffna	Mr. K Pulendran - AGA, Jaffna	By gunning down
104	06/09/1989	Kilinochchi	Mr. P Ravindran - Station Master	By gunning down
105	09/09/1989	Jaffna	Mr. Krishnamooth - Gramasevaka	By gunning down
106	09/09/1989	Jaffna	Mr. Shammughanathan - Gramasevaka	By gunning down
107	12/10/1989	Batticaloa	Mr. Sivendraraja - Gramasevaka	By gunning down
108	21/11/1989	Ampara	Mr. P L Anthonees - Doctor	By gunning down
109	30/11/1989	Batticaloa	Mr. K Sundaralingam - Clerk of the MPCS Union, Pandirippu	By gunning down
110	28/01/1990	Trincomalee	Mr. Kandasamy Sadanandan Jothi - Gramasevaka of Nilaveli Division	By gunning down
111	20/11/1991	Batticaloa	Mr. S Wijeratnam - Gramasevaka, Kokkadicholai	By gunning down
112	23/11/1991	Batticaloa	Mr. K Podiweerartnam Gramasevaka - Pandariyawela	By gunning down
113	09/09/1993	Ampara	Mr. S M Chandrapala - Post Master of Bakitiyawa	By gunning down
114	09/07/2004	Batticaloa	Mr. Kunjitahmbi Sivaraza - Gramasevaka Karadyanaru	By gunning down
115	04/04/2005	Batticaloa	Mr. Thyagaraja Kailanadan - Director of Vocational Training Ministry of Agricultural Marketing Development Co-operative Development and Hindu Affairs	By gunning down
116	10/04/2005	Ampara	Mr. Sivarathnam Arunambalam - Development Registrar of Samurdhi	By gunning down
117	15/04/2005	Ampara	Mr. T Thawarasa - Divisional Secretary	By gunning down
118	20/06/2005	Ampara	Mr. Marimuttu Paskaran - Gramasevaka Kalmunai - 3	By gunning down
119	21/09/2005	Batticaloa	Mr. A Jeevaratnam - Gramasevaka - Kinniady	Hand Grenade attack
120	19/10/2005	Vavuniya	Mr. Peraira Weerasingham - Gramasevaka - Kankankulam	By gunning down
121	02/12/2005	Batticaloa	Mr. A L M Falleel - Divisional Secretary - Kattankudy	Pistol Group
122	24/04/2006	Batticaloa	Mr. Ariyaratnam Linkgeshwaram (Education Office - Valachchenai)	By gunning down
123	26/05/2006	Batticaloa	Mr. Rathnam Rathnarajah - Provincial Official Director, Irrigation Engineer - Batticaloa	By gunning down
124	21/06/2006	Jaffna	Mr. Sinnamam Tharmarajah - Manager of URELU Co-operative Society	By gunning down

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	NAME	MODUS OPERANDI
125	04/08/2006	Jaffna	Mr. Ponnaturai Ganesha Moorthi - Bank Manager of People's Bank - Kankesanthurai	By gunning down
126	12/08/2006	Colombo	Mr. Kethesh Loganathan - Deputy General of Secretariat Coordinating for Peace Process	By gunning down
127	16/10/2006	Jaffna	Mr. Marakandu Mahendran - Gramasevaka - J/95 Arialai	
128	30/10/2006	Jaffna	Mr. Qubat Anand Rajah - Gramasevaka - J/70 GS Division	By gunning down
129	05/01/2007	Vavuniya	Mr. V Ganeshalingam - Agricultural officer	Claymore mine
130	05/01/2007	Vavuniya	Mr. V Mahendran - Agricultural officer	Claymore mine
131	12/01/2007	Jaffna	Mr. Vellayan Premachandran - Gramasevaka - J/383 GS Division	By gunning down
132	22/01/2007	Vavuniya	Mr. Daramakulasingham - CTB Depot Manager - Vavuniya	By gunning down
133	20/09/2007	Batticaloa	Mr. Muthukumaran Paramasodi - Gramasevaka - Palaththadichenai	By gunning down
134	07/01/2008	Batticaloa	Mr. Parasuraman Nanthakumar - President of Batticaloa District Volunteer Teacher's Union	By gunning down
135	20/04/2008	Batticaloa	Mr. Kanagarathnam Anadi - Gramasevaka - Kalmunai	By gunning down
136	16/11/2008	Batticaloa	Dr. Palitha Padmakumara - Thavakkadu Hospital	By gunning down
INTELLECTUALS				
137	01/07/1979	Jaffna	IP Mr. Gurusamay - A witness of the SANSONI Commission	By gunning down
138	05/05/1984	Mullaitivu	Sinnathamby Appukutty Ambalavanar, JP	By gunning down
139	22/08/1985	Mullaitivu	Mr. D K Thambipillai - President of Citizen Committee	By gunning down
140	14/12/1987	Batticaloa	Mr. Kanapathipillai Sundaralingam - Member of Gramodaya Mandalaya	By gunning down
141	17/12/1987	Batticaloa	Mr. K Sugathadasan - Ex-President of Ambalanthurai Citizens Committee	By gunning down
142	27/10/1988	Jaffna	Mr. Raja Shankar - President of the Citizens Committee	By gunning down
143	18/02/1989	Jaffna	Mr. Mylvaganam editor of the Daily "Elamurusu"	By gunning down
144	14/07/1989	Batticaloa	Mr. Krishnapillai - Ayurvedic Physician	By gunning down
145	10/05/1989	Jaffna	Mr. Mahalingam - Reporter of the Island Newspaper	By gunning down
146	27/05/1990	Batticaloa	Mrs. Thambimuttu - Social worker/Wife of Mr. Sam Thambimuttu, EPRLF MP for Batticaloa	By gunning down
147	24/05/2004	Batticaloa	Mr. Kumaravellu Thambaiya - Lecturer of Eastern University	By gunning down

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	NAME	MODUS OPERANDI
148	07/04/2006	Trincomalee	Mr. V Wignashwaram - Leader of North and East Tamil Organization in Trincomalee	By gunning down
ACADEMIC PERSONNEL				
149	26/06/1985	Jaffna	Mr. C E Anandarajah - Principal of St. Johns College	Pistol Group
150	05/08/1986	Batticaloa	Mr. Sivalingam - Principal, Sittandy Ramakrishnan Mission School	By gunning down
151	03/11/1987	Batticaloa	Mr. E Dharmalingam - Principal of Puttur College	By gunning down
152	14/12/1987	Batticaloa	Mr. K Eliyathambi Kandasamy - Principal of Palugamam Maha Vidyalaya	By gunning down
153	14/12/1987	Batticaloa	Mr. Velamppodi Gunaratnam - Teacher of Palugamam Maha Vidyalaya	By gunning down
154	14/12/1987	Batticaloa	Mr. K E Kandasamy - Principal of Palugamam Maha Vidyalaya	By gunning down
155	13/05/1988	Batticaloa	Mr. Masalamani Kanagaranam - Principal of Arampathi Maha Vidyalaya	By gunning down
156	01/11/1995	Jaffna	Mrs. Pasupathipillai - Principal of Manipay Hindu Vidyalaya	By gunning down
157	03/10/2005	Jaffna	Mr. Parameshvaram - A Teacher of OLR School Jaffna	By gunning down
158	11/10/2005	Jaffna	Mr. Nadaraja Shivagadasan - Principal of J/Christian College - Kopay	By gunning down
159	11/10/2005	Jaffna	Mr. Kanabathi Rajadorai - Principal of Central College - Jaffna	By gunning down
160	11/10/2006	Batticaloa	Miss Shivaghana Selwam - Teacher of Saraswathi College - Kinnlady	By gunning down

SOME OF THE ATTACKS CARRIED OUT BY LTTE ON CIVILIAN TARGETS

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	DESCRIPTION
1	14/05/1985	Sri Maha Bodiya - Anuradhapura	120	85	0	LTTE massacred Buddhist devotees at the Sri Maha Bodhiya
2	14/05/1985	Wilpattu Jungle - Puttalam	18	0	0	Armed terrorists shot dead 18 Sinhalese
3	02/08/1985	Thirukonamadu - Polonnaruwa	6	0	0	Armed terrorists attacked Ruhunu Somawathiya Temple
4	03/05/1986	Katunayake - Gampaha	16	0	0	Bomb exploded in Tristar aircraft at the Bandaranaike International Airport, killing foreigners and local travellers
5	07/05/1986	Colombo	14	0	0	Bomb exploded in Central Telecommunication Office complex
6	30/05/1986	Colombo	11	0	0	Bomb explosion at the Elephant House Supermarket killing civilians
7	30/05/1986	Pahala Thoppur - Trincomalee	5	0	0	Land mine explosion on a moving Bus carrying Security Force personnel and civilians
8	31/05/1986	Veyangoda Railway Station - Gampaha	10	0	0	A bomb explosion in <i>Yaldevi</i> train
9	11/06/1986	Trincomalee	22	75	0	Killing of a large group of people in a bomb explosion in a bus at Inner Harbour Road - Trincomalee
10	25/06/1986	Sittaru Kantalai - Trincomalee	16	0	0	Killing of a large group of people in a Bomb explosion in the area
11	13/07/1986	Pavakkulam - Trincomalee	11	0	0	04 armed terrorists had come in a jeep to Pavakkulam and attacked the civilians
12	17/07/1986	Block 4 Sugar Corp. - Trincomalee	10	0	0	Terrorists had exploded a bomb
13	22/07/1986	Mamaduwa - Vavuniya	32	2	0	Terrorists exploded a Land Mine on a civilian bus
14	24/07/1986	Issenbessagala - Anuradhapura	17	40	0	Killing a large group of people in a Bomb explosion

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	DESCRIPTION
15	18/02/1987	Nelungama - Badulla	7	0	0	A time bomb explosion
16	17/04/1987	Habarana - Trincomalee	96	44	0	LTTE massacred 96 civilians and 31 SF personnel who were travelling in a passenger bus
17	21/04/1987	Central Bus Stand, Pettah - Colombo	106	295	0	The LTTE exploded a car bomb at the Pettah Bus Stand
18	02/06/1987	Arantalawa - Ampara	35	14	0	Massacre of 31 Buddhist Priests and 04 civilians
19	11/06/1987	Veppankulam - Trincomalee	13	0	0	Killing a large group of people in a pressure mine explosion
20	12/06/1987	Godapotha - Polonnaruwa	8	6	0	Terrorists surrounded a temple and attacked
21	29/07/1987	Thoppur - Trincomalee	9	0	0	Terrorist attack on civilians
22	06/10/1987	Batticaloa Town	18	6	0	Armed terrorists fired at civilians
23	06/10/1987	Valachchenai - Batticaloa	40	0	0	LTTE set fire to the Batticaloa mail train
24	07/10/1987	Lahugala - Pottuvil - Ampara	30	0	0	The LTTE killed 30 Civilians travelling in a passenger bus from Moneragala to Pottuvil
25	16/10/1987	Pulmoddai - Anuradhapura	8	0	0	A bus proceeding from Pulmoddai was stopped by terrorists and attacked
26	19/10/1987	Kalkudah - Batticaloa	40	24	0	LTTE exploded a landmine
27	09/11/1987	Maradana - Colombo	23	106	0	Vehicle bomb explosion opposite Zahira College
28	22/12/1987	Morawewa - Trincomalee	6	0	0	Terrorists abducted 06 fishermen and later killed them.
29	11/03/1988	Horowpothana - Polonnaruwa	19	9	0	A group of armed terrorists had attacked a private bus at Suhadagama with small arms and grenades
30	27/03/1988	Wewalketiya - Anuradhapura	9	14	0	A bomb which was hidden in a gunny bag inside a CTB bus plying from Medawachchiya to Horowpathana exploded

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	DESCRIPTION
31	30/04/1988	Awarathalawa - Vavuniya	4	5	0	Terrorists attack on a civil bus
32	01/05/1988	Sittaru/Kantalai - Trincomalee	26	35	0	Terrorists exploded a Land Mine on a civilian bus
33	09/07/1988	Irattaperiyakulam - Vavuniya	2	10		A passenger bus leaving Jaffna was ambushed by LTTE
34	21/07/1988	Trincomalee town	5	15	0	A time bomb explosion in Bandula Hotel causing damage to the Building
35	16/08/1988	Trincomalee town	9	19		A bomb was exploded by the LTTE
36	25/08/1988	Marawila - Polonnaruwa	11	0	0	Armed terrorists had killed civilians by cutting their throats
37	14/11/1988	Peniketiyawa - Trincomalee	28	2	0	Terrorists ambushed a civil bus
38	13/04/1989	Centre Road - Trincomalee	51	43	0	A Car bomb explosion
39	17/08/1989	Nochchikulam - Vavuniya	8	4	0	An IED explosion
40	25/07/1990	Meeyankulam - Polonnaruwa	8	0	0	Civilians were hacked to death by terrorists
41	29/07/1990	Samanturai - Ampara	5	3	0	Terrorists fired at a Mosque
42	30/07/1990	Akkaraipattu - Ampara	14	0	0	Terrorists abducted and killed 14 Muslims
43	03/08/1990	Kathankudy - Batticaloa	147	70	0	Terrorists massacred Muslim devotees at a Mosque
44	05/08/1990	Mullayankadu - Ampara	17	0	0	Terrorists killed civilians working in a paddy field
45	06/08/1990	Ampara area	34	0	0	Terrorists killed civilians working in a paddy field
46	08/08/1990	Meegaswewa - Trincomalee	26	7	0	A Private coach proceeding from Morawewa to Horowpathana was attacked by Terrorists

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	DESCRIPTION
47	12/08/1990	Weerachcholai - Ampara	4	10	0	Terrorists attacked Muslim civilians working in a paddy field
48	13/08/1990	Muttur - Trincomalee	6	0	0	06 Muslim fishermen were killed and burried at Gengai villiage by terrorists
49	13/08/1990	Pulmoddai - Welioya	14	0	0	Terrorists ambushed a lorry travelling from Negombo to Kokkuvil
50	09/09/1990	Uhana - Ampara	7	2	0	Terrorists attacked farmers who were travelling on a tractor
51	13/09/1990	South of Poonani - Anuradhapura	7	0	0	Security Forces recovered 07 mutilated bodies of Muslim villagers. The deceased had been hacked to death.
52	24/09/1990	Gajabapura - Welioya	4	0	0	Terrorists set fire to 05 houses
53	30/09/1990	Maha Oya - Ampara	9	0	0	Terrorists hijacked civilians and killed them
54	11/10/1990	Arugam Bay - Ampara	9	0	0	Terrorists shot and hacked to death 09 Muslims who were collecting fire woods near Kirankove Jungle
55	02/03/1991	Havelock Road - Colombo	19	70	0	A suicide vehicle bomb explosion
56	24/03/1991	Fish Market - Akkaraipattu - Ampara	9	32	0	Bomb explosion at Fish Market
57	03/04/1991	Keviliya - Trincomalee	10	11	16	Terrorists attack on fishing vallams
58	12/06/1991	Kokkadicholai - Batticaloa	10	0	0	Bomb explosion on Manmunai Ferry
59	08/08/1991	Samanturai - Batticaloa	6	0	0	08 Muslim farmers who were on their way home from their paddy fields had been killed by a group of terrorists
60	26/01/1992	Between Aratalawa and Borapola - Ampara	10	26	0	Killing a large gp of people who were travelling in a private bus playing between Maha Oya and Ampara through a land mine explosion
61	10/04/1992	Ampara	28	36	0	A bomb exploded in a private bus which was parked at the Ampara bus stand

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	DESCRIPTION
62	10/04/1992	Maharagama - Colombo	9	23	0	At the Maharagama town a bomb exploded in a car close to the National Youth Council building
63	10/04/1992	Maradana - Colombo	8	23	0	Killing a large group of people in a car bomb explosion
64	02/06/1992	209 mile post - Pottuvil - Ampara	14	3	0	Terrorists stopped a private bus plying from Akkaraipattu to Pottuvil and opened fire
65	15/07/1992	Kirankulam - Batticaloa	19	7	0	Terrorists attacked a civil bus proceeding from Kathankudy towards Kalmunai
66	21/07/1992	Batticaloa	8	4	0	Terrorists stopped the Colombo-Batticaloa train and ordered the passengers to get down and opened fire at the Muslim passengers
67	30/07/1992	Trincomalee	9	34	0	Killing a group of people in a explosion by a bomb planted in a private bus at the bus stand
68	01/09/1992	Saindamadu - Ampara	0	0	22	LTTE launched a bomb attack
69	10/09/1992	Trincomalee	6	2	0	Blasted a ferry at Kiliveddy Point
70	26/12/1992	Vakaneri South - Batticaloa	6	0	0	A Maruti Jeep (17 - 5747) carrying the Additional AG (Batticaloa), AGA (Valachchenai) and 04 others was caught in a land mine explosion
71	01/05/1993	Armour Street Junction - Colombo	13	23	0	A suicide bomb explosion killing HE R Premadasa, the President of Sri Lanka
72	19/01/1994	Rambawewa - Anuradhapahura	10	0	0	Bomb blast in a bus at Rambawewa
73	16/03/1994	Kudiramalai - Puttalam	17	3	0	Approx. 10 boats that had gone fishing close to Kudiramalai point were attacked by terrorists
74	24/10/1994	Thotalanga Junction - Colombo	54	72	0	A suicide bomb explosion
75	07/08/1995	Independence Square - Colombo	23	40	0	A suicide cadre pushing a cart fixed with a bomb exploded it at the gate of the Ministerial office of the Western Province Chief Minister

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	DESCRIPTION
76	25/10/1995	Panama - Ampara	8	0	0	Terrorists kidnapped 02 villagers from Panama village and killed them. Later they kidnapped another 06 and killed them.
77	11/11/1995	Slave Island - Colombo	11	52	0	A suicide bomber who had been in the vicinity of AHQ detonated himself in close proximity to the Slave Island Railway Station
78	05/12/1995	Puthukudirippu - Batticaloa	12	0	0	A vehicle bomb exploded in front of the Puthukudirippu camp
79	31/01/1996	Colombo	80	1200	0	A large group of people were killed in a bomb explosion in front of the Cental Bank
80	18/06/1996	Meegasgodella - Trincomalee	6	2	0	A vehicle belonging to Survey Department was fired on by a group of terrorists while it was returning from Kantalai to Kallar
81	04/07/1996	Jaffna Town	12	50	0	Suicide bomber exploded
82	24/07/1996	Dehiwala - Colombo	57	356	0	Bomb explosion on the Alutgama train at Dehiwala station
83	12/09/1996	Arantalawa - Ampara	11	31	0	Terrorists attacked the SLTB bus plying from Ampara to Kandy
84	15/10/1997	Colombo Fort	11	105	0	Terrorists activated lorry bomb at Galadari Hotel and at the World Trade Centre
85	25/01/1998	Kandy	9	15	0	A large group of people were killed when a LTTE suicide bomber exploded 02 bombs in the vicinity of Dalada Maligawa in Kandy
86	05/03/1998	Maradana - Colombo	36	270	0	Vehicle bomb explosion near Maradana Police Station
87	09/03/1998	Eravur - Batticaloa	5	26	0	Claymore mine explosion in the centre of Eravur town
88	11/09/1998	Nallur - Jaffna	5	12	0	Bomb explosion that took place in the Municipal Commissioner's Office close to Nallur Kovil
89	29/09/1998	Jaffna	54	0	0	LTTE attack on a passenger aircraft belonging to Lion Air Flight killing 54 civilians including the crew members
90	20/11/1999	Madhu Church complex - Mannar	38	66	0	Terrorists fired small arms and mortars on the Madhu Church complex

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	DESCRIPTION
91	18/12/1999	Town Hall - Colombo	16	106	0	A suicide cadre exploded herself at a Presidential Election Campaign Meeting
92	18/12/1999	Ja-Ela - Gampaha	12	45	0	A LTTE suicide bomber attacked a UNP election meeting
93	05/01/2000	Flower Road - Colombo	9	16	0	A female suicide bomber exploded herself when police officers attempted to check her in front of the Prime Minister's Office
94	27/01/2000	Vavuniya	13	58	0	A Parcel bomb planted in the Vavuniya post office exploded
95	10/03/2000	Rajagiriya - Borella - Colombo	15	76	0	The LTTE killed a large group of people when their mission of assassinating cabinet ministers and top defence officials returning from the Parliament failed
96	07/04/2000	Aralaganvila - Polonnaruwa	4	0	0	Terrorist fired at farmers
97	12/04/2000	Fort Fedrick - Trincomalee	10	60	0	Terrorists threw a Hand Grenade at a Musical Show
98	17/05/2000	Batticaloa	17	78		A bomb exploded opposite the "Vesak Pandal" at Mangalaram Temple, Batticaloa
99	07/06/2000	Ratmalana - Colombo	24	60	0	A large group of people were killed in a LTTE suicide mission
100	15/09/2000	Maradana - Colombo	5	25	0	A suicide cadre exploded himself at Deans Road near the Eye Hospital while being checked by a Police Constable
101	02/10/2000	Mutur - Trincomalee	27	46	0	A suicide bomber riding a bicycle strapped with explosives drove into a three wheeler carrying Mr. Mohamad Latiff Baithullah, a PA candidate, killing a large group of people
102	05/10/2000	Medawachchiya - Anuradhapura	11	40	0	A LTTE suicide bomber exploded herself at a General Election meeting held by the Peoples Alliance in Medawachchiya Town, killing a large group of innocent people
103	28/11/2000	Kebitigollawa - Anuradhapura	16	36	0	Passenger bus which was proceeding on the Medawachchiya - Kebitigollewa Road, got caught to a pressure mine killing a large group of innocent people

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	DESCRIPTION
104	05/03/2005	Kolakanawadiya - Polonnaruwa	6	3	0	A group of gunman suspected to be LTTE attacked a group of civilian
105	18/11/2005	Akkaraipattu - Batticaloa	4	35	0	A Civilian lobbed two hand grenade at the Main Mosque in Akkaraipattu
106	12/04/2006	Trincomalee Town	15	45	0	A bomb exploded near Public Market - Trincomalee
107	23/04/2006	Kallampaththuwa - Trincomalee	5	0	0	LTTE cadres fired at the farmers who were in a paddy field
108	27/05/2006	Nochchiyagama - Puttalam	7	0	0	A group of 07 civilians who entered the Wilpattu National Park were killed when the vehicle in which they were travelling got caught to a cluster of landmines
109	29/05/2006	Omadiyamadu - Polonnaruwa	12	2	0	LTTE had massacred 12 persons who were engaged in a tank construction project
110	15/06/2006	Kebitigollewa - Anuradhapura	64	87	0	LTTE had exploded 02 claymore mines targeting a passenger bus transporting approximately 160 passengers from villages of Viharahalmillewa, Halmillawetiya, Yakawewa and Talgaswewa to Kebitigollewa. In the explosion 01 soldier, 15 Home Guards and 48 civilians were killed and 01 soldier and 86 civilians were injured
111	18/09/2006	Panama - Ampara	10	1	0	10 Muslim civilians were killed by the LTTE group whilst they were engaged in construction works at Radaella Tank in Panama - Potuvil area
112	05/01/2007	Nittambuwa - Gampaha	5	54	0	A Time bomb exploded in a private bus plying between Nittambuwa to Giriulla
113	06/01/2007	Seenigama - Galle	11	30	0	An explosion occurred inside a Matara bound private bus plying from Colombo at Seenigama, near the Kahawa Junction, Ambalangoda
114	01/04/2007	Mailambaveli, Eravur - Batticaloa	6	3	0	An LTTE armed gang forcibly took 08 Civilians, workers out of a construction site (Village Hope a housing scheme for Orphanage Children and took them 200m away and shot them)

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	DESCRIPTION
115	25/04/2007	Kondavattavan - Ampara	14	25	0	Passenger bus plying from Ampara to Badulla <i>via</i> Bibila was blown up by a bomb hidden inside the bus by LTTE terrorists
116	05/04/2007	Nidanwala - Polonnaruwa	4	0	0	04 male farmers were killed by a group of LTTE terrorists consisting of 10 - 15 terrorists with fire arms while the farmers were harvesting
117	07/04/2007	Piramanalankulam - Vavuniya	6	17	0	A passenger transport bus carrying civilian commuters from Mannar to Vavuniya (A-30 road) was attacked by LTTE with a claymore mine in the general area Piramanalankulam
118	13/04/2007	Aiyankerni - Batticaloa	5	2	0	LTTE attacked, using small arms, a group of TMVP members. Due to the fire 02 TMVP members and 03 civilians died and 02 civilians received injuries
119	01/05/2007	Thihihilaweddi - Batticaloa	3	0	0	LTTE shot dead 03 farmers including a woman at Thihihilaweddi in an uncleared area while the farmers were in their farm
120	26/11/2007	Wilachchiya - Anuradhapura	4	0	0	04 civilians were killed by LTTE
121	26/11/2007	Nugegoda - Colombo	15	36	0	An explosion took place at Nugegoda junction in front of shopping complex
122	05/12/2007	Abimanapura - Anuradhapura	14	21	0	LTTE terrorists exploded a claymore mine targeting a bus which was transporting civilians from Anuradhapura to Janakapura
123	16/01/2008	Okkampitiya - Monaragala	27	65	0	Blasting of a claymore mine followed by shooting LTTE terrorists targeted a passenger bus which was plying from Okkampitiya to Buttala in the general area of Weligama
124	31/01/2008	Thirunelvely - Jaffna	4	14	0	An LTTE suicide bomber who had come in a pedal cycle exploded himself on the Jaffna - Nallur road
125	02/02/2008	Dambulla - Matale	18	71	0	Passenger bus plying from Kandy to Anuradhapura was blown up by a concealed time bomb inside the bus at Dambulla bus stand
126	03/02/2008	Colombo	15	85	0	An LTTE female suicide bomber blew herself on platform No.3 inside the Colombo Fort Railway Station

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	DESCRIPTION
127	04/02/2008	Nikawewa - Welioya	8	12	0	Blasting of a claymore mine by LTTE terrorists targeting a passenger bus which was plying from Parakramapura to Janakapura in Nikawewa.
128	06/04/2008	Weliweriya - Gampaha	10	72	0	LTTE Suicide attack at Weliweriya which killed Mr. Jeyaraj Fernandopulle, Minister of Highways & Road Development and the Chief Govt. Whip.
129	25/04/2008	Piliyandala - Colombo	27	67	0	A bomb explosion using a remote control device took place inside a crowded passenger bus plying between Piliyandala and Kahapola.
130	08/05/2008	Ampara	12	36	0	An explosion took place close to the Clock Tower of Ampara.
131	26/05/2008	Dehiwala - Colombo	9	80	0	Blasting of a bomb inside the Panadura bound crowded office train at Dehiwala Railway Station.
132	06/06/2008	Katubedda - Colombo	23	28	0	Blasting of a claymore mine targeting a private passenger bus proceeding towards Mount Lavinia from Kottawa between Shilabimbarama Temple and the University of Moratuwa.
133	11/07/2008	Galge - Yala - Hambantota	4	21	0	LTTE fired on a passenger bus travelling from Buttala to Kataragama.
134	06/10/2008	Anuradhapura	27	84	0	An LTTE male suicide bomber exploded himself killing Major General K J C Perera RWP RSP VSV USP rcds Psc (Retd), leader of the opposition North Central Provincial Council, and 26 other persons and injuring 84 persons during a function held to declare open the new UNP office in Anuradhapura.
135	09/02/2009	Puliyampokkanai - Kilinochchi	9	41	0	An LTTE female suicide bomber exploded herself while troops were conducting body searches of IDPS.
136	10/02/2009	Puthukkudiyiruppu - Mullaittivu	19	75	0	Terrorists fired at IDPs coming to SF controlled area.
137	10/02/2009	Akuressa - Matara	13	42	0	An LTTE suicide bomber attacked the Jumma Mosque at Godapitiya in Akuressa.

THE LIST OF LTTE ATTACKS ON VULNERABLE VILLAGES

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	DISTRICT	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	TACTICS / MODUS OPERENDI
1	29/11/1984	Dollar Farm, Welioya	Vavuniya	33	0	0	Sinhala fishing village was attacked using automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
2	30/11/1984	Kent Farm, Welioya	Vavuniya	29	0	0	Sinhala fishing village was attacked using automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
3	04/06/1985	Dehiwatta	Trincomalee	15	0	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
4	14/08/1985	Arantalawa	Ampara	7	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
5	18/08/1985	Namalwatta	Trincomalee	7	0	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
6	07/11/1985	Namalwatta	Trincomalee	10	0	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
7	19/02/1986	Kantalai	Trincomalee	19	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
8	01/12/1984	Kokilai	Welioya	11	0	0	Sinhala fishing village was attacked using automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
9	05/05/1986	Kinniya	Trincomalee	4	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
10	25/05/1986	Mahadivulwewa	Trincomalee	20	0	0	LTTE attacked Sinhala village using automatic weapon and subsequently set fire to 20 houses.
11	02/06/1986	Trincomalee, 3rd mile post	Trincomalee	10	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	DISTRICT	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	TACTICS / MODUS OPERENDI
12	04/06/1986	Andankulam	Trincomalee	17	0	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
13	21/06/1986	Wilgamwehera	Trincomalee	9	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
14	08/07/1986	Monkey bridge	Trincomalee	15	0	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
15	09/07/1986	Mollipothna	Trincomalee	16	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
16	19/07/1986	Wadigawewa	Polonnaruwa	17	5	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
17	17/09/1986	Kantalai	Trincomalee	10	0	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
18	17/09/1986	Wadigawewa	Trincomalee	12	0	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
19	04/02/1987	Manthottam	Ampara	8	0	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
20	07/02/1987	Aranthalawa	Ampara	27	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
21	25/03/1987	Serunewa	Anuradhapura	25	0	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
22	20/04/1987	Jayanthipura	Trincomalee	15	0	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
23	29/05/1987	Kadawathmadu	Polonnaruwa	7	5	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	DISTRICT	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	TACTICS / MODUS OPERENDI
24	21/06/1987	Godapotha - Beruwila	Polonnaruwa	8	1	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
25	06/10/1987	Talawai	Batticaloa	25	0	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
26	06/10/1987	Sagarapura	Trincomalee	27	6	0	LTTE attacked Sinhala village using automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
27	10/10/1987	Gantalawa / Kantalai	Trincomalee	9	3	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
28	15/10/1987	Ella Kantalai	Trincomalee	14	0	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
29	15/12/1987	Devalegodella	Polonnaruwa	7	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
30	31/12/1987	Batticaloa	Batticaloa	30	0	0	LTTE attacked Kathankudi Muslim village using automatic weapon.
31	01/01/1988	Kuruniyankulama	Trincomalee	3	2	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
32	02/02/1988	Bogamuyaya	Ampara	11	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
33	02/03/1988	Morawewa	Trincomalee	15	3	9	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
34	05/03/1988	Sittaru, Kantalai	Trincomalee	24	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
35	14/03/1988	Galmitiyawa	Trincomalee	12	2	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
36	15/03/1988	Kivulkade	Trincomalee	7	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
37	17/03/1988	Deegawapi	Ampara	13	9	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	DISTRICT	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	TACTICS / MODUS OPERENDI
38	22/03/1988	Pudukulam	Vavuniya	4	3	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
39	22/03/1988	Medawachchikulam	Vavuniya	9	3	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
40	31/03/1988	Saindamaradu/ Kalmune	Ampara	17	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
41	08/04/1988	Megaswewa, Horowpathana	Anuradhapura	14	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
42	28/07/1988	Ethawetunuwewa	Welioya	16	1	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
43	10/08/1988	Central Camp	Ampara	11	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
44	10/09/1988	16th Colony	Ampara	7	5	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
45	10/10/1988	Mahakongaskada- Medawachchiya	Vavuniya	44	4	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
46	12/12/1988	Sumedagama	Trincomalee	7	4	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
47	17/01/1989	Maharambekulam	Vavuniya	9	7	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
48	02/02/1989	Bogamuyaya	Ampara	11	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
49	11/02/1989	Dutuwewa	Welioya	37	5	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
50	11/02/1989	Singhapura	Welioya	6	7	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
51	27/02/1989	Borawewa	Polonnaruwa	38	3	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	DISTRICT	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	TACTICS / MODUS OPERENDI
52	30/05/1990	Mihidupura	Trincomalee	5	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
53	24/07/1990	Aralaganwila	Ampara	8	0	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
54	25/07/1990	Wan Ela	Trincomalee	9	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
55	26/07/1990	Tammannawa	Anuradhapura	19	3	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
56	31/07/1990	Kantalai	Trincomalee	11	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
57	07/08/1990	Bandaraduwa	Ampara	30	4	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
58	08/08/1990	Navagamuwa	Vavuniya	7	4	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
59	11/08/1990	Eravur	Batticaloa	173	20	0	LTTE attacked a Muslim village using automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
60	13/08/1990	Avarantalava	Vavuniya	10	3	0	LTTE attacked Muslim and Sinhala villages using automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
61	19/09/1990	Vellamundel	Puttalam	23	2	0	Sinhala fishing village was attacked using automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
62	21/09/1990	Pudukudiruppu	Ampara	15	11	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
63	01/10/1990	Peruwaltalawa	Ampara	9	3	0	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
64	02/10/1990	Wahalkade	Anuradhapura	4	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
65	23/10/1990	Thantirimalai	Anuradhapura	10	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	DISTRICT	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	TACTICS / MODUS OPERENDI
66	25/10/1990	Paranamedawach-chiya	Welioya	4	2	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
67	27/10/1990	Thantirimalai	Anuradhapura	5	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
68	29/10/1990	Olikulam	Batticaloa	3	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
69	01/11/1990	Helambawewa	Welioya	10	1	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
70	03/11/1990	Bandarakubukwewa	Anuradhapura	4	2	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
71	23/01/1991	Bogamuyaya	Ampara	29	5	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
72	02/03/1991	Kaludaveli	Batticaloa	4	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
73	02/03/1991	Erakkandy area	Trincomalee	5	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
74	14/04/1991	22nd Colony, Athymale	Ampara	17	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
75	20/04/1991	Niyandella, Okkampitiya	Ampara	22	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
76	24/06/1991	Periyapullumalai	Ampara	10	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
77	06/07/1991	Puddur	Polonnaruwa	16	3	0	A group of 50 LTTE attacked a Muslim village using automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
78	06/07/1991	Karapola & Manampitiya	Polonnaruwa	9	0	1	Sinhala village was attacked using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
79	19/09/1991	Palliyagodella - Medirigiriya	Polonnaruwa	13	6	0	LTTE attacked a Muslim village using automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	DISTRICT	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	TACTICS / MODUS OPERENDI
80	29/04/1992	Karapola, Muthugla & Alinchipothana	Polonnaruwa	130	71	0	LTTE attacked a Muslim village using automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
81	16/05/1992	Kosgolla village	Ampara	5	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
82	09/08/1992	Mailanthenna	Polonnaruwa	25	10	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
83	01/10/1992	Konwewa	Welioya	15	9	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
84	15/10/1992	Palliyagodella & Ahamedpura	Polonnaruwa	146	83	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
85	25/05/1995	Kallarawa	Trincomalee	42	15	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
86	21/10/1995	Mangalagama	Batticaloa	16	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
87	21/10/1995	Monarathanna	Polonnaruwa	36	12	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
88	21/10/1995	North of Padaviya (Galtalawa)	Welioya	19	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
89	23/10/1995	Atthimalai/ Kotiyagala	Monaragala	19	1	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
90	26/10/1995	Tammanna Halmillewa	Anuradhapura	26	27	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
91	26/10/1995	Alapathwewa	Welioya	26	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
92	02/11/1995	Siyabalanduwa	Moneragala	5	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
93	22/02/1996	Mahanikawewa, Kebetigollawa	Anuradhapura	6	3	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
94	11/06/1996	Eluwankulama	Puttalam	14	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	DISTRICT	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING	TACTICS / MODUS OPERENDI
95	10/02/1997	Oddaimavadi	Batticaloa	5	3	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
96	12/05/1997	Morawewa	Trincomalee	5	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
97	02/07/1997	Erakkandy	Trincomalee	34	0	0	LTTE attacked a Muslim village using automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
98	05/07/1999	Rathmalgahawella	Ampara	4	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
99	18/09/1999	Galapitagala, Badirekka, Borapola	Ampara	50	5	0	LTTE attacked village using grenades, automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
100	07/12/2000	Welikanda	Polonnaruwa	5	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
101	17/10/2001	Ruwanpitiya	Polonnaruwa	2	3	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
102	12/04/2007	Awarantulawa	Vavuniya	7	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
103	16/01/2008	Buttala (Niyandagala/Waralanda)	Moneragala	6	3	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
104	17/01/2008	Tissamaharama	Moneragala	8	5	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
105	11/09/2008	Kotiyagala	Moneragala	7	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
106	21/02/2009	Nelliadi Karamatiya village	Ampara	14	8	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
107	12/04/2009	Mahagodayaya village	Mannar	9	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
108	13/04/2009	Makul ara village	Moneragala	3	1	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>
109	25/04/2009	Okanda	Ampara	5	0	0	LTTE attacked village using the automatic weapons, swords, knives, clubs <i>etc.</i>

ATTACK ON ECONOMIC TARGETS

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	TARGET	TACTICS/ MODUS
1	01/07/1983	Kondavil - Jaffna	Setting fire to the <i>Yaldevi</i> Train at Kondavil	Passenger Train	Set Fire
2	21/01/1984	Colombo	Bomb explosion at Hotel Oberoi	Oberoi Hotel	Time Bomb Explosion
3	19/01/1985	Murugandi - Mullaitivu	Land mine explosion on <i>Yaldevi</i> Train	Passenger Train	Land Mine Explosion
4	03/05/1986	Katunayake	Bomb planted on a Tristar Air Craft at the Bandarnaike International Airport exploded	Tristar Plane	Time Bomb Explosion
5	07/05/1986	Colombo	Bomb explosion in the Central Telecommunication Complex	Central Telecommunication Complex	Bomb was exploded before it was placed
6	30/05/1986	Colombo	Bomb explosion within the Elephant House Commercial Building	Elephant House Commercial Building	Time Bomb Explosion
7	21/04/1987	Colombo	Car bomb explosion in the Central Bus Station, Colombo	Central Bus Station	Car bomb
7	06/10/1987	Valachchenai - Batticaloa	LTTE set fire to the Batticaloa train killing 40 civilians	Passenger Train	Set Fire
8	09/10/1994	Vettalakerni - Jaffna	LTTE attack on MV "Ocean Trader" vessel	MV Ocean Trader	Sea Tiger Attack
9	09/08/1995	Pulmoddai - Trincomalee	MV "Princess Wave" ship was damaged due to an explosion carried out by the LTTE	MV Princess Wave Ship	Explosion
10	20/10/1995	Kolonnawa and Orugodawatta - Colombo	LTTE launched an attack on the Oil Refinery at Kolonnawa and the Oil Installation at Orugodawatte	Oil Tanks	Infiltrated Suicide attackers launched RPG attack
11	31/01/1996	Colombo	LTTE activated a vehicle bomb in front of the Central Bank causing extensive damage to the building, roads vehicles and the surrounding area	Central Bank and adjoining building	Suicide vehicle Bomb attack

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	TARGET	TACTICS/ MODUS
12	24/07/1996	Dehiwala - Colombo	Bomb explosion on the Alutgama Train at the Dehiwala Railway station	Passenger Train	Time Bomb Explosion
13	09/09/1997	Pulmoddai - Trincomalee	A foreign ship "MV Cordiality" at anchor off Pulmoddai was attacked by the LTTE. It is believed 90 persons were on board including 05 Army personnel, 31 Crew members and 54 minor workers.	MV Cordiality	Sea Tiger Attack
14	15/10/1997	Colombo	LTTE exploded a Vehicle (Lorry) bomb at the Galadari Hotel car park close to the World Trade Centre (Twin Towers). Killed 13 and wounded 113 included civilians and SF personnel.	Hotel Galadari/Twin Towers	Suicide attacker launched attack while vehicle Bomb exploded
15	04/12/1997	Colombo Harbour	A group of suicide Sea Tigers launched a sea borne attack on Colombo Port	Colombo Harbour	Suicide Sea Tiger attack
16	26/06/2000	Point Pedro - Jaffna	The ship MV Huan carrying private cargo was attacked by LTTE suicide boats. The vessel sank due to damage	MV Huan Cargo Vessel	Suicide Attack
17	24/07/2001	Katunayake - Gampaha	The LTTE suicide cadres attacked the SLAF base and the Bandaranaike International Airport at Katunayake	Bandaranaike International Airport and SLAF Base	A group of Suicide attackers launched an infiltration attack
18	29/04/2007	Kolonnawa - Colombo	An LTTE Light Aircraft dropped 02 bombs targeting the Kolonnawa Oil Tanks and Storage Complex area	Kolonnawa Oil Tank	Air Attack
19	29/04/2007	Muturajawela - Gampaha	An LTTE Light Aircraft dropped 02 bombs targeting the Muthurajawela Gas Storage Complex area	Muturajawela Oil Tank	Air Attack
20	26/05/2008	Dehiwala - Colombo	Blasting of a bomb inside the Panadura bound crowded office train at Dehiwala railway station	Panadura Train	Time Bomb Explosion

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	TARGET	TACTICS/ MODUS
21	22/10/2008	Kankasanturai - Jaffna	Sea Tiger suicide bombers on three LTTE suicide craft attempted to blow up the merchant ships MERCS "Nimalawa" and MERCS "Ruhuna" carrying essential relief items for civilian in the North. Two LTTE Suicide craft were completely destroyed and another was captured by the SLN.	Merchant Ships MERCS "Nimalawa" and MERCS "Ruhuna"	Suicide Attack
22	28/10/2008	Grandpass - Colombo	An LTTE light Air craft dropped 02 bombs on the premises of the Kelanitissa Power House and escaped	Kelanitissa Power House	Air Attack

ATTACKS ON VVIPs/ VIPs

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	OBJECT/PERSON ATTACKED	TYPE OF ATTACK
1	27/07/1975	Ponnalai Kadduwan (near Krishna Kovil)- Jaffna	Mr. Alfred Duraiappa - MP and Mayor of Jaffna	By gunning down
2	19/01/1983	Vavuniya	Mr. K T Pullendran - Ex-MP/UNP organiser for Vavuniya	By gunning down
3	01/09/1985	Point Pedro - Jaffna	Mr. K Thurairathinam - TULF MP for Point Pedro	By gunning down
4	03/09/1985	Uduppidi - Jaffna	Mr. K Rajalingam - TULF, MP for Uduppidi	By gunning down
5	03/09/1985	Manipai - Jaffna	Mr. V Dharmalingam - TULF MP for Manipai Father of Mr. D Siddharthan (PLOTE Leader)	By gunning down
6	03/09/1985	Thinnaveli - Jaffna	Mr. K Alalasundaram - TULF, MP for Kopay	By gunning down
7	13/11/1987	Mutur - Trincomalee	Mr. Abdul Majeed - MP for Mutur	By gunning down
8	13/07/1989	Wijerama Mawatha - Colombo	Mr. A Amirthalingam - MP, Secretary General of the TULF/ a former Opposition Leader	By gunning down
9	13/07/1989	Wijerama Mawatha - Colombo	Mr. V Yogeshwaran - TULF, MP for Jaffna	By gunning down
10	07/05/1990	Trincomalee	Mr. Sam Thambimuttu - EPRLF MP for Batticaloa	By gunning down
11	19/06/1990	Madras - India	Mr. V K Yogasangari - EPRLF, MP for Jaffna District	By gunning down
12	15/07/1990	Pottuvil - Ampara	Mr. K Kanagaratnam - MP for Pottuvil	By gunning down
13	18/12/1990	Morawewa - Trincomalee	Major General C L Wijethne	Land mine
14	02/03/1991	Havelock Road - Colombo	Deputy Defence Minister Mr. Ranjan Wijeratne	Vehicle bomb
15	21/05/1991	India	Sri Rajiv Gandhi - former PM of India	Human bomb
16	16/11/1992	Galle Face - Colombo	Navy Commander, Vice Admiral, W W E C Fernando	Sucide Attack
17	23/04/1993	Kirulapone - Colombo	Mr. Lalith Athulathmudli - DUNF Leader and Former Minister of National Security	By gunning down
18	01/05/1993	Armour St. Junction - Colombo	His Excellency R. Premadasa - President of Sri Lanka.	Human bomb

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	OBJECT/PERSON ATTACKED	TYPE OF ATTACK
19	24/10/1994	Thotalaga - Colombo	Mr. Gamini Dissanayake Leader of the opposition & UNP candidate for the presidential elections - 1994	Human bomb
20	24/10/1994	Thotalanga - Colombo	Mr. G M Premachandra - MP/DUNF Leader	Suicide attack
21	24/10/1994	Thotalanga - Colombo	Mr. Weerasinghe Mallimarachi - MP/Former Minister of Food and Co-operatives	Suicide attack
22	24/10/1994	Thotalanga - Colombo	Mr. Ossie Abeygunasekera - MP Colombo Dist./ SLMP Leader	Suicide attack
23	05/07/1996	Jaffna	Major General A S S K Hamangoda	Human bomb
24	05/07/1997	Trincomalee	Mr. Arunachalam Thangathurai - TULF MP for Trincomalee	By gunning down
25	20/07/1997	06th mile post, Nilaveli - Trincomalee	Mr. M E H Maharoo - UNP MP for Trincomalee	By gunning down
26	14/05/1998	Point Pedro - Jaffna	Major General L A R Wijeratne	Human bomb
27	15/07/1998	Vavuniya	Mr. Saravanabawanandan Shanmuganathan @ Vasanthan - PLOTE, MP for Vavuniya District	By claymore mine attack
28	29/07/1999	Borella - Colombo	Dr. Neelan Thiruchelvam - TULF MP (National list)/ Constitutional Lawyer	Suicide Attack
29	02/11/1999	Wellawatta - Colombo	Mr. Nadarajah Atputharajah - EPDP, MP/Secretary of the Politbureau of the EPDP/Editor of " <i>Thinamurusu</i> " (a Tamil tabloid paper)	By gunning down
30	18/12/1999	Ja-Ela - Gampaha	Retired Major General C L Algama	Human bomb
31	07/06/2000	Ratmalana - Colombo	Minister of Industrial Development Mr. C V Goonaratne	Human bomb
32	16/09/2000	Aranayake - Kegalle	Mr. M H M Ashraff - MP & Minister of Ports Development, Reconstruction & Rehabilitation and Founder Leader of Sri Lanka Muslims Congress (SLMC)	Heli Crash
33	07/11/2000	Korakallimadu - Batticaloa	Mr. Ashley Nimalanayagam Saundranayagam - TULF MP for Batticaloa	By gunning down
34	07/07/2004	Kollupitiya - Colombo	A Female LTTE suicide bomber who was arrested by the MSD at the entrance of the office of Minister and the EPDP Leader Mr. Douglas Devananda, blew herself up	Human bomb
35	19/10/2004	Batticaloa Town	Mr. Kingsly Rajanayagam, a former TNA MP for Batticaloa	By gunning down

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	OBJECT/PERSON ATTACKED	TYPE OF ATTACK
36	07/02/2005	Pillaiyaradi - Polonnaruwa	Mr. Ariyanayagam Chandranheru, Former TNA MP for Polonnaruwa District	In an ambush on 07/02/2005 (clash between inter Tamil rebel groups)
37	12/08/2005	Cinnamon Gardens - Colombo	Mr. Lakshman Kadiragamar - Minister of Foreign Affairs	By gunning down
38	25/12/2005	Batticaloa Town	Mr. J Pararajasingham - MP, Tamil National Alliance (TNA)	By gunning down
39	25/04/2006	Army Headquarters - Colombo	The attempt on the life of the Comd of the Army Lt. Gen. G S C Fonseka RWP, RSP, rcds, psc. Army Comd was seriously injured when a female LTTE suicide bomber who had entered into the AHQ premises disguised as a pregnant woman blew herself targeting the car carrying the Army Commander in front of the exit of the Military Hospital.	Suicide Attack
40	26/06/2006	Pannipitiya - Colombo	An LTTE suicide cadre riding an explosive laden motorcycle rammed into the car carrying Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. P S B Kulatunga RSP USP USAWC, killing him	Suicide Attack
41	20/08/2006	Tellippalai - Jaffna	Mr. Sinnathambi Sivamahasara - Former TNA MP for Jaffna District	By gunning down
42	10/11/2006	Narahenpita - Colombo	Mr. Nadarajah Raviraj - TNA MP	By gunning down
43	01/12/2006	Kollupitiya - Colombo	Abortive attempt on the life of Secretary Defence, Mr. Gotabhaya Rajapakse RWP RSP psc. An LTTE suicide bomber (male) driving an explosive laden three wheeler detonated targeting the car carrying the Secretary Defence in his motorcade.	Suicide Attack
44	28/11/2007	Thibirigasyaya - Colombo	Abortive attempt on the life of Minister Douglas Devananda. A Female handicapped LTTE suicide bomber exploded herself at the Minister's Office Complex.	Human bomb
45	01/01/2008	Kotahena - Colombo	Mr. T Maheswaran - A former Minister of UNF government	By gunning down
46	08/01/2008	Ja-Ela - Gampaha	Mr. D M Dasanayake - MP & Minister of Nation Building	By claymore mine attack
47	06/03/2008	Mankulam - Kilinochchi	Mr. K Sivanesan - Tamil National Alliance MP, Jaffna District	By claymore mine attack

SER No.	DATE	LOCATION	OBJECT/PERSON ATTACKED	TYPE OF ATTACK
48	06/04/2008	Weliweriya - Gampaha	LTTE Suicide attack at Weliweriya which killed Mr. Jeyaraj Fernandopulle, Minister of Highways & Road Development and the Chief Govt. Whip.	Human bomb
49	06/10/2008	Anuradhapura	An LTTE male suicide bomber exploded himself killing Maj. Gen. K J C Perera, RWP RSP VSV USP rcds Psc (Retd), leader of the Opposition, North Central Provincial Council.	Human bomb

RECOVERIES FROM JULY 2006 TO 2009

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL	UNIT PRICE	ESTIMATED VALUE
		EAST	NORTH	SOUTH			
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e) = (b+c+d)	(f)	(g) = (e*f)
WEAPONS							
1	Micro Pistol	26	167		193	\$188.50	\$36,379.73
2	22 Micro Pistol		1		1	\$188.50	\$188.50
3	Silencer Pistol		2		2	\$993.46	\$1,986.92
4	Pencil Shooting Pistol		2		2	\$2.17	\$4.34
5	45 mm Pistol		2		2	\$184.76	\$369.52
6	Browning Machine Gun	1			1	\$1,421.60	\$1,421.60
7	CZ 100 Pistol		3		3	\$496.73	\$1,490.20
8	Single Pistol		4		4	\$43.15	\$172.59
9	Very Light Pistol		1		1	\$43.15	\$43.15
10	Pistol	15	365	1	381	\$188.50	\$71,816.98
11	.22 LR Pistol		1		1	\$1,345.66	\$1,345.66
12	Gas Pistol		1		1	\$2,258.19	\$2,258.19
13	Revolver		2		2	\$184.76	\$369.52
14	Unidentified Weapon		25		25	\$82.84	\$2,071.00
15	Galkatus Weapon		5	4	9	\$123.75	\$1,113.75
16	Repeater Gun	1	5		6	\$64.57	\$387.42
17	12 Bore Gun	5	9		14	\$103.72	\$1,452.08
18	Shot Gun	24	86	1	111	\$64.57	\$7,167.31
19	BA 35 Weapon	2			2	\$52.54	\$105.08
20	303 Weapon	10	14		24	\$197.20	\$4,732.80
21	M 16 Weapon	2	63		65	\$492.35	\$32,002.83

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
22	UBPL Weapon		2		2	\$82.84	\$165.68
23	0.22 Weapon	7	63		70	\$1,230.52	\$86,136.40
24	MP 5 A3 Weapon		2		2	\$467.74	\$935.49
25	14.7 mm Gun		1		1	\$961.96	\$961.96
26	.38 Silencer Weapon		1		1	\$2,798.57	\$2,798.57
27	84 RL Gun		31		31	\$480.98	\$14,910.46
28	Weapon Manual		75		75	\$32.29	\$2,421.53
29	Silencer Weapon	3	33		36	\$672.83	\$24,221.95
30	Miniuzi Gun		9		9	\$179.78	\$1,618.02
31	Assault Rifle		2		2	\$77.19	\$154.38
32	T 56 Medium Weapon	1	1		2	\$82.84	\$165.68
33	T 56 Weapon	1,953	11,032	3	12,988	\$82.84	\$1,075,925.92
34	T 56 Modified Weapon		15		15	\$82.84	\$1,242.60
35	VIP Weapon		1		1	\$422.37	\$422.37
36	SLR Weapon	3	51		54	\$140.25	\$7,573.50
37	G3A3 Weapon	3	31		34	\$108.12	\$3,676.08
38	Improviced Shot Gun	1	2		3	\$103.72	\$311.16
39	Shot Gun	30	17		47	\$103.72	\$4,874.84
40	FNC Wpn		48		48	\$195.44	\$9,381.12
41	Locally Made Weapon	1	14		15	\$82.84	\$1,242.60
42	Modified Weapon		5		5	\$82.84	\$414.20
43	T 56 Weapon with Telescope		1		1	\$82.84	\$82.84
44	Weapon Fixed with Silencer		1		1	\$672.83	\$672.83
45	AK 47 Weapon		12		12	\$52.55	\$630.56
46	SS 7 Weapon		1		1	\$52.55	\$52.55
47	Trap Gun	7	9	4	20	\$32.29	\$645.74
48	Rifel		6		6	\$467.74	\$2,806.46

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
49	SMG Weapon	9	198		207	\$516.36	\$106,886.93
50	5.56 Gun		27		27	\$492.35	\$13,293.45
51	M 97 Weapon		1		1	\$82.84	\$82.84
52	Pacilan Motar + B77		8		8	\$13,512.10	\$108,096.80
53	T 56 Weapon with Bipod		1		1	\$82.84	\$82.84
54	T 56 Modified Weapon		20		20	\$82.84	\$1,656.80
55	T 58 Weapon		2		2	\$124.16	\$248.33
56	T 58 Modified Weapon		1		1	\$124.16	\$124.16
57	T 81 Weapon	11	265		276	\$77.19	\$21,303.75
58	T 97 Weapon		21		21	\$82.84	\$1,739.64
59	T 97 LMG Weapon		3		3	\$341.17	\$1,023.51
60	Sniper Weapon	12	27		39	\$1,642.97	\$64,075.83
61	Silencer Weapon with Sight		2		2	\$2,410.95	\$4,821.89
62	G3a3 LMG		4		4	\$108.12	\$432.48
63	T 56 LMG	37	237		274	\$341.17	\$93,480.58
64	T 81 LMG Weapon	2	22		24	\$617.50	\$14,820.00
65	MG 25 Weapon		5		5	\$67.20	\$336.00
66	Improvised Machine Gun		1		1	\$516.36	\$516.36
67	Locally made RCL Weapon & Platform		1		1	\$25,168.50	\$25,168.50
68	AGL Weapon		2		2	\$13,217.60	\$26,435.20
69	M 72 X A-3 Weapon		4		4	\$194.51	\$778.05
70	MK 97 Weapon		3		3	\$82.84	\$248.52
71	303 LMG	1	1		2	\$197.20	\$394.40
72	LMG	2	45		47	\$341.17	\$16,034.99
73	M16 LMG Weapon		1		1	\$492.35	\$492.35
74	RL Weapon	11	46		57	\$961.96	\$54,832.00

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
75	40 mm Grenade Launcher	36	154	1	191	\$961.56	\$183,657.96
76	Gas Gun		3		3	\$1,454.86	\$4,364.58
77	MPMG Weapon	27	243		270	\$1,469.32	\$396,716.40
78	GPMG Weapon	3	17		20	\$6,161.05	\$123,221.01
79	12.7 Weapon	4	51		55	\$2,398.00	\$131,890.00
80	RPG Weapon	95	429		524	\$961.96	\$504,069.61
81	Disposable RPG B106	7	61		68	\$322.83	\$21,952.44
82	37 mm Grad Cannon Weapon		1		1	\$2,398.00	\$2,398.00
83	Improvised Weapon use for training		10		10	\$41.42	\$414.20
84	Anti Air Craft Gun		3		3	\$1,358.50	\$4,075.50
85	Anti Air Craft Gun (27 Cannon Caliber W/o Barrel)		1		1	\$1,358.50	\$1,358.50
86	Heavy Gun (Anti Air Craft Gun)		2		2	\$1,358.50	\$2,717.00
87	Grenade Launcher		1		1	\$1,431.37	\$1,431.37
88	Air Craft Gun with Mount & Sight		1		1	\$1,358.50	\$1,358.50
89	Improvised Motar Launcher		2		2	\$1,120.45	\$2,240.91
90	C 90 Weapon		33		33	\$1,383.76	\$45,664.08
91	Improvised Mortar		1		1	\$1,120.45	\$1,120.45
92	Empty Thermo Baric Weapon		2		2	\$6,212.64	\$12,425.28
93	Thermobaric RPG Weapon		8		8	\$3,850.52	\$30,804.14
94	Thermobaric Weapon	1	45		46	\$3,850.52	\$177,123.83
95	Navy Boat Gun		1		1	\$1,358.50	\$1,358.50
96	Paddle Gun		7		7	\$2,398.00	\$16,786.00
97	30 mm Cannon Caliber Gun		4		4	\$47,960.00	\$191,840.00
98	66 mm Antitank Weapon	1			1	\$1,595.00	\$1,595.00

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e) = (b+c+d)	(f)	(g) = (e*f)
99	2" Mortar	2	13		15	\$167.00	\$2,505.00
100	60 Mortar	10	220		230	\$1,120.45	\$257,704.56
101	60 Mortar Barrel	47	110		157	\$342.00	\$53,694.00
102	Commando Mortar	2	34		36	\$2,084.06	\$75,026.25
103	81 Mortar	3	36		39	\$6,191.20	\$241,456.80
104	81 Mortar Barrel	1	58		59	\$877.50	\$51,772.50
105	81 Mortar Half Completed		76		76	\$6,669.00	\$506,844.00
106	82 Mortar	4	2		6	\$6,191.20	\$37,147.20
107	106 mm RCL Weapon with Tripod		4		4	\$12,584.20	\$50,336.80
108	Pasilan Mortar + B133		11		11	\$1,120.45	\$12,325.00
109	85 mm Arty Gun		1		1	\$12,382.40	\$12,382.40
110	120 mm Mortar	13	10		23	\$41,490.39	\$954,278.97
111	120 Mortar Barrel	1	17		18	\$430.00	\$7,740.00
112	120 Mortar (Destroyed)		2		2	\$41,490.39	\$82,980.78
113	140 mm Mortar		1		1	\$41,490.39	\$41,490.39
114	122 mm Gun		1		1	\$65,950.20	\$65,950.20
115	130 mm Gun (Unservisable)		1		1	\$46,917.00	\$46,917.00
116	130 mm Gun		5		5	\$46,917.00	\$234,585.00
117	130 mm Gun Barrel		1		1	\$11,736.75	\$11,736.75
118	130 mm Gun (Destroyed)		2		2	\$46,917.00	\$93,834.00
119	152 mm Gun	2			2	\$27,024.19	\$54,048.38
120	152 mm + B 235 Gun (Destroyed)		3		3	\$27,024.19	\$81,072.58
121	12 Barrel MBRL	1			1	\$130,000.00	\$130,000.00
122	6 Barrel MBRL		1		1	\$6,500.00	\$6,500.00

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL	UNIT PRICE	ESTIMATED VALUE
		EAST	NORTH	SOUTH			
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e) = (b+c+d)	(f)	(g) = (e*f)
MAGAZINES							
1	Pistol Magazine	14	444	9	467	\$11.00	\$5,137.00
2	5.56 Magazine		15		15	\$9.80	\$147.00
3	SMG Magazine	1	133		134	\$7.38	\$988.92
4	M 16 Magazine	1	80		81	\$9.80	\$793.80
5	FNC Magazine		1,168		1,168	\$9.80	\$11,446.40
6	303 Magazine	10			10	\$2.75	\$27.50
7	HK Magazine		11		11	\$2.75	\$30.25
8	Miniuzi Magazine		265		265	\$10.00	\$2,650.00
9	G3A3 Magazine	16	324		340	\$10.00	\$3,400.00
10	SLR Magazine	2	85		87	\$4.50	\$391.50
11	T 56 Magazine	1,572	4,636	10	6,218	\$10.00	\$62,180.00
12	T 81 Magazine	20	167		187	\$7.38	\$1,380.06
13	T 97 Magazine		42		42	\$7.38	\$309.96
14	Unidentified Magazine		22		22	\$10.00	\$220.00
15	Sniper Magazine	9	17		26	\$10.00	\$260.00
16	Silencer Magazine	4	11		15	\$10.00	\$150.00
17	LMG Drum	87	1,211		1,298	\$25.00	\$32,450.00
18	T 81 Drum		7		7	\$7.38	\$51.66
19	LMG Link	164	84		248	\$2.50	\$620.00
20	12.7 Link Parts		3,004		3,004	\$2.50	\$7,510.00
21	MPMG Links	16	2,033		2,049	\$2.50	\$5,122.50
22	MPMG Links+b172 Bag		1,401		1,401	\$4.50	\$6,304.50
23	MPMG Drum	32	62		94	\$29.00	\$2,726.00
24	GPMG Drum	4	1		5	\$29.00	\$145.00
25	12.7 Drum	4	34		38	\$29.00	\$1,102.00
26	Paddle Gun Drum		41		41	\$29.00	\$1,189.00

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
27	87.35 Large Drum		3		3	\$29.00	\$87.00
28	37 mm Ammo Drum		4		4	\$29.00	\$116.00
29	87.35 Small Drum		4		4	\$29.00	\$116.00
30	12.7 Container	26	14		40	\$29.00	\$1,160.00
WEAPON ACCESSORIES							
1	T 56 Prisile Grip		25		25	\$7.32	\$182.95
2	T 56 Weapon Bolt		5		5	\$27.50	\$137.50
3	Bayonet		55		55	\$42.50	\$2,337.50
4	T 56 Magazine Sprin		12		12	\$3.42	\$41.04
5	LMG Butt		19		19	\$22.04	\$418.69
6	LMG Bipod		36		36	\$7.32	\$263.44
7	Sniper Weapon Cover		2		2	\$52.00	\$104.00
8	T 56 Cocking Handle		3		3	\$23.70	\$71.10
9	T 56 Bolt Carrier		275		275	\$27.50	\$7,562.50
10	T 56 Toolkit		5		5	\$7.74	\$38.68
11	Sniper Weapon Cover		6		6	\$52.00	\$312.00
12	RPG Prisile Grip		9		9	\$7.32	\$65.86
13	Upper Hand Guard		189		189	\$12.78	\$2,414.72
14	Sniper Bipod		1		1	\$100.50	\$100.50
15	MPMG Top Cover		15		15	\$15.50	\$232.50
16	Mortar Barrel Similar to 60 Mortar		1		1	\$342.00	\$342.00
17	Pistol Parts		70		70	\$94.25	\$6,597.36
18	37 mm Barrel		2		2	\$639.83	\$1,279.66
19	12.7 Weapon Butt Plate		14		14	\$2.20	\$30.80
20	.50 Tripod		1		1	\$28.00	\$28.00
21	RL Barrel		8		8	\$59.00	\$472.00

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
22	Baba Mortar Parts		6		6	\$10,372.60	\$62,235.59
23	RCL Tipod		1		1	\$440.00	\$440.00
24	Barrel of 14.5mm Gun		1		1	\$214.32	\$214.32
25	Paddle Gun Barrel		3		3	\$599.50	\$1,798.50
26	14.5 mm Gun Tipod		3		3	\$39.90	\$119.70
27	MPMG Mount		2		2	\$34.00	\$68.00
28	30 mm Cannon Barrel		1		1	\$11,990.00	\$11,990.00
29	GPMG Bipod		2		2	\$496.00	\$992.00
30	82 mm Mortar Barrel	6	1		7	\$111.40	\$779.80
31	82 mm Mortar Base Plate	8			8	\$750.00	\$6,000.00
32	82 mm Mortar Bipod	4	16		20	\$750.00	\$15,000.00
33	76 mm Gun Firing Pin		1		1	\$21.98	\$21.98
34	76 mm Gun Bridge Block		1		1	\$159.00	\$159.00
35	30 mm Cannon Gun Mount		1		1	\$2,398.00	\$2,398.00
36	12.7 Weapon Tripod		16		16	\$21.43	\$342.91
37	152 Arty Barrel		1		1	\$2,964.00	\$2,964.00
38	12.7 Weapon Projectile		1,500		1,500	\$2,964.00	\$4,446,000.00
39	.50 Tripod		3		3	\$21.43	\$64.30
40	Claymore Stand	21	416		437	\$4.20	\$1,834.44
41	60 Mortar Tipod		72		72	\$750.00	\$54,000.00
42	60 Mortar S + B23 Sight		66		66	\$33.97	\$2,242.02
43	81 Mortar Sight	7	5		12	\$157.32	\$1,887.84
44	82 Mortar Sight	3	2		5	\$157.32	\$786.60
45	Arty Sight		5		5	\$157.32	\$786.60
46	GPMG Weapon Barrel		5		5	\$899.00	\$4,495.00
47	RPG Sholder Guard		17		17	\$14.52	\$246.84
48	120 Mortar Bridge Cup		1		1	\$615.35	\$615.35

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
49	RPG Sight		9		9	\$159.50	\$1,435.50
50	Unidentified Weapon Barrel		30		30	\$111.40	\$3,342.00
51	Unidentified Projectile		25		25	\$242.50	\$6,062.58
52	RCL Barrel		4		4	\$820.00	\$3,280.00
53	60 Mortar Bipod	36	58		94	\$750.00	\$70,500.00
54	60 Mortar Sight	2	4		6	\$157.32	\$943.92
55	120 mm Mortar Barrel (Destroyed)		1		1	\$430.00	\$430.00
56	60 Mortar Base Plate	42	78		120	\$200.00	\$24,000.00
57	Mortar Tube		5		5	\$111.40	\$557.00
58	MPMG Barrel	10	233		243	\$214.32	\$52,079.76
59	120 Mortar Base Plate	5	7		12	\$187.74	\$2,252.87
60	Heavy Weapon Tripod		1		1	\$21.43	\$21.43
61	Barrel of Heavy Gun		5		5	\$111.40	\$557.00
62	Heavy Weapon Barrel		2		2	\$111.40	\$222.80
63	Doutail Nut Catch		36		36	\$6.54	\$235.44
64	T 56 But		74		74	\$98.80	\$7,311.20
65	37 mm Barrel		8		8	\$214.32	\$1,714.56
66	MMG Barrel		7		7	\$214.32	\$1,500.24
67	GPMG Top Cover		1		1	\$10.09	\$10.09
68	GPMG Barrel		31		31	\$214.32	\$6,643.92
69	AP Mine Bottom Part		600		600	\$3.84	\$2,304.00
70	MPMG Bolt Carrier		5		5	\$27.80	\$139.01
71	14.5 Anti Air Craft Weapon Barrel		1		1	\$214.32	\$214.32
72	12.7 Weapon Body Part		2		2	\$1,358.50	\$2,717.00
73	MPMG Weapon Body Part		3		3	\$1,469.32	\$4,407.96

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
74	Pressure Mine Case		970		970	\$5.80	\$5,630.37
75	12.7 Barrel		26		26	\$102.60	\$2,667.60
76	.50 Barrel		1		1	\$960.00	\$960.00
77	Mini Night Single Eye Accuision		4		4	\$960.00	\$3,840.00
78	12.7 Weapon Bypod + B275	1	5		6	\$23.60	\$141.60
79	12.7 Barrel		1		1	\$102.60	\$102.60
80	60 Mortar Brush		15		15	\$2.50	\$37.50
81	Gas Went		35		35	\$3.52	\$123.20
82	T 56 Fore Sight		5		5	\$26.22	\$131.10
83	T 56 Bolt		52		52	\$27.50	\$1,430.00
84	LMG Bolt		13		13	\$56.58	\$735.52
85	T 56 But		9		9	\$98.80	\$889.20
86	12.7 Tripod		3		3	\$39.90	\$119.70
87	T 56 Gas Tube		988		988	\$3.53	\$3,484.38
88	Shot Gun Barrel		38		38	\$25.00	\$950.00
89	Unidentified Gun Barrel		16		16	\$214.32	\$3,429.12
90	LMG Body Group		35		35	\$27.50	\$962.50
91	FMC Body Group		6		6	\$27.50	\$165.00
92	T 81 Body Group		19		19	\$27.50	\$522.50
93	AK 47 Body Group		19		19	\$27.50	\$522.50
94	T 56 Weapon Piston		268		268	\$27.50	\$7,370.00
95	T 56 Body Group		218		218	\$27.50	\$5,995.00
96	T 56 Receiving Cover	86	1,227		1,313	\$14.51	\$19,056.62
97	T 56 Returning Spring	49	1,721		1,770	\$0.35	\$615.08
98	T 81 Gun Barrel		1		1	\$877.50	\$877.50
99	81 Mortar Bomb Body Part		555		555	\$8,487.18	\$4,710,384.90

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
100	140 mm Gun Barrel		1		1	\$30,863.00	\$30,863.00
101	T 56 Body Part		1,020		1,020	\$82.84	\$84,496.80
102	T 56 Weapon Body Part		231		231	\$82.84	\$19,136.04
103	T 56 LMG Weapon Body Part		96		96	\$341.17	\$32,752.32
104	G3S3 Weapon Body Part		3		3	\$108.12	\$324.36
105	Barrel of Pasilan		2		2	\$217.50	\$435.00
106	AK 47 Weapon Body Part		81		81	\$52.55	\$4,256.31
107	MPMG Bipod		64		64	\$39.90	\$2,553.60
108	MPMG Tripod	2	25		27	\$39.90	\$1,077.30
109	GPMG Weapon Part		1		1	\$1,469.32	\$1,469.32
110	Anti Air Craft Gun Barrel		7		7	\$102.60	\$718.20
111	81 Mortar Base Plate	8	73		81	\$200.00	\$16,200.00
112	81 Mortar Bypod	9	111		120	\$750.00	\$90,000.00
113	81 Mortar Upper Part		400		400	\$1,547.80	\$619,120.00
114	82 mm Mortar Base Plate		6		6	\$200.00	\$1,200.00
115	82 Mortar Bypod		18		18	\$750.00	\$13,500.00
116	152 Arty Dummy Barrel		1		1	\$275.00	\$275.00
117	120 Mortar Bypod		4		4	\$205.73	\$822.94
118	122 mm Gun Barrel		2		2	\$33,013.83	\$66,027.66
119	122 mm + B275 Gun Trail		4		4	\$17.10	\$68.40
120	130 mm Gun Barrel		3		3	\$30,863.00	\$92,589.00
121	130 mm Projectile		119		119	\$242.50	\$28,857.88
122	130 Arty Gun Trail		1		1	\$28.00	\$28.00
123	120 Mortar Bypod	3	4		7	\$205.73	\$1,440.14
124	120 Mortar Sight	6	6		12	\$298.00	\$3,576.00
125	152 mm Gun Barrel		1		1	\$21,464.10	\$21,464.10

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVE							
1	9 mm Ammo	7,623	96,148	150	103,921	\$0.16	\$16,461.09
2	3.8 mm Ammo		30,992		30,992	\$0.24	\$7,283.12
3	.22 Ammo	80	29,634	2	29,716	\$0.03	\$1,001.43
4	SMG Ammo		1,100		1,100	\$0.16	\$174.24
5	M 16 Ammo	499	107,246	11	107,756	\$0.12	\$13,307.87
6	FNC Ammo	200	21234		21434	\$0.12	\$2,647.10
7	Minimi Ammo		400		400	\$0.12	\$49.40
8	Unidentified Ammo		9,323		9,323	\$0.15	\$1,375.14
9	38 mm Ammo		90		90	\$0.16	\$14.69
10	.45 mm Pistol Ammo		114,000		114,000	\$0.19	\$22,047.60
11	5.56 Ammo	3,800	648,477		652,277	\$0.12	\$80,556.21
12	5.56 X 45 Ammo	4,158	680,627		684,785	\$0.12	\$84,570.95
13	Shot Gun Ammo	1,170	4,670	2	5,842	\$0.19	\$1,118.74
14	7.62 X 39 mm Ammo	414,623	864,765	2,219	1,281,607	\$0.15	\$189,037.03
15	7.62 X 17 mm Ammo		60,850		60,850	\$0.15	\$8,975.38
16	7.62 X 19 mm Ammo		4,315		4,315	\$0.15	\$636.46
17	7.62 X 51 Ammo	2,718	15,477	14	18,209	\$0.13	\$2,325.29
18	7.62 X 54 Ammo	19,946	194,310	83	214,339	\$0.07	\$15,453.84
19	M 357 Ammo		900		900	\$677.35	\$609,616.80
20	12.7 X 108 Ammo	1,376	104,307		105,683	\$0.76	\$80,107.71
21	.50 Ammo	153	11,079	3	11,235	\$0.90	\$10,130.60
22	Sniper Ammo	490	1,000		1,490	\$0.13	\$196.08
23	14.5 mm Ammo		1,275		1,275	\$1.43	\$1,824.78
24	25 mm Ammo		68		68	\$0.04	\$2.94
25	23 mm Ammo		11,173		11,173	\$0.04	\$482.67

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
26	Pasilan Mortar Bomb		14		14	\$158.05	\$2,212.70
27	.38 Cartridge		4		4	\$13.63	\$54.52
28	Naval Weapon Ammo		135		135	\$27.79	\$3,751.31
29	HP 84 Ammo		1,980		1,980	\$0.16	\$313.63
30	0.30 mm Ammo		7,202		7,202	\$0.09	\$671.95
31	MMI 39 Heat Ammo		360		360	\$0.05	\$17.78
32	30 mm Ammo		2,108		2,108	\$27.79	\$58,576.05
33	73 mm Ammo		96		96	\$197.60	\$18,969.60
34	100 mm T 55 Tank Ammo		37		37	\$44.25	\$1,637.25
35	Anti Air Craft Ammo		1,011		1,011	\$0.76	\$766.34
36	Paddle Gun Ammo		366		366	\$27.79	\$10,170.23
37	FNC Ammo		3,440		3,440	\$0.12	\$424.84
38	AP Mine Detonators		5,045		5,045	\$1.92	\$9,686.40
39	AP Mine Fuze	3,500	11,357		14,857	\$1.92	\$28,525.44
40	AP Mine Primers		940		940	\$1.92	\$1,804.80
41	Trap Bomb Fuze		40		40	\$1.92	\$76.80
42	AP Mine	7,054	97,906	13	104,973	\$7.68	\$806,192.64
43	AP Mine Covers		4,000		4,000	\$1.92	\$7,680.00
44	AP Mine Fuze Cap		360		360	\$1.92	\$691.20
45	Hand Para	1	43		44	\$24.50	\$1,078.00
46	Anti Tank Mine	9	517		526	\$11.09	\$5,834.44
47	Suicide Claymore		113		113	\$41.98	\$4,743.47
48	Claymore Mines	364	4,676	28	5,068	\$41.98	\$212,742.48
49	TV Claymore Mine		3		3	\$41.98	\$125.93
50	Half Completed Claymore		25		25	\$41.98	\$1,049.44
51	12 SG Shot Gun Ammo		7,300		7,300	\$0.13	\$964.33
52	Claymore Mine Cases		548		548	\$10.49	\$5,750.93

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
53	Jumping Mine		226		226	\$23.22	\$5,247.27
54	Electric Mine		82		82	\$23.22	\$1,903.88
55	Sea Mine		23		23	\$11.09	\$255.12
56	Land Mine	8	83		91	\$11.09	\$1,009.38
57	Bar Mine		84		84	\$11.09	\$931.74
58	RPG Bomb	217	4,837		5,054	\$112.57	\$568,928.78
59	Releasing Switch		60		60	\$4.16	\$249.72
60	76 mm Bomb		66		66	\$229.00	\$15,113.99
61	Claymore Switches		24,000		24,000	\$4.16	\$99,888.00
62	Thunder		1,420		1,420	\$0.73	\$1,029.50
63	RPG Chargers	35	1,039		1,074	\$112.57	\$120,900.18
64	60 Mortar Bomb	714	13,520	1	14,235	\$45.26	\$644,345.85
65	60 Mortar Bomb Trail		58		58	\$22.63	\$1,312.69
66	82 Mortar Trail		1,110		1,110	\$24.70	\$27,417.00
67	38 mm Mortar Bomb		80		80	\$34.58	\$2,766.40
68	Bangalore Torpedo		1,620		1,620	\$34.50	\$55,890.00
69	RCL Bomb		364		364	\$111.15	\$40,458.60
70	81 mm Mortar Bomb Cartridge		702		702	\$8.42	\$5,909.86
71	81 mm Bomb	73	5,803		5,876	\$18.37	\$107,942.12
72	82 Mortar Bomb	1,483	2,426		3,909	\$24.70	\$96,552.30
73	81 Trail Part		1,216		1,216	\$12.35	\$15,017.60
74	81 Mortar Bomb Trail		195		195	\$12.35	\$2,408.25
75	82 Mortar Bomb Para		195		195	\$33.50	\$6,532.50
76	130 mm Ammo + B386		18		18	\$834.21	\$15,015.80
77	40 Grenade Launcher Bomb	161	560		721	\$30.35	\$21,882.71
78	152 Arty Ammo	7	20		27	\$516.53	\$13,946.36
79	81 mm Mortar Bomb Trap		560		560	\$18.37	\$10,287.20

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
80	60 Mortar Bomb Fuze		1,264		1,264	\$11.32	\$14,308.48
81	81 Mortar Bomb IEDs		291		291	\$12.35	\$3,593.85
82	81 Mortar Trap		30		30	\$12.35	\$370.50
83	85 mm Mortar Bomb		362		362	\$169.74	\$61,447.18
84	81 Mortar Bomb Fuze		3,075		3,075	\$6.18	\$18,988.13
85	120 mm Mortar Bomb Fuze		245		245	\$39.51	\$9,680.56
86	120 Mortar Bomb	99	1,896		1,995	\$158.05	\$315,309.75
87	122 mm Ammo		574		574	\$436.51	\$250,554.33
88	130 mm Ammo		80		80	\$834.21	\$66,736.88
89	130 mm Fuze		10		10	\$417.11	\$4,171.06
90	MBRL Bomb		18		18	\$744.29	\$13,397.13
91	Para Bomb		7		7	\$1.50	\$10.50
92	Missile Antitank Cell		14		14	\$11,000.00	\$154,000.00
93	Missile Charger		36		36	\$1,100.00	\$39,600.00
94	Surface to Air Missile (SAM)		11		11	\$11,000.00	\$121,000.00
95	Missile 9p 59 CPC Anti Aircraft Missile		5		5	\$11,000.00	\$55,000.00
96	60 Mortar Primers		150		150	\$11.32	\$1,697.43
97	81 Mortar Primers		246		246	\$11.92	\$2,931.73
98	120 Mortar Primers		15		15	\$449.08	\$6,736.20
99	Pressure Mine	10	265		275	\$23.22	\$6,384.95
100	Pressure Bomb		16		16	\$23.22	\$371.49
101	Suicide Switch		2		2	\$3.61	\$7.22
102	Anti Tank Mine Cases		108		108	\$5.55	\$598.98
103	Arul Bomb	43	2,374		2,417	\$34.30	\$82,903.10
104	Arul Bomb Fuze		94		94	\$8.58	\$806.05
105	Smoke Bomb	3	33		36	\$15.00	\$540.00

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
106	Hand Grenade	497	18,314	22	18,833	\$26.39	\$497,091.39
107	TRG Hand Grenade		803		803	\$1.62	\$1,300.86
108	Locally Manufactured Hand Grenade		166		166	\$13.19	\$2,190.04
109	Low Explosive Slab (1kg)		51		51	\$0.75	\$38.35
110	Smoke Bomb		18		18	\$15.00	\$270.00
111	Smoke Grenade		35		35	\$20.26	\$709.19
112	TNT Explosive (Kg)	23.5	2985.75		3,009.25	\$1.11	\$3,344.78
113	TNT Capsule		125		125	\$1.11	\$138.94
114	TNT Slab (Kg)	2,700	271		2971	\$1.11	\$3,302.27
115	Black Powder (Kg)		93		93	\$4.08	\$379.01
116	Small Packet of TNT Explosive		91		91	\$1.11	\$101.15
117	TNT Slab		306		306	\$1.11	\$340.12
118	Black Powder (Kg)		50		50	\$4.08	\$203.77
119	Low Explosive (Kg)		152	10	162	\$4.08	\$660.21
120	C4 Explosive (Kg)	638	5,099.95	312.5	6,050.45	\$7.92	\$47,927.43
121	Explosive (Kg)	6	1,006		1012	\$7.92	\$8,016.36
122	Gun Powder (Kg)		204.5		204.5	\$4.08	\$833.42
123	TNT Pieces		41		41	\$2.23	\$91.23
124	Gun Powder (Kg)		1,214.5		1,214.5	\$4.08	\$4,949.57
125	Electric Detonators	2,052	244,276	35	246,363	\$0.25	\$60,851.66
126	Det Cord (M)	1,663.5	33,500		35,163.5	\$0.53	\$18,555.78
127	Sefty Fuze (M)	156	25,605		25,761	\$0.23	\$5,829.71
128	Suicide Jacket	6	287		293	\$43.76	\$12,821.68
129	Suicide Brassiere with 5 Chargers		12	2	14	\$7.92	\$110.88
130	Suicide Jacket (without Explosives)		10		10	\$20.00	\$200.00

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
131	Suicide Belt		29		29	\$10.00	\$290.00
132	Pulling Switch		9		9	\$3.40	\$30.57
133	Suicide Jacket Switches		210		210	\$3.40	\$713.22
134	Claymore Electric Circuit		15,015		15,015	\$83.96	\$1,260,587.33
135	Gas Bomb	2	7		9	\$31.53	\$283.73
136	Cannon Ammo	934	494		1,428	\$0.76	\$1,082.42
137	Trip Flares		59		59	\$29.58	\$1,744.93
138	Trapping Code (50m Each)		8		8	\$116.75	\$934.01
139	Safety Fuze (M)	20	850		870	\$0.23	\$196.88
140	Explosives Filled Items		68		68	\$1.06	\$72.01
141	Claymore Wire (M)		112		112	\$0.24	\$26.88
142	Tool Kit		75		75	\$3.41	\$255.81
143	IEDs		904		904	\$3.50	\$3,164.00
144	IED Switches		200		200	\$3.40	\$679.26
145	Claymore Tripod		169		169	\$96.40	\$16,290.76
146	Firing Device	16	2549		2,565	\$17.50	\$44,887.50
147	Rocket Ammo		3		3	\$287.05	\$861.16
148	Non-Electric Detenators		69,618		69,618	\$0.78	\$54,023.57
149	Plastic Battery Cases for Electric Mine		41,600		41,600	\$12.00	\$499,200.00
150	122 Rounds		89		89	\$436.50	\$38,848.50
151	152 Projectile		20		20	\$574.10	\$11,482.00
152	Plastic Claymore Cover		16		16	\$8.40	\$134.33
153	Primers		680		680	\$5.56	\$3,779.17
154	7.62 X 39 Ammo Noses		5,000		5,000	\$0.30	\$1,475.00
155	120 mm Mortar Projectile		22		22	\$242.50	\$5,335.07
156	152 mm Projectile		639		639	\$242.50	\$154,959.54

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
157	85 mm Projectile		329		329	\$222.50	\$73,202.50
158	122 mm Projectile		288		288	\$242.50	\$69,840.92
CONTROLLED ITEMS AND OTHER							
1	Pack	8	514		522	\$37.50	\$19,575.00
2	Water Scooter		1		1	\$2,390.00	\$2,390.00
3	Fiber Boat	2	159		161	\$2,390.00	\$384,790.00
4	Boat Oil Tank		3		3	\$27.43	\$82.29
5	Burned Boat		1		1	\$2,390.00	\$2,390.00
6	Suicide Boat		12		12	\$2,390.00	\$28,680.00
7	Fishing Boat		7		7	\$2,390.00	\$16,730.00
8	Range Finder		24		24	\$400.00	\$9,600.00
9	Large Size Boat		3		3	\$2,390.00	\$7,170.00
10	Boat Engine Body Parts and Accessories		12		12	\$3,000.00	\$36,000.00
11	Boat Engine	5	433		438	\$999.75	\$437,890.50
12	Fiber Boat (without Engine)		2		2	\$2,000.00	\$4,000.00
13	Propeller (with Three Wing)		2		2	\$2,390.00	\$4,780.00
14	Life Jacket		103		103	\$31.00	\$3,193.00
15	Diving Kit		43		43	\$137.00	\$5,891.00
16	Diving Pin		32		32	\$132.00	\$4,224.00
17	Improved Boat		1		1	\$2,000.00	\$2,000.00
18	Dingi Boat with Fixed Claymore (75kg)		2		2	\$7,745.17	\$15,490.34
19	Telescope		3		3	\$116.70	\$350.10
20	Plastic Gas Mask		200		200	\$228.50	\$45,700.00
21	Gas Mark		318		318	\$228.50	\$72,663.00
22	LTTE Jacket		260		260	\$42.00	\$10,920.00

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
23	Weapon with Bino		1		1	\$116.70	\$116.70
24	Binocular	8	63	2	73	\$116.70	\$8,519.10
25	Compass	5	246	1	252	\$29.60	\$7,459.20
26	GPS	6	106	2	114	\$196.60	\$22,412.40
27	Single Eye Night Vision		1		1	\$1,301.49	\$1,301.49
28	Night Vision		17		17	\$2,694.38	\$45,804.46
29	Pouch	53	3,752	2	3,807	\$4.48	\$17,040.51
30	Oil Bottle		7		7	\$1.20	\$8.40
31	LTTE Pack		87		87	\$162.00	\$14,094.00
32	Hand Grenade Pouch		4,417		4,417	\$4.48	\$19,770.93
33	Helmet		87		87	\$176.53	\$15,358.01
34	Flack Jacket		35		35	\$420.00	\$14,700.00
35	Belt Order	25	143	1	169	\$162.00	\$27,378.00
36	Water Bottle		8		8	\$2.50	\$20.00
37	Fiber Boat		3		3	\$2,390.00	\$7,170.00
38	Body Armour		11		11	\$671.30	\$7,384.30
39	Sattelite Map (Large)		20		20	\$2.00	\$40.00
40	Sattelite Map		104		104	\$2.00	\$208.00
41	Sattelite Map (Small)		14		14	\$2.00	\$28.00
42	Map	11	4,221		4,232	\$2.00	\$8,464.00
43	Jaffna Maps		60		60	\$2.00	\$120.00
44	Inch Maps		375		375	\$2.00	\$750.00
45	Map (Misc.)		47		47	\$2.00	\$94.00
46	Tamil Map		8		8	\$2.00	\$16.00
47	Ponchocape	1	21		22	\$4.86	\$106.92
48	Kilinochchi Map		9		9	\$2.00	\$18.00
49	Ear Guard		48		48	\$0.87	\$41.52

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL	UNIT PRICE	ESTIMATED VALUE
		EAST	NORTH	SOUTH			
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e) = (b+c+d)	(f)	(g) = (e*f)
SIGNAL EQUIPMENT							
1	ICOM Hand Held Set	159	586		745	\$305.00	\$227,225.00
2	ICOM Set		2		2	\$305.00	\$610.00
3	ICOM Comm. Receiver (IC R100)		1		1	\$35.00	\$35.00
4	ICOM ICU 87 Radio Set		5		5	\$305.00	\$1,525.00
5	ICOM ICU 82 Radio Set		33		33	\$305.00	\$10,065.00
6	ICOM ICV F 30 Light Hand Held Set		4		4	\$305.00	\$1,220.00
7	ICOM IC 2G Hand Held Set		3		3	\$305.00	\$915.00
8	ICOM IC R 20 Hand Held Set		1		1	\$305.00	\$305.00
9	RA 8200 Base Station		2		2	\$3,417.71	\$6,835.42
10	MC Micro Base Station Set		1		1	\$305.00	\$305.00
11	Alinco Base Station Set		2		2	\$305.00	\$610.00
12	Anristu Base		1		1	\$17,945.88	\$17,945.88
13	Alinco Hand Held Set		1		1	\$341.77	\$341.77
14	AR 300A Set		2		2	\$341.77	\$683.54
15	ASEL San Hand Held Set		2		2	\$341.77	\$683.54
16	Cougar Hand Held Set	5	1		6	\$4,338.75	\$26,032.50
17	Alinco Hand Held Set		1		1	\$4,338.75	\$4,338.75
18	Unritsu Base		1		1	\$341.77	\$341.77
19	AR 300 A Set		2		2	\$4,338.75	\$8,677.50
20	Alcon Base Station		2		2	\$588.00	\$1,176.00
21	PRC 77 Man Pack Sets	21	2		23	\$588.00	\$13,524.00
22	PRC 4700 Man Pack Sets		12		12	\$588.00	\$7,056.00
23	ICOM ICV 68 Radio Set		20		20	\$305.00	\$6,100.00
24	ICOM ICV 85 Radio Set		3		3	\$305.00	\$915.00
25	ICOM Scanner Ic728		1		1	\$305.00	\$305.00

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
26	ICOM Hand Held Radios (IC - V82)		239		239	\$305.00	\$72,895.00
27	ICOM V 82 Hand Held Radio (without Battery Pack)		12		12	\$305.00	\$3,660.00
28	ICOM Old Type Hand Held Radio (without Battery Pack)		110		110	\$305.00	\$33,550.00
29	ICOM Base Station	3	5		8	\$305.80	\$2,446.40
30	ICOM FM Tranceiver		11		11	\$305.00	\$3,355.00
31	ICOM Tranceiver (IC 718)		2		2	\$305.00	\$610.00
32	ICOM IC A 200 Base Radio		1		1	\$305.00	\$305.00
33	Motorola MC Micro Radio Set		1		1	\$196,126.81	\$196,126.81
34	Motorola GP 340 Radio (without Battery Pack)		9		9	\$196,126.81	\$1,765,141.29
35	Motorola Spectra Base		5		5	\$4,832.17	\$24,160.85
36	Motorola MCX 100 Mother Board		1		1	\$196,126.86	\$196,126.86
37	Motorola Hand Held Set		2		2	\$4,158.22	\$8,316.44
38	Motorola GM 340 Radio	2	4		6	\$196,126.81	\$1,176,760.86
39	Motorola GM 360 Radio		1		1	\$196,126.81	\$196,126.81
40	PRC 1077 Man Pack Radio	32	126		158	\$5,880.00	\$929,040.00
41	PRC 1077 Radio Amp		7		7	\$588.00	\$4,116.00
42	PRM 4700 Man Pack		12		12	\$588.00	\$7,056.00
43	Kenwood Base Station		4		4	\$4,222.55	\$16,890.20
44	Kenwood Transreceiver (TM261 A)		6		6	\$850.00	\$5,100.00
45	Kenwood Hand Held Set		3		3	\$850.00	\$2,550.00
46	Kenwood Radio Set		2		2	\$850.00	\$1,700.00
47	Astro Base Station Radio		1		1	\$3,378.39	\$3,378.39

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
48	VERTEX Standard Base Station		1		1	\$196,126.81	\$196,126.81
49	VRC 9600 Radio		2		2	\$16,126.00	\$32,252.00
50	VX 150 Radio Set		2		2	\$209.36	\$418.72
51	YEASU VX 150 Hand Held Radios (with 20 X Battery Pack)		24		24	\$209.36	\$5,024.62
52	YEASU VX 150 Radio		6		6	\$209.36	\$1,256.15
53	YEASU VX 5 Hand Held Radios (with 1 X Battery Pack)		2		2	\$209.36	\$418.72
54	YEASU Hand Held Radio Set	44	77		121	\$209.36	\$25,332.44
55	YEASU FT212 RH		1		1	\$209.36	\$209.36
56	YEASU VX 150 Radio Set		18		18	\$209.36	\$3,768.46
57	YEASU Base Station		1		1	\$209.36	\$209.36
58	Spectra Base Station		1		1	\$4,832.18	\$4,832.18
59	SABER Hand Held		1		1	\$32,482.16	\$32,482.16
60	Eddysfone HF Radio (57000)		1		1	\$32,482.16	\$32,482.16
61	Motorola Hand Held Set		10		10	\$4,158.22	\$41,582.20
62	Motorola Base Station Set		2		2	\$3,378.39	\$6,756.78
63	Motorola FX 2500 Set		1		1	\$4,158.22	\$4,158.22
64	SABEER Radio Set		1		1	\$3,248.71	\$3,248.71
65	SABEER H/h Set		41		41	\$3,248.71	\$133,197.11
66	Spectra Base Station Set		1		1	\$4,832.17	\$4,832.17
67	NERA		1		1	\$4,832.17	\$4,832.17
68	NERA Set		1		1	\$4,832.17	\$4,832.17
69	R 3000A Communication Receiver		1		1	\$4,832.17	\$4,832.17
70	Multiband Receiver Hand Held Set		1		1	\$4,832.17	\$4,832.17
71	PRC 1088		1		1	\$4,832.17	\$4,832.17
72	Part of Radio Sets		60		60	\$4,832.17	\$289,930.20

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
73	YEASU Hand Held Set (VX 150)		8		8	\$207.54	\$1,660.31
74	YEASU HF Transceiver	2	17		19	\$207.54	\$3,943.24
75	YEASU Hand Held Transreceiver		43		43	\$207.54	\$8,924.18
76	YEASU Hand Held Set		213		213	\$207.54	\$44,205.81
77	YEASU Fm Transceiver (FT 3000 M)		4		4	\$207.54	\$830.16
78	YEASU All Made Transceiver (FT 857)		9		9	\$207.54	\$1,867.85
79	VERTEX Standard Base Station		1		1	\$207.54	\$207.54
80	VERTEX Standard HF Set		3		3	\$207.54	\$622.62
81	STOBO (XR 1810) Set		1		1	\$207.54	\$207.54
82	VERTEX Standard (VXR 7000)		1		1	\$207.54	\$207.54
83	TRA 967/3 Set		1		1	\$207.54	\$207.54
84	Unidentified HF Set		31		31	\$4,832.17	\$149,797.27
85	Radio Set		19		19	\$207.54	\$3,943.24
86	Alcon Base Station		1		1	\$4,832.17	\$4,832.17
87	Cougar Hand Held		25		25	\$4,338.75	\$108,468.75
88	GV 180 Radio Set		4		4	\$4,832.17	\$19,328.68
89	HF Radio Set PR2000HV 125 Complete		1		1	\$11,786.52	\$11,786.52
90	PRM 4700 Man Pack Radio		4		4	\$588.00	\$2,352.00
91	RT 700 12 Radio Set		1		1	\$4,832.17	\$4,832.17
92	ICOM YEASU Hand Held Radio Set		1		1	\$305.00	\$305.00
93	PRM 4700 Base Station		5		5	\$9,450.00	\$47,250.00
94	PRM 4700 Base Station (Unserviceable)		2		2	\$9,450.00	\$18,900.00

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
95	PRM 4700 5 Way Battery Charger		1		1	\$1,710.00	\$1,710.00
96	PRM 4700 4 Way Battery Charger		1		1	\$1,710.00	\$1,710.00
97	PRM 4700 2 Way Battery Charger		1		1	\$1,710.00	\$1,710.00
98	PRC 1077 4 Way Battery Charger		1		1	\$1,710.00	\$1,710.00
99	PRC 1077 4 Way Battery Charger		17		17	\$1,710.00	\$29,070.00
100	Multiplexer Dual Battery Charger		1		1	\$307.80	\$307.80
101	Motorola Hand Held Battery		28		28	\$31.00	\$868.00
102	Motorola Battery Charger		20		20	\$307.80	\$6,156.00
103	Motorola 6 Way Charger		5		5	\$855.00	\$4,275.00
104	Motorola Battery Charger		20		20	\$307.80	\$6,156.00
105	ICOM VC 35 Battery Charger		1		1	\$307.80	\$307.80
106	ICOM Hand Held Battery Charger		26		26	\$1,710.00	\$44,460.00
107	Battery Charger		1		1	\$1,710.00	\$1,710.00
108	Battery Charger (5 way 12 V)		1		1	\$1,710.00	\$1,710.00
109	Battery Charger (7 Way 12 V)		1		1	\$1,710.00	\$1,710.00
110	5 Way Charger		1		1	\$1,710.00	\$1,710.00
111	4 Way Charger		1		1	\$1,710.00	\$1,710.00
112	12 V Battery		7		7	\$495.42	\$3,467.96
113	12 V Battery Charger		2		2	\$307.80	\$615.60
114	12 V Battery Charger		5		5	\$307.80	\$1,539.00
115	YEASU Communication Receiver		1		1	\$207.54	\$207.54
116	ICOM Hand Held Antenna		22		22	\$305.00	\$6,710.00
117	YEASU VX 150 Hand Held Antenna		16		16	\$264.46	\$4,231.36

SER No.	ITEMS	No. RECOVERED			TOTAL (e) = (b+c+d)	UNIT PRICE (f)	ESTIMATED VALUE (g) = (e*f)
		EAST (b)	NORTH (c)	SOUTH (d)			
118	PRC 1077 Rod Antenna		4		4	\$264.46	\$1,057.84
119	PRC 1077 Tape Antenna		4		4	\$264.46	\$1,057.84
120	PRC 292 Antenna		1		1	\$264.46	\$264.46
121	Yeadu Hand Held Antenna		4		4	\$207.54	\$830.16
122	Pianet Outdoor RF Antenna		1		1	\$264.46	\$264.46
123	Rod Antenna		7		7	\$264.46	\$1,851.22
124	Motorola Power Pack		27		27	\$264.46	\$7,140.42
125	Astro HL 6020 RF Amplifier		1		1	\$207.54	\$207.54
126	Astro HL 600 RF Amplifier		1		1	\$207.54	\$207.54
127	Motorola RF Transmitter		1		1	\$207.54	\$207.54
128	Cougar SMT	3	9		12	\$7,947.50	\$95,370.00
129	Cougar Repeater		2		2	\$21,675.00	\$43,350.00
130	Cougar DAM		3		3	\$7,947.50	\$23,842.50
131	Cougar Duplexer		1		1	\$21,701.50	\$21,701.50
132	Cougar Wide band Equalizer		1		1	\$8,638.75	\$8,638.75
133	Cougar Disk Link		2		2	\$21,701.50	\$43,403.00
134	Cougar Repeater		6		6	\$21,242.50	\$127,455.00
135	Kenwood FM Transreceiver TM 271 A		1		1	\$85.00	\$85.00
136	Kenwood Hand microphone		11		11	\$850.00	\$9,350.00
137	Motorola Hand microphone		2		2	\$4,158.22	\$8,316.44
138	PRC 1077 PSU		8		8	\$9,450.00	\$75,600.00
139	PRM 4700 PSU Controller		1		1	\$9,450.00	\$9,450.00
140	PRM 4700 Base Booster		3		3	\$9,450.00	\$28,350.00
141	Motorola MCX 100 PSU		1		1	\$4,158.22	\$4,158.22
142	230 V 1.5 KVA PSU		2		2	\$908.50	\$1,817.00
TOTAL VALUE							\$34,426,699.28

MAJOR ATTACKS LAUNCHED ON SF CAMPS/ESTABLISHMENTS

SER No.	DATE	GENERAL AREA	SECURITY FORCE CAMPS/ESTABLISHMENTS	DETAILS OF KILLED / WOUNDED & MISSING
1	05/07/1987	Nelliady Jaffna	Nelliady camp	19 Army Killed, 31 Army Wounded
2	15/06/1990	Mannar	Detachment at Thalai Mannar pier	07 Army Killed, 19 Army Wounded, 11 Army Missing
3	12/07/1990	Kokavil	Kokavil detachment	48 Army Killed, 18 Army Missing
4	05/08/1990	Jaffna Fort	Terrorists attacked Jaffna Fort using Arty and Mortars weapons.	06 Army Wounded, 03 Police Wounded
5	22/11/1990	Mankulam	Mankulam camp	20 Army Killed, 37 Army Wounded, 77 Army Missing
6	19/03/1991	Mannar	Kokkupadayan and Silawathurai camps	27 Army Killed, 68 Army Wounded, 05 Army Missing
7	10/07/1991	Elephant Pass	Elephant Pass camp complex	156 Army Killed, 748 Army WIA
8	02/10/1992	Vettalikerni, Kaddaikadu	Kaddaikadu Detachment FDLs	12 Army Killed, 27 Army Wounded, 03 Navy Wounded
9	25/07/1993	Janakapura - Welioya	Janakapura camp	24 Army Killed, 31 Army Wounded 20 Army Missing
10	11/11/1993	Pooneryn	Pooneryn camp	227 Army Killed, 514 Army Wounded, 305 Army Missing 14 Navy Killed, 47 Navy Wounded, 88 Navy Missing
11	12/08/1994	Polonnaruwa	Kaddamuruvikulam camp	22 Army Killed, 45 Army Wounded 01 Civilian Wounded
12	28/06/1995	Jaffna	Mandaitivu camp	90 Army Killed, 41 Army Wounded, 17 Army Missing, 06 Civilian Killed 01 Civilian Wounded
13	28/07/1995	Welioya	Kokkutuduvai camp	02 Army Killed, 29 Army Wounded
14	18/07/1996	Mullaitivu	Mullaitivu camp compact	1,173 Army Killed

SER No.	DATE	GENERAL AREA	SECURITY FORCE CAMPS/ESTABLISHMENTS	DETAILS OF KILLED / WOUNDED & MISSING
15	11/12/1996	Batticaloa	Terrorists attacked and over ran the Pulukunawa Special Task Force detachment	16 Army Killed, 08 Army Wounded, 03 Army Missing 28 Police Killed, 27 Police Wounded
16	09/01/1997	Paranthan	Paranthan and Elephant Pass complex	158 Army Killed, 392 Army Wounded, 65 Army Missing, 07 Civilian Killed, 17 Civilian Wounded
17	05/03/1997	Trincomalee	Chinabay Air Force camp	07 Air Force Wounded
18	06/03/1997	Batticaloa	Vavunathivu camp	73 Army Killed, 98 Army Wounded, 02 Army Missing
19	01/02/1998	Kilinochchi/ Paranthan	Kilinochchi/Paranthan FDL	89 Army Killed, 405 Army Wounded, 26 Army Missing
20	08/06/1998	Kilinochchi	Kilinochchi FDL	30 Army Killed, 256 Army Wounded, 33 Army Missing
21	27/09/1998	Kilinochchi	Kilinochchi FDL	857 Army Killed, 936 Army Wounded, 171 Army Missing
22	02/11/1999	Oddusudan	Oddusudan/Mankulam/Kanagarayankulam camp including Western sector	117 Army Killed, 1,459 Army Wounded, 94 Army Missing
23	11/12/1999	Vettilaikerni, Jaffna	Vettilaikerni and Thanankilappu FDLs	197 Army Killed, 1,921 Army Wounded, 28 Army Missing
24	14/12/1999	Kadjuwatta - Batticaloa	Kadjuwatta detachment with 81mm mortar fire	80 Army Killed, 450 Army Wounded
25	23/04/2000	Elephant Pass	SF camp at North of Elephant Pass	80 Army Killed, 450 Army Wounded
26	10/05/2000	Ariyalai/ Thanankilappu, Jaffna	FDL at Ariyalai/Thanankilappu	628 Army Killed, 5,129 Army Wounded, 301 Army MIA
27	11/08/2006	Jaffna	Muhamalai FDL	191 Army Killed, 901 Army Wounded, 06 Navy Killed, 32 Navy Wounded
28	26/03/2007	Katunayake - Gampaha	Katunayake SLAF Base	03 Air Force Killed, 17 Air Force Wounded

SER No.	DATE	GENERAL AREA	SECURITY FORCE CAMPS/ESTABLISHMENTS	DETAILS OF KILLED / WOUNDED & MISSING
29	27/03/2007	Chenkalady	Chenkalady Army Detachment and EPDP office	02 Army Killed, 04 EPDP Killed, 03 Army Wounded, 02 Police Wounded, 02 EPDP Wounded, 13 Civilian Wounded
30	16/10/2007	Thalgasmankada	Thalgasmankada Detachment	01 Army Killed, 04 Army Wounded
31	22/10/2007	Anuradhapura	Anuradhapura SLAF Base	01 Army Killed, 13 Air Force Killed 02 Army Wounded, 20 Air Force Wounded
32	29/05/2008	Chirutivu island	Chirutivu Island SLN Detachment	02 Army Killed, 02 Army Wounded, 02 Navy Missing, 05 Civilian Killed, 12 Civilian Wounded
33	09/09/2008	Vavuniya	Vavuniya SLAF Base, Radar Station and Security Force Head Quarters (Wanni) SLA Camp	13 Army Killed, 26 Army Wounded, 07 Air Force Wounded, 01 Police Killed, 12 Police Wounded

MAJOR ATTACKS LAUNCHED BY LTTE ON SRI LANKA NAVY

SER No.	DATE	SHIP/CRAFT	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING
1	3/3/1996	P 110- Inshore Patrol Craft	Nainathivu Pier	Destroyed due to explosion of LTTE Sea Mine	-	-	-
2	7/10/1990	SLNS Edithara - Surveillance Command Ship	Off Valvettithurai	Ship sustained minor damages due to LTTE suicide attack	1	2	-
3	5/4/1991	SLNS Abeetha - Surveillance Command Ship	Off Point Pedro	LTTE launched a suicide attack and the ship was badly damaged	9	4	-
4	02/09/1991	P 143- Inshore Patrol Craft	Off Nainathivu	Destroyed due to explosion of LTTE Sea Mine	6	-	-
5	03/02/1992	P 118- Inshore Patrol Craft	Jaffna Lagoon	Destroyed due to explosion of LTTE Sea Mine	2	-	1
6	30/08/1992	P 166- Inshore Patrol Craft	Mandathivu	Captured by LTTE	-	-	-
7	26/02/1993	P 119- Inshore Patrol Craft	Nagathewanthurai	Destroyed due to explosion of LTTE Sea Mine	-	-	-
8	26/08/1993	P 115- Inshore Patrol Craft	Nagathewanthurai	Destroyed due to LTTE attack during a confrontation	-	-	-
9	27/08/1993	P 121- Inshore Patrol Craft	Nagathewanthurai	Destroyed due to LTTE attack during a confrontation	-	-	-
10	29/08/1993	P 464-Fast Attack Craft	Off Point Pedro	Destroyed by LTTE suicide attack disguised as fisherman	-	-	7
11	11/11/1993	P 114- Inshore Patrol Craft	Nagathewanthurai	Captured by LTTE	-	-	-
12	12/11/1993	P 120- Inshore Patrol Craft	Nagathewanthurai	Captured by LTTE	-	-	-
13	13/11/1993	P 123- Inshore Patrol Craft	Nagathewanthurai	Captured by LTTE	-	-	-

SER No.	DATE	SHIP/CRAFT	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING
14	16/08/1994	A 516 - Surveillance Command tender	Kankesanthurai Harbour	LTTE launched an attack using suicide divers and the ship was sunk.	-	-	-
15	17/08/1994	Tug Dheera	Kankesanthurai Harbour	LTTE launched an attack using suicide divers and the ship was sunk.	-	-	-
16	19/09/1994	SLNS Sagarawardena - Offshore Petrol Vessel	South of Mannar	Ship was sunk due to LTTE attack	1	7	20
17	19/04/1995	SLNS Sooraya-Fast Gun Boat	Trincomalee Harbour	Sunk due to LTTE suicide diver attack	-	1	-
18	19/04/1995	SLNS Ranasuru-Fast Gun Boat	Trincomalee Harbour	Sunk due to LTTE suicide diver attack	6	10	-
19	16/07/1995	SLNS Edithara - Surveillance Command Ship	Kankesanthurai Harbour	Sunk due to LTTE suicide diver attack	3	5	-
20	29/08/1995	P 463-Fast Attack Craft	North of Mullaittivu	LTTE fired upon the craft using Long Range Weapon	4	-	4
21	29/08/1995	P 456-Fast Attack Craft	North of Mullaittivu	LTTE fired upon the craft using Long Range Weapon	1	-	8
22	02/10/1995	SLNS Ranagaja - Landing Craft Mechanized	Off Mullaittivu	The Ship was attacked by LTTE Sea Tigers	4	6	-
23	17/10/1995	A 512 - Auxiliary Ship	Trincomalee Harbour	Sunk due to LTTE suicide diver attack	7	5	-
24	30/03/1996	P 458-Fast Attack Craft	Off Vettilaikkeni	Sunk due to LTTE suicide attack during a confrontation	-	-	9
25	11/06/1996	P 244-Coastal Patrol Craft	Karainagar, Old Pier	Destroyed due to LTTE suicide diver attack	1	-	-
26	11/06/1996	P 234-Coastal Patrol Craft	Karainagar, Old Pier	Minor damages due to LTTE suicide diver attack	-	-	-

SER No.	DATE	SHIP/CRAFT	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING
27	12/06/1996	P 243-Coastal Patrol Craft	Karainagar, Old Pier	Minor damages due to LTTE suicide diver attack	-	-	-
28	13/06/1996	P 232-Coastal Patrol Craft	Karainagar, Old Pier	Destroyed due to LTTE suicide diver attack	-	-	-
29	31/07/1996	SLNS Ranaviru - Fast Gun Boat	South of Mullaittivu	Sunk due to LTTE suicide attack	8	-	22
30	20/10/1996	P 161-Inshore Patrol Craft	South of VTK	Damaged due to LTTE RPG attack	-	-	2
31	20/10/1996	P 164-Inshore Patrol Craft	Off Chundikulam	Destroyed due to LTTE RPG attack	-	1	-
32	25/10/1996	P 457-Fast Attack Craft	Off Trincomalee Harbour	Sunk due to LTTE suicide attack during a confrontation	-	-	12
33	19/10/1996	P 452-Fast Attack Craft	Off Kokkilai	Sunk due to LTTE suicide attack	4	1	3
34	22/02/1998	SLNS Pabbatha - Landing Craft Mechanized	Off Point Pedro	Sunk due to LTTE suicide attack	6	-	7
35	23/02/1998	Valampuri I - Ferry	Off Point Pedro	Sunk due to LTTE suicide attack	20	-	-
36	30/10/1998	P 498-Fast Attack Craft	Off Mullaittivu	Destroyed during LTTE cluster attack	1	2	16
37	07/04/2000	P 463-Fast Attack Craft	Off Nakarkovil	Destroyed due to LTTE fire from Long Range Weapon	-	4	8
38	07/04/2000	P 493-Fast Attack Craft	Off Nakarkovil	Destroyed due to LTTE fire from Long Range Weapon	3	1	6
39	12/04/2000	P 170-Inshore Patrol Craft	Modaragammaru	Destroyed due to LTTE suicide attack	1	2	-
40	05/06/2000	P 482-Fast Attack Craft	Off Vettilaikkeni	Destroyed during LTTE cluster attack	-	2	6
41	05/06/2000	P 496-Fast Attack Craft	Off Vettilaikkeni	Destroyed during confrontation	-	-	15

SER No.	DATE	SHIP/CRAFT	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING
42	30/09/2000	P 183-Inshore Patrol Craft	North of Kalpitiya	Destroyed due to LTTE RPG and Mortar fire	-	-	-
43	23/10/2000	A 542 - Fast Personnel Carrier	Trincomalee Harbour	LTTE launched a suicide attack and the ship was badly damaged	-	-	-
44	21/03/2001	P 495-Fast Attack Craft	Off Mullaitivu	Destroyed during LTTE cluster attack	-	13	5
45	16/09/2001	P 251-Coastal Patrol Craft	North East of Point Pedro	Destroyed due to LTTE attack during a confrontation	-	-	10
46	07/01/2006	P 476-Fast Attack Craft	East of Rocky Point	Destroyed due to a LTTE suicide attack.	-	2	13
47	25/03/2006	P 431-Fast Attack Craft	Off Kudiramalai	Destroyed due to LTTE suicide attack disguised as a fishing trawler	-	11	8
48	11/05/2006	P 418-Fast Attack Craft	Off Nagarkovil	Destroyed due to a suicide attack during a confrontation	8	-	9
49	28/06/2006	P 190-Inshore Patrol Craft	Off Baththalangunduwa Island	Damaged severely due to LTTE RPG attack	5	3	-
50	18/10/2006	P 167-Inshore Patrol Craft	Galle Harbour	Destroyed due to LTTE suicide attack	-	5	-
51	19/10/2006	P 126-Inshore Patrol Craft	Galle Harbour	Destroyed due to LTTE suicide attack	-	5	-
52	20/10/2006	P 223-Coastal Patrol Craft	Galle Harbour	Destroyed due to LTTE suicide attack	1	4	-
53	09/11/2006	P 416-Fast Attack Craft	Off Thondiaimanaru	Destroyed due to a suicide attack during a confrontation	10	7	-
54	19/11/2006	P 461-Fast Attack Craft	Off Thondiaimanaru	Destroyed during LTTE cluster attack	9	1	-
55	06/04/2007	P 132-Inshore Patrol Craft	Off Kalpitiya	Destroyed during LTTE cluster attack	-	-	5

SER No.	DATE	SHIP/CRAFT	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	KILLED	WOUNDED	MISSING
56	26/12/2007	P 413-Fast Attack Craft	Off Delft Island	Destroyed due to a suicide attack during a confrontation	3	6	9
57	14/02/2008	P 147-Inshore Patrol Craft	North of Mannar	Destroyed due to LTTE attack	-	-	6
58	22/03/2008	P 438-Fast Attack Craft	Off Nayaru	Suicide attack using semi submerged craft by LTTE	3	5	9
59	10/05/2008	A 520-Auxiliary Ship	Ashroff Jetty, Trincomalee Harbour	LTTE launched an attack using suicide divers and the ship was sunk	-	-	-
60	01/11/2008	Z 142-Inshore Patrol Craft	Off Point Pedro	Destroyed due to LTTE suicide attack	-	-	4
61	19/01/2009	P 434-Fast Attack Craft	Off Mullaittivu	Suicide attack using semi submerged craft by LTTE	-	1	19
62	30/04/2009	P 017-Inshore Patrol Craft	East of Nayaru	Destroyed due to LTTE attack	11	2	-
63	30/04/2009	Z 137-Arrow Craft	Off Mullaittivu	Destroyed due to LTTE attack	3	-	-
64	04/05/2009	P 020-Inshore Patrol Craft	Off Mullaittivu	Destroyed due to LTTE attack	4	7	-
TOTAL					145	125	243

MAJOR ATTACKS LAUNCHED BY LTTE ON SRI LANKA AIR FORCE

SER No.	DATE	AIR CRAFT DESTROYED	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	KILLED	MISSING
1	14/09/1985	B-212	Mutur	Passenger Flight	-	-
2	22/03/1986	B-212	Elephant Pass	Passenger Flight	-	-
3	13/09/1990	SF-260	Palaly	SLAF Base Palaly	1	-
4	16/06/1991	B-212	Vavuniya	Passenger Flight	1	-
5	02/05/1992	Y-8	Palaly	Cargo Flight	6	-
6	08/02/1994	B-212	Palaly	Passenger Flight	-	-
7	28/04/1995	AVRO	Palaly	Passenger Flight/LTTE Missile Attack	48	-
8	29/04/1995	AVRO	Palaly	Passenger Flight/LTTE Missile Attack	52	-
9	14/07/1995	IA-58	Palaly	Attack Mission	1	-
10	18/11/1995	Y-8	Palaly	Cargo Flight	5	-
11	22/11/1995	AN-32	Palaly	Passenger Flight/LTTE Missile Attack	63	-
12	22/01/1996	MI-17	Palaly	Passenger Flight/LTTE Missile Attack	39	-
13	12/07/1996	B-212	Welioya	Passenger Flight	-	-
14	16/01/1997	UAV	Pooneryan	Aerial Observatoin Mission	-	-
15	20/01/1997	Y-12	Palaly	Passenger Flight	4	-
16	03/05/1997	Y-12	China Bay	Camp Attack	7	-
17	19/03/1997	MI-24	Mullaitivu	Heli returning home after working in Palali	-	6
18	05/01/1997	UAV	Omanthai	Aerial Observation Mission	-	-
19	11/10/1997	MI -24	Kokilai	Escort Mission	2	-
20	25/11/1997	B-212	Palaiyavadi - Vavuniya	Passenger Flight	4	-
21	01/02/1998	MI-17	Olumadu	Casualty Evacuation Flight	-	-
22	26/06/1998	MI-24	Irattaperiyakulam	Attack Mission	4	-
23	12/06/1998	UAV	Omanthai	Aerial Observatoin Mission	-	-

SER No.	DATE	AIR CRAFT DESTROYED	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	KILLED	MISSING
24	29/03/1999	UAV	Pompemadu	Aerial Observatoin Mission	-	-
25	29/09/1998	AN-24	Iranativu	Civil Passenger Flight	50	-
26	17/12/1999	MI-24	Kilali	Attack Mission	4	-
27	17/02/2000	B-212	Muhamalai	Casevac Flight	3	-
28	24/05/2000	MI-24	Meesalai	Attack Mission	2	-
29	19/10/2000	MI-24	Nagar kovil	Attack Mission		-
30	23/10/2000	MI-24	Koddiyar Bay	Attack Mission	4	-
31	24/07/2001	MI-17	Katunayake	Attack on Katunayake Air Base and Bandaranaike International Airport	6	-
		MI-17				
		MIG-27				
		KFIR (C 722)				
		KFIR (C 723)				
		K-8				
		K-8				
		K-8				
		A-330				
A-340						
32	22/01/2003	UAV	Alaweddi	Aerial Observatoin Mission	-	-
33	19/09/2005	UAV	Mankulam	Aerial Observatoin Mission	-	-
34	26/03/2007	-	Katunayake	An LTTE Air attack on the SLAF Base, Katunayake, Two Light Fixed Wing Aircrafts of LTTE, flying over the SLAF Base, Katunayake dropped three bombs	3	-
35	20/04/2007	UAV	Kokilai	Aerial Observatoin Mission	-	-
36	24/04/2007	-	Palaly	An LTTE Light Aircraft dropped three bombs near the Myladdy Beach closer to the Coastal Defence Line	6	-

SER No.	DATE	AIR CRAFT DESTROYED	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	KILLED	MISSING
37	29/04/2007	-	Kolonnawa/ Muthurajawela	An LTTE Light Aircraft dropped 02 bombs targeting the Kolonnawa Oil Tanks and Storage Complex area. Almost simultaneously another LTTE Light Air Craft dropped 02 bombs targeting Muthurajawela Gas Storage Complex area.	-	-
38	22/10/2007	MI-24	Anuradhapura	Attack on SLAF Base Anuradhapura	2	-
		B-212				
		3 X PT-6				
		K-8				
		MI-24				
		MI-17				
		B206				
Beech Craft						
39	22/10/2007	-	Anuradhapura	Combined ground and air attack on the SLAF Base Anuradhapura by LTTE Black Tigers. 02 Bombs were dropped by 02 LTTE Light Aircraft which flew away.	13	-
40	27/04/2008	-	Kokkuthuduvai & Padaviya	An LTTE Air attack on Army positions. Two LTTE light aircraft dropped 03 bombs in to the Area HQ Welioya and HQ 224 Brigade Galkulama and escaped.	1	-
41	08/08/2008	UAV	Anuradhapura	Aerial Observatoin Mission	-	-
42	26/08/2008	-	Trincomalee	An LTTE Air attack on the SLN Dockyard, Trincomalee. Two LTTE light Aircraft dropped two improvised bombs on the Navy Camp Premises and escaped.	4	-
43	09/09/2008	-	Vavuniya	An LTTE Air craft dropped two bombs targeting 211 Brigade officers mess and Special forces Brigade area in a combined ground and air attack on the SF HQ (Wanni) complex, SLAF base and Radar Station	15	-

SER No.	DATE	AIR CRAFT DESTROYED	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	KILLED	MISSING
44	11/09/2008	UAV	Anuradhapura	Aerial Observation Mission	-	-
45	28/10/2008	-	Grandpass	An LTTE light Air craft dropped 02 bombs into the premises of the Kelanitissa Power station and escaped	-	-
46	28/10/2008	-	Thallady	An LTTE light Air craft dropped 03 bombs at the Area Headquarters, Mannar and escaped	-	-
47	20/02/2009	-	Colombo & Katunayake	02 LTTE Air Craft on a suicide mission targeting Inland Revenue building and SLAF base Katunayaka were destroyed	-	-

REPORTED PROCUREMENT OF WARLIKE EQUIPMENTS DURING PEACE PROCESS
2002 - 2006

ARTILLERY GUNS

152 mm Guns	09
130 mm Guns	06
130 mm Barrel assemble	04

ANTI AIR CRAFT GUNS

23 mm AA - ZU 23	15
23 mm AA - T 2 H	25
12.7 mm	50
14. 5 mm	03
25 mm	03

MORTAR

82 mm	25
120 mm	03
35 mm	05

ASSAULT RIFLES

AK or T 56	10,000
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MINES

Mines	398,160
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EXPLOSIVES

TNT	50 tons
C4	50 tons

MISSILLES

IGLA (SA - 16)	15
IGLA - Launcher	05

RADARS

Radar (X - band) Koden	04
Radar (Furuno)	02
Radar - Koden - 3441	10
Radar - (Furuno) MK 11	03
Radar - JRC	21
Raymine radar	15

BOAT ENGINES/BOATS

1250 HP Yamaha	01
1200 HP Yamaha	10
New cargo boat	02
Remote control boat	01
300 HP Yamaha	05
250 HP Yamaha	48
225 HP Yamaha	05
200 HP Yamaha	76

AIR CRAFT/FUEL

Slin 143	03 (Purchased - 10)
Fuel	5,985 Ltr

OTHERS

NCB MASK Filter	900
NCB Gloves	100
NCB Boat	100

INDEX OF TERMS

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AIPT	Advance Infantry Platoon Training
ATBC	Australian Tamil Broadcasting Cooperation
BAI	Battlefield Air Interdiction
BTA	British Tamil Association
BTC	British Tamil Conservatives
BTF	British Tamil Forum
CAS	Close Air Support
CFA	Cease Fire Agreement
CMR	Canadian Multicultural Radio
CTR	Canadian Tamil Radio
DMI	Directorate of Military Intelligence
DNI	Director Naval Intelligence
DUNF	Democratic United National Front
EOD	Electro Optical Devices
EOSS	Electro Optical Surveillance System
EPRLF	Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front
EROS	Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students
FAC	Fast Attack Craft
FDL	Forward Defence Line
FGB	Fast Gun Boat
GPS	Global Positioning System
GTV	Global Television
HR	Human Rights
IBC	International Broadcasting Company
ICRC	International Committee of Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IFT	International Federation of Tamils
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPC	Inshore Patrol Craft
IPKF	Indian Peace Keeping Force
ISA	International Student Association
JVP	Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna

HUMANITARIAN OPERATION—FACTUAL ANALYSIS

LCM	Landing Craft Mechanized
LTTE.....	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MP.....	Member of Parliament
NFZ.....	No Fire Zone
NTT	National Tamil Television
OBM.....	Outboard Motor
OPV	Offshore Petrol Vessel
PA	Peoples Alliance
PGM.....	Precision Guided Munition
PLOTE	People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam
RPG.....	Rocket Propelled Grenade
SA	Suicide Attack
SF	Security Forces
SIOT	Special Infantry Operation Training
SIS.....	State Intelligence Service
SLA	Sri Lanka Army
SLAF	Sri Lanka Air Force
SLMM	Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
SLN	Sri Lanka Navy
SOF	Special Operational Force
TCC	Tamil Coordinating Committee
TELA	Tamil Eelam Liberation Army
TELO	Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation
TLP	Tamil Liberation Party
TMVP	Tamil Makkalai Vedithalei Puligal
TNT	Tamil New Tigers
TRO.....	Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation
TRT	Tamil Radio and Television
TULF.....	Tamil United Liberation Front
TYO	Tamil Youth Organisation
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNF.....	United National Front
UNP	United National Party
UNICEF	United Nations International Children’s Education Fund
VOT	Voice of Tigers
WTM.....	World Tamil Movement

